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Abstract 
This thesis explores changes in attention that occur in response to predictive learning. 
Learned predictiveness is a bias in learning towards cues with prior predictive utility, 
or indeed a bias away from cues that have poor prior utility. In a typical learned 
predictiveness experiment, predictive validity is first manipulated such that cues are 
either predictive or non-predictive of a set of outcomes. In a subsequent and 
seemingly unrelated task involving novel outcomes, new learning is biased in favour 
of the previously predictive cues. This bias has been interpreted as a shift in attention 
towards items with predictive utility. However, the relative contribution of automatic 
and controlled selection mechanisms in producing the bias remain to be fully 
characterised. The studies reported here examine the expression of learned 
predictiveness using cognitive tasks that involve competition for stimulus processing. 
Chapter 2 measured the processing of predictive and non-predictive items in the 
attentional blink, a visual detection task that limits the availability of controlled 
attention. There was no evidence that the predictive history of targets was associated 
with variations in their detection. However, predictiveness did influence target 
detection indirectly by virtue of the predictive history of critical distractors, such that 
targets were easier to identify when they were immediately flanked by non-predictive 
stimuli. In contrast, novelty was a potent source of processing bias for both targets 
and distractors: Novel targets were easier to detect than familiar targets. In Chapter 3, 
controlled attention was manipulated by issuing instructions about the causal nature of 
cues, and differentiating between measures of associative memory and causal 
reasoning. Experiment 7 – Experiment 8 attempted to tease apart inferential and 
automatic contributions to the bias by presenting instructed causes that were 
predictive and non-predictive in initial training, as well as instructed non-causes that 
were predictive and non-predictive in initial training. The results showed that the 
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predictive history of cues influenced subsequent learning over and above the effect of 
explicit instruction, suggesting an automatic bias that persists in the presence of top-
down control. However, the results for cues instructed as non-causes suggest that the 
relationship between explicit instruction and predictiveness was interactive rather than 
additive. Chapter 4 extended this procedure to include the presence of novel stimuli. 
Learned predictiveness in the presence of novelty was first assessed in the absence of 
explicit instruction about which cues were causal. There was no evidence for the bias 
when predictive and non-predictive cues appeared alongside novel items at the start of 
the second task. When instructions about the causal structure of the task were 
reintroduced, novelty was once again a potent source of selection bias, such that 
learning favoured novel items instructed as causal. In Experiment 11, there was 
evidence that the predictive history of items was influencing associative memory for 
cues known to be non-causal of an outcome, though this pattern of results was slightly 
different to those observed in Chapter 3. This suggests that the presence of novelty 
changes the way in which the automatic effects of predictive history interact with top-
down control. The results are discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to the interaction 
between automatic and controlled selection mechanisms, as well as theories of 
learning and attention.  
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Chapter 1: Making sense of a complex world 
 
We live in a complex world, rich with information about where to look, what to think, 
and what actions to take at any given moment. Our ability to successfully navigate 
this environment depends on selecting and responding to the most relevant aspects of 
what lies before us. Indeed, our capacity to process information is severely limited 
(Allport, 1989; Broadbent, 1958; Carrasco, 2011), suggesting that the way in which 
we prioritise signals is a critical mechanism driving detailed perception and goal-
driven action. Given this limited capacity, it is broadly held that signals compete in 
order to achieve detailed analysis (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Knudsen, 2007; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Adding to the complexity of the problem, there are 
several sources of bias influencing the outcome of this competitive process, 
originating from the physical properties of the world (Itti & Koch, 2001; Wolfe & 
Horowitz, 2004), as well as a variety of internal states (Le Pelley, 2010). 
 The general ideas put forward in this opening paragraph are pervasive in 
Psychology, taken as fundamental aspects of broad areas of research such as attention 
(Beck & Kastner, 2009; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Pashler, 1998), learning (Le 
Pelley, 2010; McLaren et al., 2014), decision making (Evans, 2008), and perception 
(Carrasco, 2011). This thesis deals with the interaction between two potent influences 
on one’s behaviour, namely learning and attention. The importance of attention in 
facilitating the selection of behaviourally salient signals is well established (e.g., 
Pashler, 1998). However, the utility of those signals isn’t always an intrinsic feature 
of the environment. Learning is an important way in which we come to know the 
usefulness of information, by observing the relationship between cues and outcomes. I 
start this chapter by briefly outlining the key properties of attention according to 
current understanding within the cognitive literature. In doing so, I highlight the 
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distinction between top-down and bottom-up biases in selection, which form a critical 
component of many theoretical frameworks of attentional control. However, a recent 
line of research demonstrates that learning has a distinct influence on selection, 
suggesting that a greater understanding of the relationship between learning 
mechanisms and stimulus selection is required. Accordingly, this provides the basis 
for contrasting operational measures of attention across the cognitive and learning 
domains. This reveals an important theoretical consequence of the way in which 
attention is measured in the learning literature, namely that the construct is open to 
numerous interpretations. As a result, there is uncertainty as to the role of specific 
selection processes in learning. It is this uncertainty that provides the motivation for 
the current thesis.  
 
1.1. Learning to attend: Effects of predictiveness on perception and cognition 
 
While the importance of selective attention has been recognised since the 
emergence of experimental psychology (Helmholtz, 1867; James, 1890/1981), the 
construct has often eluded complete explanation. For example, a favoured tradition in 
discussions of attention is to cite these words from William James: 
 
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by 
the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem 
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought… It 
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively 
with others. (1890/1981, p. 381)  
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Indeed, while James eloquently captures some of the fundamental properties of 
attention, the intuitively appealing explanation requires further elaboration. More 
recently, attention has been associated with a wide-ranging number of more specific 
cognitive phenomena, leading to the less poetic insistence that, “no one knows what 
attention is” (Pashler, 1998, p. 1). Nonetheless, it is broadly held that the critical 
purpose of attention is stimulus selection in the face of our limited capacity for the 
detailed analysis of sensory information (Carrasco, 2011; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995).  
Stimulus selection is pivotal in characterising a broad variety of processes that 
influence the way in which we make use of information. Accordingly, a central 
theme in empirical work has been to map out various modes of selection. For 
example, selection has been investigated at the level of object-based processing (e.g., 
Duncan, 1984), feature-based processing (e.g., Wolfe, 1994), spatial processing (e.g., 
Posner, 1980), temporal processing (e.g., Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), and 
category-level processing (e.g., Peelen, Fei-Fei, & Kastner, 2009). These are 
traditionally explored within paradigms designed to engage each process 
independently. Spatial processing is revealed in cueing paradigms (Posner, 1980), 
whereas feature-based attention is studied making use of search paradigms (Wolfe, 
1994). However, given the central assumption that selection is necessary in order to 
accommodate our limited ability to process information, a common characteristic of 
these operational measures is that they test performance under conditions in which 
processing capacity is taxed, and therefore when selective attention is thought to be 
most crucial. 
The way in which selection is biased under such conditions has been 
conceptualised according to a number of functional distinctions. A critical 
theoretical division is the difference between top-down and bottom-up mechanisms 
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of selection (e.g., Carrasco, 2011; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Top-down, or 
endogenous attentional control, also known as goal-driven attention, reflects a bias 
in selection originating from the goals and intentions of an observer. This form of 
attentional control enables us to prioritise incoming signals on the basis of pre-
existing knowledge, goals, and expectations. Indeed, detecting and responding to 
information from a scene is facilitated by prior knowledge of important 
characteristics, such as spatial location (Dosher & Lu, 2000; Posner, Snyder, 
Davidson, 1980), features (Egeth, Virzi, & Garbart, 1984), or category (Peelen, Fei-
Fei, & Kastner, 2009). Alternatively, bottom-up, or exogenous, stimulus-driven 
selection, reflects the control of attention by the physical properties of a stimulus. 
Given the key role ascribed to the external cue in driving responding, this form of 
attentional control is often thought to operate in a more involuntary, automatic 
fashion. Accordingly, responding to certain classes of stimuli, such as the sudden 
onset of new objects (Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994), or cues that differ dramatically 
from their surrounds (Wolfe, 1992), appears to be automatic in the sense that 
performance is impeded or facilitated independently of the intentions of the observer.  
While this dichotomy provides a useful framework for operational measures 
of attention, it is unlikely that behaviour emerges exclusively from one form of 
selection. Rather, it is widely argued that behaviour reflects the dynamic interplay 
between top-down and bottom-up control (Carrasco, 2011; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Knudsen, 2007; Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). Indeed, it is this 
interplay that forms the basis for the influential framework of attentional control put 
forward by Desimone and Duncan (1995), namely the biased competition theory of 
selective attention. The fundamental principle of this theory is the idea that the 
processing of sensory information is a competitive process. This means that the 
detailed analysis of one piece of information comes at the expense of another. 
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Critically, this ongoing competition is controlled. In particular, it is the mechanisms 
of top-down and bottom-up control that in combination influence the resolution of 
the competitive process. Thus, the nature of the competition will rely on the kind of 
incoming perceptual information as well as the behavioural goals of the observer. 
Formulated in this manner, attention is an emergent property of the mechanisms 
required to resolve perceptual conflict and control motor output.  
There is now much evidence in support of the biased competition model of 
attention (see Beck & Kastner, 2009; Duncan, 2006, for reviews). However, the 
distinction between top-down and bottom-up mechanisms of stimulus selection is a 
pervasive one, incorporated within numerous theoretical frameworks that vary in 
specificity from general descriptions to more formulated computational models (e.g., 
Itti & Koch, 1998; Mozer, 1991; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 
1989). Recent findings suggest that this distinction may be insufficient to fully 
characterise the sources of selection bias that determine the resolution of perceptual 
competition. There is now a growing body of work that points to learning as a 
distinct source of attentional control.  
For example, various attentional paradigms have incorporated the delivery of 
monetary rewards on a trial-to-trial basis in order to demonstrate the modulation of 
selection by value. Kiss, Driver, and Eimer (2009) showed that the selection of 
targets associated with high reward is facilitated relative to low reward targets 
during visual search. This occurs when both high and low reward targets are 
physically salient, and therefore assumed to be equally prioritised via bottom-up 
processes (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991). Indeed, it is likely that value-driven and physical 
bottom-up processes operate independently. When visual salience and value 
information vary independently within a complex perceptual context, both variables 
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combine to influence performance in a way that maximises reward (Navalpakkam, 
Koch, Rangel, & Perona, 2010).  
Value-driven selection biases appear to influence cognitive control as well as 
perceptual decisions. Indeed, cognitive control has been formulated as an attentional 
mechanism biasing competition in favour of current task demands (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). Broadly speaking, demonstrations of cognitive control rely on one’s ability to 
flexibly switch to the relevant components of a task in the face of interfering 
information (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Stroop, 1935). Reward associations have 
been shown to influence the way in which this conflict is resolved. For example, 
Della Libera and Chelazi (2006) provided some initial evidence that the delivery of 
reward affects the balance of inhibitory control evident in negative priming. In the 
Stroop task, when the colour of the word and its meaning do not correspond, 
interference from word meaning is selectively reduced for highly rewarded colours 
(Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). Similar effects have been reported in flanker 
and task-switching tasks (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012), as well 
as the Simon task (Sturmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & Sommer, 2011), all classical 
indexes of cognitive control.  
The studies reviewed thus far all make use of procedures in which rewards are 
issued on an immediate trial-by-trial basis, suggesting that learning-driven changes 
in attention arise rapidly in order to guide performance in an on-line manner. 
However, it appears that these changes in processing are relatively stable. That is, 
learning in one context can influence selection in a subsequent task. In one 
demonstration by Raymond & O’Brien (2009), faces were associated with varying 
monetary rewards in an initial training phase. Those same faces were then used as 
stimuli in a version of the attentional blink task, a visual detection task with severe 
temporal constraints, in which competition for target selection is high. Importantly, 
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the goal of the task was visual detection independent of any reward. In line with the 
evidence reviewed thus far, high reward faces showed a benefit in detection 
compared to faces associated with low rewards. In a related finding, Della Libera 
and Chellazzi (2009) provided extensive training associating shapes with high 
versus low rewards. In a subsequent, unrewarded test phase, shapes associated with 
high rewards were more easily selected as targets, and harder to reject as distractors.  
Thus, there is consistent evidence to suggest that learning, in the form of value 
associations, can alter the selection priority of sensory signals. The findings outlined 
above share the characteristic that reward is directly associated with target 
information. This raises the possibility that learning influences selection indirectly 
by altering the motivational components of a task. According to this possibility, 
learning influences stimulus selection by changing the salience of goals and can 
therefore be interpreted as enhancing voluntary, top-down attentional control. 
Indeed, incentive driven motivation has been explicitly conceptualised as a means of 
increasing executive control processes in order to facilitate performance (Pessoa & 
Engelmann, 2010). For example, some theories of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick, 
2007) suggest that the conflict generated by the presence of interfering information 
on a given trial acts as a learning signal motivating observers to adapt their 
behaviour in subsequent trials. If the presence of explicit learning in the form of 
reward-associations simply adds to the strength of that signal, the findings above can 
be thought to reflect changes in motivation as opposed to a more distinct role of 
learning in affecting attentional control.  
However, this explanation does not account for situations in which value-
driven selection runs counter to the physical salience of a scene as well as the goals 
of the observer. In a visual search procedure initially developed by Anderson, 
Laurent, and Yantis (2011a), participants were trained on an initial task in which the 
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display consisted of equally salient coloured circles, one of which was a target. One 
target colour was associated with high reward, and another target colour was 
associated with low reward. This was followed by an unrewarded test phase. Now, 
the target was a diamond amongst circle distractors. On some trials, one of the 
distractor circles was either a high or low value circle from prior training. What is 
important to note is that the salience of colours was equated across shapes, and the 
target consisted of a shape singleton. Given that shape singletons capture attention, 
both top-down and bottom-up factors favour the selection of the target. However, a 
detriment in target selection was observed on trials in which value associated 
distractors were present. Thus, rewarded stimuli involuntarily captured attention 
over and above the influences of stimulus-driven and voluntary attentional control. 
Subsequent work has replicated this basic effect under a number of conditions 
(Anderson et al., 2011b; 2012; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a; 2010b; 2011; 
Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015).  
Taken together these findings are consistent with a unique role for learning in 
influencing selection processes. Interestingly, within the cognitive literature 
reviewed thus far, stimulus-reward associations have been the primary focus for 
examining changes in selection that arise with learning. This has implications for 
understanding the way in which learning influences selection processes. For 
example, if it is taken that learning modulates the specific selection processes 
responsible for an outcome (Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011), then the 
attentional change associated with reward might be quite different to that associated 
with other forms of learning, such as reasoning about the causal relationships 
between events.  
Within the learning literature, the study of predictiveness, that is, the extent to 
which a stimulus reliably signals an outcome, has been central to demonstrations 
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implicating attentional processes (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). Such 
demonstrations have been critical for attentional theories of associative learning 
(e.g., Kruschke, 2001; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). Given that there is no unitary 
understanding of attention, a valuable extension of current work would include 
characterising the relationship between additional learning mechanisms and specific 
stimulus selection processes. In the next section I review in more detail how 
attention has been viewed within the learning literature.  
 
 1.2. Attending to learn: Effects of predictiveness on associability  
  
As with attention, learning is a strong form of processing bias. Indeed, some of the 
concepts outlined in the previous section share some resemblance to many of the 
ideas embodied in the learning literature. For example, the notion of stimulus 
competition, or cue competition, in the face of limited processing resources lies at the 
heart of many models of associative learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 
1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1978). Perhaps most influentially, Rescorla 
and Wagner (1972) formalised the acquisition of associations between events based 
on algorithms predicting that cues compete in order to gain control of behaviour, 
given the assumption that the magnitude of learning is finite. While the model allows 
for the physical salience of cues to influence this competition, the primary means by 
which associations are modified is the predictive validity of cues, that is, the extent to 
which a cue reliably predicts the presence of an outcome. Thus, predictive cues gain a 
stronger association with events compared to less predictive information. It should be 
noted that while cue competition implies that selection is incorporated into the model, 
at its core it is not strictly attentional in nature. On any given trial, the formation of 
 18 
associations is not selective, as learning is limited for all available cues on the basis of 
their combined predictive validity. Rather, the processing inherent in the Rescorla-
Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) is conceptualised as an automatic 
association between two events that is non-attentional in nature. 
Subsequent work has taken these mechanisms as a foundation for including 
attention in learning more explicitly. Many models of associative learning (e.g., 
Kruschke, 2001; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) now accept that the 
stimulus selection necessary for the acquisition of associative relationships is 
influenced by some form of selective attention. Such models share the same basic 
assumption that the attention devoted to a stimulus is flexible and governed by its past 
utility in predicting events. More specifically, attention is formalised within model 
predictions as an associability parameter, which is determined by previous learning 
about a stimulus and in turn influences the rate of future learning about that stimulus. 
As such these models view attention and learning as having an interdependent 
relationship. Associability, or α, describes the property of a stimulus that determines 
the rate at which it will enter into associations. Associability changes according to the 
associative strength between a cue and the outcome with which it is paired. Thus, the 
rate of learning provides an index of attentional change, whereby cue competition is 
biased in favour of cues with high associability. While many such models remain 
largely agnostic as to the mechanisms by which associations and therefore 
associability emerge, it has been widely argued that the formation of associations is 
automatic (McLaren et al., 1994; McLaren et al., 2014). Thus, to the extent that one 
assumes that the mechanisms of association are automatic, in that they operate 
independently of the intentions of the participant, the implicit assumption here is that 
attentional change is relatively automatic. 
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An important example of one such model is that proposed by Mackintosh (1975). 
According to this model, the associability of a cue increases if that cue is a more 
effective predictor of an outcome relative to other cues available at the same time. If 
the associative strength between the cue and the outcome is high, that is, if a cue is a 
reliable predictor of the correct outcome, then associability will increase. If a cue is a 
poor predictor of the outcome, because its associative strength is relatively low, 
associability will decrease. Thus, attention to a stimulus is maintained and 
preferentially supports further learning provided it remains a good predictor relative 
to other cues present at the same time. Certainly, alternative models have been 
proposed in which the relationship between associability and associative strength 
differs (e.g., Pearce & Hall, 1980; Le Pelley, 2004), however, such models share the 
same premise that attention changes according to the mechanisms of associative 
competition.  
Importantly, it is rarely argued that such models provide a comprehensive account 
of the mechanisms involved in learning. Rather, they are taken to characterise the 
more automatic components of attentional change within a dual-system approach. 
According to this view (e.g., Mackintosh, 2003; McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 
1994; McLaren et al., 2014; Evans, 2008), learning is the result of both automatic 
associative processes and higher-order propositional processes operating together, 
though sometimes in competition (see Le Pelley, Oakshott, & McLaren, 2005). While 
this position is amenable to characterising the effect of various sources of attentional 
bias alongside the emergence of learning, much work has traditionally focused on 
interpretations relating to associability. That is, changes in attention are thought to 
occur automatically, independent of the intentions of the observer. 
However, some theorists have made the claim that learning relies exclusively on 
propositional processes (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, de Houwer, & 
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Lovibond, 2009). According to this view, all learning relies on reasoning about the 
relationship between events in an attentionally demanding process, the outcome of 
which is declarative knowledge about that relationship. While this controlled learning 
is thought to be an effortful process, the role of attention has been less explicitly 
outlined in such single-process accounts of learning.  
The issues raised by this comparison can be emphasised by examining the way in 
which attention has been implicated in learning tasks. Traditionally this rests on 
demonstrations of transfer. In particular, the predictive value of cues is manipulated in 
one context, and the effect of this manipulation on learning about those same cues in a 
subsequent context is observed. If prior predictiveness influences new learning, it is 
taken that learning has altered the selection priority of cues, thus affecting the ease 
with which they can enter into further associations. A robust example of this 
methodological approach, and one critical to this thesis, is the learned predictiveness 
effect first reported by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003; see also Lochmann & Wills, 
2003). The basic experimental design used to demonstrate this effect is shown in 
Table 1.  
In the original demonstration, participants completed a causal learning task in 
which they were asked to play the role of a doctor in order to learn which of a variety 
of foods led to allergic reactions in a fictitious patient. Each trial in the first phase 
consisted of a compound of two food cues, leading to one of two allergic reactions. 
The critical manipulation was that each compound consisted of one perfectly 
predictive cue, represented by A – D, and one non-predictive cue, W – Z. For 
example, cue A consistently predicted the presence of Outcome 1 (O1), and therefore 
 21 
had perfect predictive utility. In contrast, W had no predictive utility because it was 
equally predictive of both O1 and O2.1 
 
Table 1  
A basic learned predictiveness design (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). 
 
Phase I Phase II Test 
AW – O1 AY – O3 AC 
AX – O1 BZ – O4 WY 
BW – O2 CW – O3 BD 
BX – O2 DX – O4 XZ 
CY – O2   
CZ – O2   
DY – O1   
DZ – O1   
 
Note.  Letters (A – D and W – Z) refer to 
individual food cues. O1 – O4 refer to 
four outcomes. 
 
 In Phase II, a novel patient was introduced and again participants were 
required to learn the causal relationship between food cues and their respective 
allergic reactions. The same cues, in novel combinations, served to predict the 
occurrence of these novel reactions. In this phase, both components of the compound 
discrimination were equally predictive. That is, both A and W shared the same 
                                                
1 It could be argued that describing W as non-predictive is not entirely accurate, given that it predicts 
the presence of an outcome (either O1 or O2) on every trial. However, in line with prior literature on 
learned predictiveness, “non-predictive” here indicates that a given cue is equally paired with both 
available outcomes during Phase I and therefore provides no benefit in making correct predictions 
during this phase. That is, participants would be expected to demonstrate chance performance during 
training if using the cue W to make predictions. 
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objective relationship with O3 and O4 respectively. The critical difference between 
components was their status as a predictive or non-predictive cue in the initial phase 
of learning. The test phase assessed learning by means of novel compounds. Half of 
these compounds consisted of previously predictive components that signalled the 
same outcome during Phase II (AC and BD), and the remainder consisted of 
previously non-predictive components signalling the same outcome during Phase II 
(WY and XZ). Test ratings, as shown in Figure 1, revealed that previously predictive 
compounds were more easily paired with their correct outcomes, suggesting better 
learning for these cues.  
 
Figure 1.   Learning scores reflect a linear transformation 
of the data reported by Le Pelley & McLaren (2003) in order to 
remain consistent with the measures used in this thesis. Scores 
range from 0 to 100, with a score of 50 indicative of chance, as 
represented by the dotted line. These are shown for test 
compounds consisting of predictive components and test 
compounds consisting of non-predictive components. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean difference between 
predictive and non-predictive cues.  
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This effect, repeatedly found across various scenarios (see Le Pelley, 2010, for a 
recent review), is consistent with some models that predict attentional change 
according to the mechanisms of associative competition (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Le 
Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). According to such models, attention will 
be biased towards predictive cues A – D and away from non-predictive cues W – Z 
throughout Phase 1. This means that cues A – D will have an advantage when 
entering into new associations during the second phase, resulting in the observed 
preference in learning for these cues. Importantly, the hypothesised process does not 
rely on a deliberate attempt by the individual to control attention in a biased fashion 
according to the nature of the Phase I relationships. Instead, given the proposed 
relationship between associative history and associability, this explanation relies on 
the assumption that the attentional processes underlying the emergence of this bias are 
automatic to the extent that they follow as a consequence of associative learning, and 
to the extent that associative learning is thought to reflect an automatic process.  
However, this assumption can be questioned. In demonstrations of learned 
predictiveness, there is often a high degree of conceptual similarity between the 
scenarios across the two phases of learning. One possibility, therefore, is that the 
effect is governed by a simple heuristic arising from inferential reasoning. It may be 
that participants make the explicit assumption that the predictive utility of cues A – D 
will transfer across similar contexts resulting in the controlled, volitional selection of 
those cues throughout the second phase of learning (Mitchell, Griffiths, Seetoo, & 
Lovibond, 2012). Such an explanation accords well with claims that associative 
learning relies exclusively on propositional knowledge (e.g., Mitchell, de Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009), and that the attentional mechanisms responsible for the effect are 
controlled selection processes (Mitchell et al., 2012).  
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Consistent with this possibility is evidence suggesting that learned 
predictiveness is susceptible to manipulation of inferred beliefs. In their Experiment 2, 
Mitchell et al. (2012) directly manipulated inferential beliefs across the two phases of 
a learned predictiveness design by way of instruction. At the onset of the second 
phase, participants in their continuity condition were explicitly instructed that the 
same cues would be relevant. In contrast, those in the change condition were 
instructed the opposite, that previously predictive cues were now irrelevant. Critically, 
this condition revealed a complete reversal of the effect whereby more was learned 
about the relationship between previously irrelevant cues and the novel outcomes. 
That learned predictiveness is sensitive to variations in explicit reasoning suggests a 
role for controlled, volitional processes in explaining the effect.  
There is, however, evidence to suggest that the presence of the inference alone 
is not sufficient to produce the learned predictiveness effect. For example, Le Pelley 
et al. (2010a) investigated the expression of learned predictiveness adopting a 
procedure in which the use of higher order reasoning was encouraged. In this 
demonstration, the critical relationships were explained to participants in written 
statements highlighting the summary of cue-outcome pairings as well as the 
frequency with which they occurred. Such a manipulation should indeed strengthen 
the ability of participants to engage in deductive reasoning, given the minimal 
demands on working memory. Interestingly, they failed to observe learned 
predictiveness under these conditions. The bias was only observed when the relevant 
information was presented in trial and error form across multiple trials. This is 
contrary to what would be expected if explicit causal attribution were the sole 
mechanism responsible for the effect.  
Similarly, related attentional effects in predictive learning appear to be 
inconsistent with an explanation based solely on inferential processes. For example, in 
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a two-stage causal learning paradigm similar to that of learned predictiveness, Le 
Pelley, Mitchell, and Johnson (2013) observed an attentional bias towards cues 
previously experienced as predictors of a high value outcome. However, instructions 
issued following training appeared to bias attention towards cues previously 
experienced as predictors of low value outcomes. Thus, opposing influences of 
training and instruction on learned attentional responses have been found. Taken 
together these findings raise the possibility that learned predictiveness reflects the 
operation of a combination of inferential and non-inferential processes.  
This highlights a problem associated with the different ways in which 
attention is measured across the cognitive and learning domains. Learning tasks rely 
on the rate of learning as a measure of attention. It appears that this leaves open 
multiple interpretations as to the specific nature of the attentional change observed in 
effects such as learned predictiveness. Quinlan (2010) has further suggested that this 
poses a more fundamental issue. Given that operational observations of attentional 
selection within the cognitive literature rely on paradigms designed to stress 
processing capacity, selection is engaged in different ways across learning and 
attentional paradigms. This raises the possibility that although selective attention may 
be operating in demonstrations of learning, it might not be the primary determinant of 
performance. More direct evidence as to the selection mechanisms operating during 
learning may help to clarify the theoretical similarities between the two lines of 
research. 
As such, recent work has moved towards examining the relationship between 
predictiveness and attention by employing direct measures of attention, as established 
within the cognitive literature. The advantage of such measures is that they can assess 
changes in stimulus processing over and above the rate of learning. For example, 
measures of eye gaze have been used to look at the relationship between the rate of 
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learning in a learned predictiveness procedure and the overt orienting response. Le 
Pelley, Beesley, and Griffiths (2011) showed that a bias towards learning about 
predictive cues in Phase II corresponded to an increase in eye gaze to predictive cues. 
While it is generally argued that eye gaze corresponds quite closely to attention 
(Deubel & Schneider, 1996), it can be unclear as to what kind of attentional process 
one might be referring to. For example, Mitchell et al. (2012) measured eye gaze 
when they employed an instructional manipulation on learned predictiveness. They 
found that gaze was biased towards cues instructed as important, even when this 
instruction conflicted with predictiveness established through prior training. 
Accordingly, they argued that changes in gaze reflect the product of controlled 
attentional changes, which rely on the beliefs of the observer. Indeed, it is difficult to 
interpret changes in eye gaze during such tasks. Given that in such designs the bias in 
gaze is also towards a cue indicating a correct prediction, the bias could be thought to 
reflect decision or response processes.  
Subsequent studies have used alternative paradigms, thought to be adaptable to 
the measurement of nonstrategic processes. For example, the spatial cuing paradigm 
(Posner, 1980) has been foundational in demonstrating the distinction between 
voluntary and automatic spatial selection (e.g., Jonides, 1981). Le Pelley, Vadillo, and 
Luque (2013) used a version of spatial cuing coupled with a learned predictiveness 
categorisation task. They showed that the predictiveness of irrelevant distractors 
influenced spatial attention. Predictive distractors captured attention, facilitating 
subsequent target detection in that location relative to non-predictive distractors. This 
effect was only found when the temporal distance between the distractor and the 
target was short, indicating that the effect relied on rapid, nonstrategic selection. 
Similar effects have been found in methods using temporal selection (e.g., Livesey, 
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Harris, & Harris, 2009; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), as well as spatial motor selection 
(Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010).  
 
1. 3. This thesis   
 
 In summary, the interaction between learning and attention has been of 
interest in both cognitive and learning areas of research. However, operational 
measures of attention differ between the two domains, which has led to uncertainty 
concerning the selection processes that vary with learning. In the cognitive domain, 
attention is measured under situations in which processing resources are taxed, and 
therefore when selection is crucial. Alternatively, changes in associability, or the rate 
of learning, provide an indirect measure of attentional change in demonstrations of 
learning. This focus on associability carries with it assumptions about the automatic 
nature of attentional change during learning. As a result, the role of top-down 
attentional control has received less discussion. Given that controlled, voluntary 
processes are thought to play a role in learning either exclusively, or in combination 
with automatic association, a useful addition to current knowledge would be an 
extension of the attentional manipulations employed in learning tasks.  
The learned predictiveness paradigm presents a task that is adaptable to 
various manipulations of attentional selection. Indeed, the study of this effect has 
been critical in discussions of attention as it highlights a bias in learning that appears 
to reflect the operation of inferential and non-inferential processes. As such, recent 
work incorporating direct measures of attention into learned predictiveness 
procedures provides a promising means of characterising the selection mechanisms 
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responsible for the effect, and by extension the attentional processes involved in 
predictive learning more generally.   
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the stimulus selection processes 
that vary with predictive learning. To this end, the original contribution of the work 
presented here assesses the learned predictiveness effect using novel cognitive tasks 
that involve competition for stimulus processing. Such manipulations should provide 
insight into the relative contribution of controlled and automatic selection processes in 
producing the bias.  
Chapter 2 presents a series of experiments that combine the first phase of 
learned predictiveness training with a measure of visual detection, the attentional 
blink task. The attentional blink provides an index of how visual information is 
prioritised under conditions where processing resources are taxed due to high 
temporal processing demands. If predictiveness influences the selection priority of 
cues, changes in selection should be evident immediately following Phase I. First, I 
establish the presence of learned predictiveness in an extended learning design. I then 
examine the detection of predictive and non-predictive targets in a skeletal attentional 
blink task, a version of the paradigm in which only targets and their masks are 
presented by varying temporal separation (Experiment 2). In subsequent experiments, 
additional distractors are included in the design in order to increasingly engage 
competitive processing. Experiment 3 employs the fully familiarised predictive and 
non-predictive stimuli, while Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 introduce novel stimuli 
as well in order to provide a means of assessing the effect of predictiveness on 
selection over and above the influence of familiarity. 
In Chapter 3, top-down attention is manipulated by the use of instructions about 
the causal components of the task. Mitchell et al. (2012) first made use of an 
instructional manipulation during learned predictiveness to suggest that the bias 
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emerges as a result of inferential, controlled attentional processes. However, the 
initial design was not well equipped to test the potential involvement of automatic 
selection. As such, this approach was extended in order to provide a more sensitive 
measure of both automatic and controlled selection by using orthogonal 
manipulations of predictive history and instruction at the start of the second stage of 
learning, as well as measuring associative memory and causal reasoning separately at 
test.   
Given the use, and importance, of novel items in Chapter 2, a beneficial 
comparison would be the introduction of novelty within the manipulation of volitional 
attention employed in Chapter 3. This is the aim of Chapter 4, which first examines 
the emergence of learned predictiveness in the absence of instruction when predictive 
and non-predictive cues appear alongside novel items at the start of the second stage 
of learning (Experiment 9). Experiment 10 and Experiment 11 then test how 
instructions influence the effect of novelty on predictiveness.  
The General Discussion of this thesis is presented in Chapter 5, which provides a 
summary of the results as they relate to automatic and controlled processing. These 
findings are discussed in relation to theories of learning and attention.  
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Chapter 2: Learned predictiveness and the attentional blink 
 
If learned predictiveness reflects the kind of automatic attentional change 
predicted by attentional models of associative learning, then differences in processing 
should be evident immediately following the first phase of learning in a task that 
directly manipulates the cognitive control of selective attention. Accordingly, this 
chapter investigates the relationship between learned predictiveness and visual 
identification under conditions where the availability of cognitive resources is 
constrained. Rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP, Potter & Levy, 1969) is a widely 
used visual attention paradigm allowing investigation into the temporal limits of 
stimulus identification and encoding. During RSVP, stimuli are presented 
consecutively at the same spatial location at rates typically a fraction of a second (e.g., 
100 ms per item). A rather striking property of stimulus identification under these 
conditions is the relatively preserved ability to extract complex visual information 
from a single item (Lawrence, 1971; Potter, 1975; Potter & Levy, 1969). However, 
whether this performance holds for multiple items depends on the temporal distance 
between them. The attentional blink (AB) refers to a transient deficit in the ability to 
report the second of two targets (T2) when it is presented within 200 ms – 500 ms of 
an initial target (T1) during RSVP (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; see also 
Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987). In traditional demonstrations of the AB, the task is to 
detect two targets embedded amongst a stream of distractors. The serial position of T2 
following T1 is manipulated in a variable known as lag. For example, if T2 appears at 
lag 1, this means that it appears immediately following T1 in the RSVP stream with 
no intervening distractors. The main dependent variable of interest is the ability to 
report T2 as a function of lag. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic of the trial structure in an 
AB task, along with the commonly observed pattern of results. As is shown in the 
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figure, despite preserved T1 accuracy across lags, there is a relatively long lasting 
deficit in the ability to report T2 at shorter lags. This deficit is not observed at longer 
lags, when T2 accuracy recovers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.     Shown above is an example of trial structure in the attentional 
blink. Items are presented centrally, offset by approximately 100 ms in time. 
Participants search for two targets, here defined by colour. A typical pattern of 
results is shown below. When the temporal distance between targets is short, T2 
detection is poor despite preserved T1 performance. As lag increases, T2 
detection recovers.  
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 It is now well established that the AB is a robust effect observed across a 
range of stimuli, including alphanumeric characters (Chun & Potter, 1995; Raymond, 
Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), words (Barnard et al., 2004; Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996), 
objects (Harris, Benito, & Dux, 2010; Livesey & Harris, 2011), and faces (de Jong, 
Koster, van Wees, & Martens, 2009; Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005), suggesting that 
the phenomenon reflects a fairly central characteristic of limited perceptual awareness 
(Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010). There is now strong evidence 
consistent with the proposal that this limitation occurs at a postperceptual stage of 
stimulus processing. For example, items presented within the duration of the T2 
deficit, including targets that have failed detection (Shapiro, Driver, Ward, & 
Sorenson, 1997), as well as distractors (Harris, Benito, & Dux, 2010; Harris & Little, 
2010; Maki, Frigen, & Paulson, 1997), can prime subsequent items within the stream. 
Similarly, electrophysiological evidence has shown that ERP components associated 
with perceptual as well as semantic processing are present during the AB deficit, 
whereas components tied to working memory consolidation are suppressed during 
that period (Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005; Vogel, 
Luck, Shapiro, 1997). This means that stimuli failing to reach the level of 
identification nonetheless undergo substantial processing, to the point of at least 
partial semantic recognition.  
Thus, it appears that the deficit in T2 report arises from the more coordinated 
processing requirements of consolidation in working memory and explicit target 
report (Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006). While several theoretical models 
have been put forward to account for the presence of the AB, a common component 
of many explanations is the distinction between two stages of processing (e.g., Chun 
& Potter, 1995; Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998; Ward, 
Duncan, & Shapiro, 1996). During an initial, high-capacity stage, fleeting perceptual 
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and conceptual information is registered for multiple items in the stream. Given this 
relatively shallow form of initial registration, the information for each item in this 
stage is relatively short-lived, with subsequent items causing rapid decay. In order to 
reach the level of full report, an item needs to be taken up by the subsequent, limited 
capacity stage of effortful processing. This stage is initiated once the first target, T1 is 
detected. Due to the close temporal proximity of the stimuli, T1 and potentially a 
subset of surrounding items are included in this window of effortful processing. 
According to many models (e.g., Potter et al., 2005; Potter et al, 2002; Shapiro, Arnell, 
& Raymond, 1994), this leads to competition between items in order to gain the 
limited resources needed for consolidation and response selection. T1, by virtue of its 
temporal position generally wins, leaving subsequent stimuli vulnerable to 
interference. The AB is thus predicted to occur as a result of the delayed attentional 
response to T2, causing a subsequent loss of competition for resources. 
Importantly, the deficit observed in the AB is sensitive to target and distractor 
manipulations designed to alter the selection priority of stimuli. For example, targets 
with a degree of learnt salience, such as one’s own name (Shapiro, Caldwell, & 
Sorenson, 1997), a famous face (Jackson & Raymond, 2006), or an emotionally 
salient word (Anderson, 2005; Anderson & Phelps, 2001) show a reduced impairment 
relative to more neutral stimuli. Similarly, when a stimulus that has been previously 
paired with an unpleasant outcome is used as a distractor in an RSVP task, it can 
automatically generate an impairment for subsequent targets, similar to that observed 
in the AB (Smith, Most, Newsome, & Zald, 2006). Thus, there is some evidence to 
suggest that stimuli with either familiarised or conditioned importance gain a 
competitive advantage under conditions of constrained attention.  
Further studies have examined the effect of learning within the AB paradigm 
more explicitly. Raymond & O’Brien (2009) examined the transfer of learnt value 
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associations to visual detection in the AB. In an initial learning task, different faces 
predicted outcomes with either a high or low probability. These outcomes were both 
gains and losses. Thus, there were high probability and low probability gains, as well 
as high and low probability losses. Recognition of those faces as T2 was then 
measured at one short lag and one long lag in a subsequent AB task. For faces 
associated with positive gains, the probability with which those faces predicted gains 
modulated visual detection. Thus, for faces associated with wins, recognition was 
better for high probability win faces compared to low probability win faces at both 
lags. In a single target detection task, similar effects were reported by O’Brien and 
Raymond (2012), in which there was a clear benefit in recognition for faces more 
likely to predict a specific outcome, regardless of whether that outcome was a win or 
a loss. While it is worth noting that recognition effects may be interpreted according 
to a number of processes, what these studies clearly demonstrate is an effect of prior 
learning on subsequent visual detection in a largely unrelated task. 
Livesey, Harris, and Harris (2009) further investigated the influence of target 
predictiveness during RSVP. They employed a procedure in which two targets 
requiring subsequent report were embedded within a stream of distractors, as in 
traditional AB tasks. Shortly following the presentation of the second target a cue 
would appear to the left or right of the stream requiring a speeded response. 
Throughout the experiment, some targets consistently predicted the direction of a 
subsequent response, while others were irrelevant to the cueing task as they predicted 
either response equally. Eventually, when targets that were predictive of a particular 
response were presented within the duration of the blink, they were protected from the 
processing constraint. That is, identification was facilitated for cues that were 
predictive of a particular response. This occurred independently of any need to use 
those cues strategically, given that two targets required detection in every trial and 
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were thus important regardless of their signal validity in the seemingly unrelated 
cueing task. This suggests a fairly automatic change in visual selection for predictive 
cues.  
In summary, the AB is a task in which the availability of processing resources 
can be manipulated without varying the perceptual or response properties of the task. 
One factor that contributes to the deficit appears to be visual competition, whereby 
items compete in order to gain the limited capacity resources necessary for explicit 
identification. Importantly, this competition is influenced by learning in a manner that 
does not appear to rely on the intentions of the observer. That is, there is evidence to 
suggest that the AB is sensitive to fairly automatic changes in stimulus selection, even 
when learning has occurred in a prior task. If changes in predictiveness within the 
learned predictiveness paradigm correspond to variations in attentional selection, then 
the AB should provide an appropriate way in which such changes can be measured. In 
particular, the task should be sensitive to the more automatic components of 
attentional change, providing a means of assessing the presence of an automatic 
process in learned predictiveness. Accordingly, based on the evidence that the AB is 
sensitive to both learning and an automatic change in stimulus processing, the 
following studies examine transfer between the first stage of learned predictiveness, 
in which cues are rendered either predictive or non-predictive, and visual detection in 
the attentional blink. I start by establishing the presence of the learned predictiveness 
bias in a novel extended design. 
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2.1. Experiment 1  
 
 In this experiment, participants were asked to complete a learned 
predictiveness task that was modelled on the commonly used allergist task. The 
stimuli that were used in this chapter consist of line drawings of everyday objects, 
taken from the set of Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). These objects provide an 
ideal stimulus set as they have been used in both demonstrations of learned 
predictiveness (e.g., Livesey, Thorwart, De Fina, & Harris, 2011) as well as the 
attentional blink (e.g., Livesey & Harris, 2011). Given the nature of the cues, a 
scenario was presented in which participants were asked to observe the reactions of an 
alien who had come to earth and was suffering allergies after eating everyday objects. 
As per previous procedures, some of these objects were perfectly predictive of certain 
allergies, while others were non-predictive, having been paired with either outcome 
equally. Following this, a new alien was introduced who had also come to earth and 
was eating everyday objects. This alien, despite eating the same objects, suffered 
novel allergic reactions. Again, as in traditional demonstrations, each trial consisted 
of an object that was predictive in the first phase, and one object that was non-
predictive in the first phase. Both objects were now perfectly predictive of a specific 
outcome, and the bias towards previously predictive versus previously non-predictive 
objects was assessed at test. Thus, the scenario and basic structure of the task mimic 
traditional demonstrations quite closely.  
What diverges from past procedures is the extent of the design. The number of 
compounds appearing in Phase I was increased. While each compound still consisted 
of two components, each predictive component was paired with an increased number 
of non-predictive components across trials. Thus, instead of predictive cue A 
 37 
appearing alongside non-predictive cues W and X on separate trials, a predictive cue 
A would now appear alongside non-predictive components W, X, Y, and Z on 
separate trials. This extended design is shown in Table 2.1.   
 
 
Table 2.1  
Design of Experiment 1  
 
                   Phase I Phase II Test 
AW – O1 ES – O1 AS – O3 AG 
AX – O1 ET – O1 BT – O4 CE 
AY – O1 EU – O1 CU – O3 BH 
AZ – O1 EV – O1 DV – O4 DF 
BW – O2 FS – O2 EW – O3 SY 
BX – O2 FT – O2 FX – O4 UW 
BY – O2 FU – O2 GY – O3 TZ 
BZ – O2 FV – O2 HZ – O4 VX 
CW – O2 GS – O2   
CX – O2 GT – O2   
CY – O2 GU – O2   
CZ – O2 GV – O2   
DW – O1 HS – O1   
DX – O1 HT – O1   
DY – O1 HU – O1   
DZ – O1 HV – O1   
 
Note.     Letters refer to individual food cues across both stages of learning.  
O1 – O4 represent the four different outcomes.  
 
The motivation for this design is that it should encourage increased selective 
attention to the predictive cues of the task. It has been widely argued that the 
mechanisms of working memory and selective attention are closely linked whereby 
attention serves to bias the contents of working memory towards goal directed 
information (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012). Given the large 
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number of compounds and different pairings, any strategy that relies on memorising 
the relationship between whole compounds and outcomes would be unlikely to yield 
performance above chance. Thus, selection of predictive components in particular 
becomes necessary in order to attain a reasonable level of performance. This should 
facilitate a change in the selection priority of stimuli, and thus increase the ability to 
observe a difference in selection in subsequent experiments. 
 
2.1.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
 Sixteen first year psychology students participated in this experiment in 
exchange for partial course credit (7 female, mean age = 18.9). The experiment was 
conducted on Apple Mac Mini computers attached to a 17-in. CRT monitor, running 
software programmed in PsychToolbox for Matlab (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
 
Stimuli 
 The stimuli for this experiment consisted of 16 black and white line drawings 
of items taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). The items consisted of a 
bicycle, glove, barn, piano, rocking chair, umbrella, anchor, bell, aeroplane, bed, 
hammer, trumpet, toaster, kite, kettle, and sailboat. The allocation of these images to 
serve as cues A – H and S – Z was counterbalanced across participants such that each 
image appeared as each cue across the experiment. Thus there was one participant per 
counterbalanced condition. At a viewing distance of approximately 57 cm, these 
subtended a visual angle of 3 - 7 ° horizontally, and 3 - 5 ° vertically, and were 
presented in pairs in the upper half of the screen separated by 8.5 °. The allergic 
reactions serving as outcomes consisted of fever, nausea, headache, and rash. These 
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were randomly allocated to O1 – O4 for each participant, and were presented in text 
form in the lower half of the screen.  
 
Procedure 
 Participants were instructed that they would be playing the role of a doctor 
whose patient, an alien named Mr Green, had come down to earth and was 
experiencing allergic reactions after eating everyday objects. They were informed that 
on every trial they would be observing two things that Mr Green had eaten. Once the 
two objects appeared, they were required to predict which of two allergic reactions 
Mr Green would suffer by clicking on one of the two allergic reactions presented for 
that patient. Upon making a self-paced selection, feedback was issued for the duration 
of 1 second in the form of a green tick or a red cross as well as the name of the 
allergic reaction experienced on that trial.  
 Phase 1 consisted of the 32 trial types shown in Table 2.1. Each trial type was 
presented twice per block in 5 blocks of trials. The order of trials was randomised 
within each block, and the left and right position of the cues was counterbalanced 
within each block. 
 At the beginning of Phase 2, participants were told that they would now be 
observing a new patient, Mr Blue. They were informed that Mr Blue was also an alien 
who had come to earth, but was suffering different allergies after eating everyday 
items. Participants were asked to again observe the allergies of Mr Blue in order to 
learn which items were causing which allergic reactions. Each of the 4 blocks of trials 
in Phase 2 consisted of 2 presentations of the 8 trial types shown in Table 2.1. These 
appeared in random order within each block, with the position of the cues 
counterbalanced across the left and right.  
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 The test phase occurred immediately following Phase 2. During the test, all 
cues were again presented in compound. These compounds are shown in Table 2.1. 
Participants were told that they would now be presented with a variety of foods that 
Mr Blue had eaten, and that they were required to make a judgement about each meal. 
For each compound, they were asked to judge the likelihood that Mr Blue, having 
eaten those items, would suffer from the allergic reaction allocated to O3, or whether 
he would be more likely to suffer from the allergic reaction serving as O4. This 
judgement was made on a linear analogue scale, labelled “Very confident that 
[outcome 3] will occur” on the left, and “Very confident that [outcome 4] will occur” 
on the right. This rating appeared in the lower half of the screen, and yielded a score 
out of 100 for each compound, with low scores reflecting a judgement that the 
compound would lead to O3, and high scores reflecting a judgement that the 
compound would lead to O4. Each compound appeared in random order, and the left 
and right position of the cues was randomised for each trial. 
 
2.1.2. Results 
Exclusions.     Given that the critical predictions relating to learned predictiveness rely 
on the sufficient acquisition of the initial component discriminations, an exclusion 
criterion based on Phase 1 performance was adopted whereby participants were 
excluded if they failed to achieve 60% accuracy by the last block. This is consistent 
with previous learned predictiveness protocols (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003) and 
was applied to the first phase of learning in all subsequent experiments reported in 
this chapter. Two participants were excluded and replaced on the basis of this 
criterion for Experiment 1.  
   
 41 
Phase I.     Acquisition of the Phase I and Phase II discriminations was assessed by 
averaging the prediction accuracy across compounds within each block. This is shown 
for both stages of training in the left and right panel of Figure 2.2. Accuracy increased 
steadily across Phase I. Scores were analysed by means of a one-way repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Block (1 – 5) as a factor, which 
revealed a significant main effect of block on accuracy, F(4, 60) = 42.71, p < .001, η2p 
= .74. 
Phase II.     Similarly, accuracy increased across Phase II. A one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Block on accuracy, F(3, 45) = 
9.47, p < .001, η2p = .55. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.      Mean accuracy across blocks for Phase I (Panel A) and  
Phase II (Panel B) in Experiment 1. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Test.     The test rating for each compound was recoded as a score out of 100, such 
that a higher score reflects a more confident pairing of the test compound with its 
correct outcome, and 50 is indicative of chance. These were averaged according to 
whether cues were predictive or non-predictive in the first phase and are shown in 
Figure 2.3. Scores were compared by way of a paired-samples t-test, which showed 
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that test scores were significantly higher for compounds comprising previously 
predictive components compared to previously non-predictive components, t(15) = 
2.5, p = .025, η2p = .29. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.     Learning scores for test compounds consisting of 
predictive components and test compounds consisting of non-
predictive components. Scores range from 0 – 100, with a score of 
50 indicative of chance, as represented by the dotted line. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean difference between 
predictive and non-predictive cues. 
 
 
2.1.3. Discussion 
 Experiment 1 successfully demonstrates the learned predictiveness bias 
making use of a modified extended design. Participants were better at identifying the 
relationship between test compounds and their predicted outcome for compounds 
consisting of cues that were predictive in the first phase compared to test compounds 
consisting of non-predictive cues from the first phase.  
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The observed pattern of results mimics those observed by Le Pelley and 
McLaren (2003) in the original demonstration of learned predictiveness quite closely. 
It is worth noting that the learned predictiveness effect is robust across variations in 
the scenario (e.g., Le Pelley, Beesley, & Griffiths, 2011; Le Pelley et al., 2010a) as 
well as the design (e.g., Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers, & Knipe, 2010), and thus there 
is no reason to believe that the bias observed here reflects any qualitative difference in 
the nature of learning despite the greatly extended version of the task. 
 
2.2. Experiment 2 
 Following on from the successful demonstration of learned predictiveness 
above, Experiment 2 combines the first phase of this procedure with a subsequent AB 
task. The initial stage of learning provides a set of predictive and non-predictive cues. 
Of interest in this experiment is whether differences in predictiveness correspond to 
differences in visual selection during the AB.  
Given that Raymond and O’Brien (2009) observed an effect of prior learning 
that transferred to performance in the AB, a similar procedure was also used here 
whereby a learning phase preceded the presentation of critical stimuli as T2 in a 
skeletal AB task. In this procedure, only the two temporally separated targets as well 
as their backward masks are shown. Making use of one short lag and one long lag 
condition, this procedure has been shown to produce a deficit in target report similar 
to more traditional trial sequences. That is, a deficit for T2 report at the short lag and 
restored identification at the long lag (Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1997). Structured in 
this way, the skeletal AB task creates two conditions of attentional availability for T2 
processing. At the short lag, T2 appears under the condition of limited attention, 
whereas at the long lag, given that initial target processing has had time to conclude, 
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T2 appears when attention is fully available for identification. Thus, the skeletal 
design provides a straightforward measure of the temporal resolution of the sustained 
coordination of limited capacity resources once target processing has been initiated. 
T2 items consisted of predictive or non-predictive cues from the initial phase 
of the procedure outlined in Experiment 1. These followed a novel image presented as 
T1. Based on prior findings showing an advantage in selection for cues predicting 
important outcomes both within the AB literature (e.g., Livesey, Harris, & Harris, 
2009; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), as well as spatial attention paradigms (Le Pelley, 
Vadillo, & Luque, 2013), it was anticipated that predictive items would show an 
advantage over non-predictive items under conditions in which attention is limited, 
that is, at the short lag. Once attention has recovered at long lags, equivalent 
performance would be expected across predictive and non-predictive items.  
 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants and apparatus 
 Thirty-two first year psychology students from the University of Sydney 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit (17 female, mean age = 
19.7). Apparatus was the same as Experiment 1.  
 
Stimuli 
 The two allergic reactions acting as outcomes O1 and O2 in the learning phase 
were again presented in text form in the lower half of the screen and were randomly 
allocated for each participant from the outcomes employed in Experiment 1. 
Following Experiment 1, cues comprised line drawings of everyday items taken from 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). The original 16 items were again counterbalanced 
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across participants to serve as cues A – H and S – Z in the learning phase, leading to 
two participants per counterbalanced condition. An additional 16 images were 
employed in order to complete the required stimulus set of 32 images. These items, 
which served as the images for T1, consisted of: an accordion, a basket, wheeled cart, 
candle, couch, cup, desk, bag, hat, iron, watch, scissors, shoe, oven, television, and 
watering can. The stimulus set subtended a visual angle of 3 – 7° horizontally, and 3 – 
6° vertically at a viewing distance of approximately 57 cm. Image masks consisted of 
abstract black lines with a similar spatial frequency and curvature to that of the 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) images, within a white 7 - 7 ° area. 
 
Procedure 
Learning phase.     The learning phase was identical in all ways to the first phase of 
Experiment 1.  
 
RSVP phase.     Immediately following the learning task, participants were informed 
that on each trial in the second half of the experiment, they would be viewing two 
objects that the alien would be eating displayed very rapidly. They were told that they 
would be required to report the identity of both items following each trial. 
Two independent variables were manipulated in a 2 × 2 design with T2 
predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) and lag (short vs. long) as within subject 
factors. Figure 2.4 shows a graphic depiction of the trial structure and design for this 
phase. Each trial began with a fixation cross displayed on a white background in the 
centre of the screen for 500 ms. This was followed by T1 and its mask displayed in 
immediate succession for 59 ms each. A blank white screen then appeared for either 
59 ms, in the short lag condition, or 472 ms in the long lag condition. Thus, the 
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stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between T1 and T2 was 177 ms in the short lag 
condition, and 649 ms in the long lag condition. T2 and its accompanying mask 
immediately followed the blank screen for 59 ms each.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.     Illustration of the trial structure employed in Experiment 2. Each 
stimulus was presented for 59 ms. At short lags, the blank inter stimulus 
interval was 59 ms, and 472 ms in the long lag condition. Participants were 
required to report the identity of the two objects immediately following each 
trial. T2 consisted of either a predictive cue, or a non-predictive cue from the 
learning phase.  
 
 The 16 images not previously experienced in the learning phase comprised the 
stimulus set for T1, while T2 was always taken from the items seen during the 
learning phase. Thus there were 8 images that were predictive during the initial 
learning phase, and 8 images that were non-predictive during learning. Each image 
appeared an equal number of times throughout the experiment. The total 192 trials 
were divided into 6 blocks of 32 trials, however there was no discernable break in 
between blocks. Thus there were 48 trials per condition. Each T2 item appeared twice 
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per block, once each at the two lag conditions. The same pairings of T1 and T2 were 
never repeated across the experiment and the identity of T1 was evenly distributed 
between the two lags. Otherwise, the allocation of T1 to each trial was random. No 
more than 3 of the same lag appeared in succession across trials. 
 Following each trial, a screen appeared allowing participants to make their 
responses for the first target. The top of the screen contained the instruction, “Select 
1st target”. Beneath the text 15 images were displayed in a random order. These 
contained the two targets, as well as 13 distractors. Overall, the display contained an 
equal number of items taken from the T1 stimulus set, the predictive T2 stimulus set, 
and the non-predictive T2 stimulus set. The frequency of individual items as 
distractors was approximately equated across trials. This was followed by an identical 
screen labelled, “Select 2nd target”. Participants selected targets by using the mouse, 
and the space bar was used to transition to the next screen. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
Exclusions.     As in Experiment 1, participants were excluded if they failed to achieve 
60% accuracy during the last block of training. An additional criterion was applied to 
T1 performance across all subsequent experiments. If participants failed to reach a 
level of T1 accuracy, averaged across conditions, of 60%, they were excluded from 
further analyses. Given that T2 accuracy is calculated as conditional upon the correct 
identification of T1, this reduces the likelihood that a deficit in one condition arises 
from overall poor performance in T1. One participant failed both criteria, three failed 
the learning criterion, and one failed the T1 criterion. These participants were 
replaced.    
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Learning.     Accuracy was averaged across compounds and is shown for each block 
in Figure 2.5. Accuracy increased steadily during training, as shown by a significant 
effect of block on accuracy as revealed by one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F(4, 
124) = 54.99, p < .001, η2p = .64. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5.   Prediction accuracy averaged over compounds 
across training blocks during Phase I of Experiment 2. Error 
bars show SEM. 
 
 
RSVP.     In all experiments, the order in which participants reported items was not 
taken into account when calculating target accuracy. That is, if a target was correctly 
identified in either response screen a correct response was recorded. T2 accuracy was 
calculated conditional upon the correct identification of T1 (T2|T1). Thus, only trials 
in which T1 was reported accurately were used to assess T2 performance. This is the 
most common way to report T2 accuracy during the attentional blink. Although the 
order of report of T1 and T2 was allowed to vary, it is not typical to make T1 
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accuracy conditional upon the identification of T2. Given that T2 accuracy is very 
low in some conditions, that is, at short lags, this does not provide a sufficient number 
of trials to render T1 analyses meaningful.   
 
T1.     T1 accuracy was analysed for conditions in which T2 was predictive and for 
conditions in which T2 was non-predictive. This is shown for the short lag and the 
long lag in Figure 2.6. There was no evidence to suggest that either lag or the 
predictiveness of T2 influenced the ability of participants to report the identity of the 
novel T1. A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Lag (short vs. long) and T2 
predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors revealed no significant main 
effect of lag, no significant main effect of T2 condition, and no significant lag × T2 
predictiveness interaction, all Fs < 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.     Accuracy for T1 at the short and long lag, for conditions  
in which T2 was predictive, and conditions in which T2 was non-
predictive. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean 
difference between predictive T2 and non-predictive T2 conditions.  
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T2.     Conditional T2 accuracy is shown for the short lag and long lag condition for 
targets that were predictive and for targets that were non-predictive in Figure 2.7. 
Conditional accuracy was subjected to repeated-measures ANOVA with Lag (short vs. 
long) and T2 predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors. This showed a 
main effect of Lag, F(1, 31) = 135.31, p < .001, η2p = .81, but no main effect of T2 
predictiveness, and no Lag × T2 predictiveness interaction, all Fs < 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Conditional T2 accuracy across lags according 
to whether targets were predictive or non-predictive. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean difference across conditions 
in which target predictiveness varied. 
 
 
2.2.3. Discussion 
 The present experiment failed to show an effect of prior predictiveness on 
visual selection during the attentional blink. This is somewhat surprising given the 
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consistent findings showing a benefit in selection for predictive information (e.g., 
Livesey et al., 2009; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009), as well as work showing facilitated 
target detection for significant stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Anderson & Phelps, 
2001; Jackson & Raymond, 2006; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorenson, 1997). As 
mentioned earlier, the skeletal AB task presents a straightforward test of the temporal 
resolution of the sustained use of limited capacity resources once target processing 
has been initiated. However, the key difference between this procedure and more 
standard versions of the task is the presence of distractors, which increase demands on 
selective processing. Indeed, it appears that while distractors appearing before the 
onset of T1 are inhibited (Dux & Harris, 2007; Dux, Coltheart, & Harris, 2006; Harris 
et al., 2010; Olivers & Watson, 2006), once effortful processing has been prompted 
on the basis of an initial target, not only is less attention available for T2, but 
distractor inhibition is attenuated (Dux & Harris, 2007; Dux & Marios, 2008). This 
suggests that in full stream versions of the task, visual competition between targets 
and distractors is a critical component of the observed deficit. 
 One possibility is that the hypothesised change in selection with predictive 
utility may only be evident when selection is in fact most crucial, that is, in the face of 
increased competition. Given a biased competition view of attention (e.g., Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995), selection is most critically involved during the relative competition 
between objects, as opposed to attention merely resulting in an absolute form of 
signal enhancement. If predictiveness is biasing the way that cues compete, then a 
skeletal design may not be as sensitive to the proposed changes in selection. Although 
masks consisting of noise provide some competition, a full stream of object 
distractors would provide increased interference by way of semantic and object based 
perceptual features. To address this issue, Experiment 3 made use of a full stream AB 
design where the effect of manipulating target as well as distractor predictiveness 
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could be examined. While the question still remains as to why the results here might 
diverge from those of Raymond and O’Brien (2009), this will be considered in the 
General Discussion in synthesis with subsequent experiments.  
 
2.3. Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 was carried out in order to examine whether variations in 
detection according to predictiveness could be observed in the AB by using a 
procedure in which competition is present. In the current design, all items in each 
stream were equally familiar, consisting of all cues encountered in the learning task. 
Specific components of the stream were controlled. The prior predictiveness of T1 
and T2, as well as the critical distractors immediately flanking each target, was 
manipulated across multiple lags in a fully crossed design. If visual competition is 
biased in favour of predictive items, then allowing a comparison between predictive 
targets and equally familiarised non-predictive targets should provide a strong 
manipulation in which a difference can emerge.  
 Further, by manipulating the predictiveness of critical distractors there is the 
opportunity to directly influence the extent to which distractors interfere with target 
identification. The role of distractors in the AB has been a theoretically important one, 
and therefore controlling their predictiveness may be essential in isolating an effect of 
predictiveness on visual selection within the AB. Semantically related distractors can 
prime the subsequent identification of T2 (Harris & Little, 2010; Maki, Frigen, & 
Paulsen, 1997), as well as produce interference if considered as conceptually 
unrelated (Dux & Coltheart, 2005). Given that there is evidence to show that 
distractors immediately following T1 undergo attentive processing (Visser, Bischof, 
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& Di Lollo, 1999), this suggests that these items influence how attention is distributed 
across time during target processing.  
Demonstrations of distractor repetition effects (DRE, e.g., Drew & Shapiro, 
2006; Dux et al., 2006; Dux & Harris, 2007) highlight more specifically the role that 
distractors play in selection during RSVP. For example, when the distractors 
immediately flanking T1 are identical, and drawn from a different category to that of 
T1, T2 detection improves (Dux et al., 2006). Dux et al. (2006) suggested that this 
manipulation should allow for a reduced AB due to the more efficient processing of 
T1. This is because the distractor immediately following T1, that is the T1 + 1 
distractor, should be inhibited both featurally, given a refractory period of the features 
encountered at the T1 – 1 distractor, as well as conceptually, as a result of the 
categorical difference between targets and distractors. Reduced T1 + 1 processing 
should greatly reduce the ability of this distractor to mask subsequent items, thus 
allowing more resources for T2 processing. 
Dux and Harris (2007) showed that when the same manipulation is applied to 
T2, such that the distractors immediately before and after T2 are identical and 
categorically distinct from the target, there is an increase in T2 detection relative to 
conditions in which distractors are not repeated, but only when T2 is at lag 2. They 
argue that this selective T2 DRE provides some suggestion as to what may be 
happening to distractor processing during RSVP. Prior to the detection of T1, the 
availability of cognitive control facilitates distractor suppression. Once T1 is detected, 
that control is lost and one consequence of this is that distractor suppression fails 
during the duration of the blink. However, when T2 is presented at lag 2, the T2 – 1 
item is also the T1 + 1 item. The T1 + 1 item undergoes attentive processing (so-
called lag-1 sparing), and therefore, can be effectively inhibited. So repeating that 
distractor helps subsequent target selection. This inhibition fails when the distractor 
 54 
preceding T2 occurs at subsequent short lags, and no difference between repeated 
distractor and non-repeated distractor conditions is seen2.  
At a general level, this suggests that when distractors occur within the period 
of increased stimulus interference due to a loss of cognitive control, their salience 
influences the outcome of that competitive process. This means that if predictiveness 
changes the selection priority of stimuli, one should be able to observe an indirect 
effect on target processing by manipulating the prior predictiveness of these critical 
distractors. 
 
2.3.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
 Thirty-two first year psychology students enrolled at the University of Sydney 
participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit (21 female, mean 
age = 20.6). Apparatus remained the same as prior experiments.   
 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli comprised the set of 16 images employed in Experiment 1. O1 and O2 
were again randomly allocated for each participant from those employed in 
Experiment 1. Outcome presentation parameters as well as stimulus counterbalancing 
proceeded according to previous experiments.  
 
                                                
2 It is worth noting that this account makes the prediction that the DRE should 
indeed be observed at long lags once cognitive control has been regained. While this 
was not observed in Dux and Harris (2007), it is in fact quite difficult to demonstrate 
distractor effects at long lags, because of ceiling performance. For some evidence of 
distractor inhibition effects at these time points, see Harris, Benito, and Dux (2010). 
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Procedure 
Learning phase.     The learning phase was identical to that of Experiment 2.  
 
RSVP phase.     Immediately following the learning task, participants completed the 
RSVP phase. They were informed that on every trial they would be viewing a variety 
of objects that the alien was eating displayed rapidly at fixation. They were told that 
on every trial two of these items would be displayed in red and that they were 
required to report the identity of the two red items. Table 2.2 shows the design of the 
RSVP trial types for this phase.  
 
Table 2.2 
Trial types for Experiment 3.  
 
Trial Type T1 T2 Critical Distractors 
1 P P P 
2 P P NP 
3 P NP P 
4 P NP NP 
5 NP P P 
6 NP P NP 
7 NP NP P 
8 NP NP NP 
 
Note.     Each trial type was presented at lag 1, lag 2, lag 5, and lag 9. P denotes 
items that were predictive in Phase I, and NP denotes items that were non-
predictive in Phase I. 
 
Each trial began with a fixation cross shown for 500 ms. This was 
immediately followed by the RSVP sequence consisting of the full set of 16 images. 
Four independent variables were manipulated in a 4 × 2 × 2 × 2 within subjects design 
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with lag (lag 1, 2, 5, and 9), T1 predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive), T2 
predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive), and the predictiveness of critical 
distractors (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors. Thus, within each trial the 
identity of T1, T2, as well as the critical distractors was controlled. The remainder of 
the RSVP stream consisted of the remaining images in random order. As items were 
never repeated within a stream, the same item could never appear in more than one 
condition in any given trial. A total of 256 trials were completed, providing 8 trials 
per condition.  
 Lag.     There were four lags separating T1 and T2. Thus, T2 could appear 
immediately following T1 (lag 1), following 1 intervening distractor (lag 2), 
following 4 intervening distractors (lag 5), or following 8 intervening distractors (lag 
9). Each item in the stream was presented for 58 ms followed by a blank inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) of 35ms, resulting in a SOA of 93 ms. Thus the second target 
could appear within 93, 186, 465, or 837 ms of T1.  
 T1.     T1 consisted of either a predictive or non-predictive item. Each item 
appeared at T1 16 times across all trials, and was never repeated in the same condition 
more than once. T1 could appear at serial positions 3, 4, 5, or 6 within the stream. 
Each serial position was employed an equal number of times throughout the 
experiment.  
 T2. Similarly, T2 consisted of either a predictive or non-predictive item. 
Each item was shown as T2 an equal number of times across trials, appearing 16 
times in total.  Items did not appear in the same condition more than once.  
Critical distractors. The predictiveness of the critical distractors was also 
manipulated such that these were either predictive or non-predictive cues. Critical 
distractors were defined as the distractors immediately flanking both targets, equating 
to 4 distinct critical distractors on each trial. To clarify, the distractors immediately 
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preceding and immediately following each target were controlled and were all either 
predictive or non-predictive on each trial. For lag 1 trials, the critical distractors 
comprised the 2 distractors immediately preceding T1 and the 2 distractors 
immediately following T2. In the lag 2 condition, these comprised the 2 distractors 
immediately preceding T1, the distractor separating T1 and T2, as well as the 
distractor immediately following T2. The allocation of each item as a critical 
distractor was equated across trials. Note that given the fully crossed nature of the 
design this means that predictive and non-predictive critical distractors can flank both 
predictive and non-predictive targets and thus provide no information as to whether 
the upcoming target will be a predictive or non-predictive item.  
 
2.3.2. Results 
 Given a large number of conditions in Experiments 3 – 5, the results reported 
below are restricted to the most theoretically important analyses as well as any 
significant and marginal findings. 
 
Exclusions.     Three participants were excluded on the basis of the learning criterion, 
and three participants were excluded on the basis of the T1 criterion. All excluded 
participants were replaced. 
 
Learning.     Accuracy increased steadily across blocks in Phase I, as is shown in 
Figure 2.8. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Block on 
accuracy, F(4, 132) = 67.66, p < .001, η2p = .67. 
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Figure 2.8. Prediction accuracy for the learning phase  
across blocks, averaged across compounds, for Experiment 3.  
Error bars represent SEM. 
 
RSVP 
T1.     T1 accuracy was averaged within each condition and scores were analysed by 
way of a 4 (Lag: 1, 2, 5, and 9) × 2 (T1 predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) 
× 2 (T2 predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 2 (critical distractor 
predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) repeated measure ANOVA. This 
revealed a significant Lag × T2 predictiveness × Critical distractor predictiveness 
interaction, F(3, 93) = 3.04, p = .034, η2p = .09. There was little further indication that 
T1 detection varied across conditions as the main effects of lag, target predictiveness, 
and critical distractor predictiveness, as well their interactions did not reach 
significance, largest F = 2.32, p = .09, η2p = .07.  
In order to investigate the three-way interaction, T1 accuracy was collapsed 
across the conditions in which T1 predictiveness varied, and analysed at each lag. 
Thus the T2 predictiveness × Critical distractor predictiveness interaction was 
examined at each lag. These data are shown in Figure 2.9. At lag 1, there was some 
indication that the influence of T2 predictiveness on T1 accuracy varied according to 
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whether the critical distractors were predictive or non-predictive, however the T2 
predictiveness × critical distractor predictiveness interaction failed to reach a 
conventional level of significance, F(1, 31) = 3.79, p = .061, η2p = .11. There was no 
significant main effect of T2 predictiveness, and no main effect of critical distractor 
predictiveness, all Fs < 1. The main effects of T2 predictiveness and critical distractor 
predictiveness, as well as their interaction, also failed to reach significance at 
subsequent lags, largest F = 2.90, p = .10, η2p = .08. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. T1 accuracy averaged over conditions in which T1  
identity varied. Accuracy is shown for conditions in which T2  
as well as the critical distractors were predictive or non-predictive,  
at lag 1, 2, 5 and 9. Error bars represent the within-subjects 
standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005). 
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T2.     T2 identification was again measured conditional upon the correct 
identification of T1 (T2|T1). Thus, the analysis of T2 accuracy only takes into account 
trials on which T1 has been identified correctly. Scores were subjected to repeated 
measures ANOVA with Lag (lag 1, 2, 5, and 9), T1 predictiveness (predictive vs. 
non-predictive), T2 predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive), and Critical 
distractor predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors. The presence of an 
attentional blink was confirmed by a significant effect of Lag on T2 detection, F(3, 
93) = 132.07, p < .001, η2p = .81. There was also a significant main effect of 
Distractor predictiveness, such that T2 detection was better when targets were 
immediately flanked by predictive distractors, F(1, 31) = 5.54, p = .025, η2p = .15. 
However there was also a significant Lag × T1 predictiveness × Distractor 
predictiveness interaction, F(3, 93) = 3.11, p = .042, η2p = .09. None of the remaining 
main effects or interaction effects were significant, largest F = 2.82, p = .10, η2p = .08. 
 To detail the three-way interaction, scores were averaged across T2 
predictiveness in order to test the T1 predictiveness × Distractor predictiveness 
interaction at each lag. This is shown in Figure 2.10, along with the mean accuracy 
for the main effect of distractor predictiveness. There were no significant main effects, 
and no significant interaction at lag 1, all Fs < 1, or at lag 2, largest F = 2.03, p = .16, 
η2p = .06, or at lag 5, all Fs < 1. The analysis at lag 9 revealed a significant T1 
predictiveness × distractor predictiveness interaction, F(1, 31) = 4.54, p = .041, η2p 
= .13, but no main effect of distractor predictiveness, F(1, 31) = 1.74, p = .18, η2p 
= .05, and no main effect of T1 predictiveness, F < 1.  
Simple effects analysis revealed that at lag 9, when T1 was predictive, T2 
detection did not vary according to Distractor predictiveness, F < 1. When T1 was 
non-predictive, performance was slightly better when distractors were predictive, 
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however this failed to reach a conventional level of significance, F(1, 31) = 3.83, p 
= .059, η2p = .11. T2 detection according to T1 and distractor identity across lags is 
shown in Figure 2.10. The mean for predictive and non-predictive distractor 
conditions is also shown on the figure.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Conditional T2 accuracy averaged across conditions  
in which T2 identity varied. Thus, accuracy is shown for predictive  
and non-predictive T1 and critical distractor conditions across lags.  
Crosses represent the average overall accuracy for when distractors  
were predictive (black) and when distractors were non-predictive  
(grey). Error bars represent the within-subject standard error of the  
mean (Cousineau, 2005). 
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2.3.3. Discussion 
 Once again, there was little evidence that the prior predictiveness of targets 
influenced selection priority during the AB. For performance at T1 as well as T2, 
there was no difference in the ability of participants to identify targets according to 
whether they were predictive or non-predictive in a prior learning task.  
On the other hand, there was some indication that predictiveness might 
influence target selection indirectly, via the level of distractor processing. Overall, T2 
detection was better when targets were flanked by predictive distractors. This result is 
an interesting one in the absence of any initial effects of target predictiveness on 
target identification. Previous findings of facilitated selection for predictive targets 
(e.g., Livesey et al., 2009) suggest a benefit in the attentional resources dedicated to 
the processing of predictive items. Given that manipulations of distractor salience 
designed to decrease the processing of distractors facilitate target detection (Dux & 
Harris, 2007), one would anticipate increased interference from predictive distractors, 
and therefore reduced T2 selection.  
One possibility is that predictive distractors are facilitating the allocation of 
attentional resources by maintaining a controlled state of selection once T1 has been 
detected. Numerous studies (e.g., Di Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005; 
Nieuwenstein & Potter, 2006; Olivers, van der Stigchel, Hulleman, 2007) have 
reported an attenuation of the AB deficit in paradigms making use of the consecutive 
presentation of multiple targets, suggesting that a period of sustained consolidation 
can be generated under certain conditions. If predictive items have gained salience it 
may be that they behave more like targets and induce such a “spreading of sparing” 
effect. This appears unlikely for several reasons. First, this explanation would 
anticipate that the distractor effect would appear primarily at short lags. There was 
little evidence for this. Further, Livesey and Harris (2011) found little evidence of this 
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sparing effect for Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) images, suggesting that the effect 
may be isolated to alphanumerical stimuli. Finally, such an explanation is at odds with 
evidence showing that salient distractors in fact induce a deficit for subsequent targets, 
similar to that observed in the AB (Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005; Smith et al., 
2006). 
An alternative possibility is that predictive distractors decrease in salience as a 
result of increased familiarity. In related paradigms, it is well established that 
selection favours novel stimuli. Said another way, familiar items lose selection 
priority over novel items (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2006; Johnston & Schwarting, 
1997; Neo & Chua, 2006). There is evidence that such effects are related to response 
selection under some circumstances. Visual information selected more frequently in 
one context as predictive of an outcome will interfere less as distracting information 
in a subsequent task (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2012). Given the increased 
selection of predictive items over non-predictive items in the learning task, as well as 
previous findings showing increased time spent looking at these cues (Le Pelley, 
Beesley, & Griffiths, 2011), it is possible that these familiarity effects are contributing 
towards the reduced competition of predictive stimuli as distractors, thereby 
enhancing target detection. 
Regardless of how distractor salience influences target detection, any 
explanation would need to further take into account the fact that changes in selection 
appear to be occurring exclusively at the level of distractor predictiveness. This point 
is an important one, and given the relevance to subsequent experiments will be 
considered further in the General Discussion. However, it should be noted that the 
effect of distractor predictiveness on T2 detection varied as a function of lag and T1 
identity. Similarly, while overall distractors did not influence T1 accuracy, there was 
some indication of a distractor effect that varied according to T2 identity and lag. 
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Unfortunately these interactions did not provide any interpretable indication as to the 
relationship between target predictiveness, distractor predictiveness, and lag. Thus the 
overall distractor effect should be interpreted with caution prior to a replication of the 
effect. With this in mind, Experiment 4 was designed to replicate the presence of a 
distractor effect while extending the design to include a manipulation of familiarity 
during RSVP. 
 
2.4. Experiment 4 
 The aim of Experiment 4 was to establish an effect of distractor predictiveness 
on target selection in the AB in a procedure that includes a manipulation of familiarity. 
As highlighted above, stimulus novelty is a potent source of selection bias in tasks of 
visual selection. By controlling familiarity as an explicit factor, the effect of learning 
and familiarity can be more effectively teased apart. Again, the first phase of the 
experiment comprised the initial learning task. This was followed by the RSVP task 
requiring participants to detect two targets during each trial. In Experiment 3, 
predictive and non-predictive stimuli were intermixed such that each condition 
comprised equally exposed items. In Experiment 4, predictive and non-predictive 
cues appeared in separate trials intermixed with novel stimuli. As such, two separate 
stimulus sets were created that could appear in any given trial. Stimulus Set Predictive 
(Set P) consisted of the predictive items as well as an equal number of novel objects. 
Stimulus Set Non-predictive (Set NP) consisted of the non-predictive stimuli and an 
equal number of an alternative set of novel objects. Within each stimulus set, target 
and distractor identity was controlled in a fully crossed design. In Set P, for example, 
T1 could be predictive or novel, whereas in Set NP, T1 could be non-predictive or 
novel. 
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 This means that within each stimulus set it is in fact familiarity that is 
manipulated, and observing an influence of predictiveness relies on differences in the 
effect of familiarity across stimulus sets. That is, in one stimulus set the familiar 
components are predictive, and in the remaining set the familiar components are non-
predictive. If there is an influence of predictiveness this would suggest that the 
difference between familiar and novel items will depend on whether those familiar 
items are predictive or non-predictive. If the familiarity of the targets is influencing 
selection priority, then an overall deficit for familiar items relative to novel items 
should be observed. However, if predictive distractors are preferentially losing that 
competitive priority, then predictive distractor conditions should result in facilitated 
target detection relative to novel distractor conditions. In contrast, in Set NP one 
would expect less of a difference between non-predictive and novel distractor 
conditions.  
 
2.4.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
 Forty-eight first year undergraduate psychology students enrolled at the 
University of Sydney participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course 
credit. The apparatus remained the same as previous experiments.  
 
Stimuli 
 The images employed during the learning phase for Experiment 4 were 
identical to those of previous experiments. In order to complete the required stimulus 
set of 32 images for the RSVP phase, the 16 additional images employed in 
Experiment 2 were again employed here. The identity and allocation of outcomes, as 
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well as the counterbalanced allocation of images to serve as cues A – H and S – Z, 
was done according to the procedure used in prior experiments.  
 
Procedure 
Learning phase.     The learning phase was identical to that of the previous 
experiments.  
 
RSVP phase.     The instructions issued at the start of the RSVP phase were as per 
Experiment 3. Each RSVP stream consisted of 16 images. The full set of 32 images 
was divided into two stimulus sets of 16, the predictive stimulus set, and the non-
predictive stimulus set. The predictive stimulus set consisted of the 8 predictive cues 
from the learning phase, as well as 8 randomly chosen images from the novel set. The 
8 non-predictive cues from the learning phase, as well as the remaining 8 novel 
images comprised the non-predictive stimulus set. Half of all trials employed an 
RSVP stream consisting of items from the predictive stimulus set, and the remaining 
half of trials consisted of items from the non-predictive stimulus set. 
 For both stimulus sets, four independent variables were manipulated in a 4 × 2 
× 2 × 2 within subjects design. This is depicted in Table 2.3. The factors in this design 
were lag (lag 1, 2, 5, and 9), T1 familiarity (novel vs. familiar), T2 familiarity (novel 
vs. familiar), and the nature of the critical distractors (novel vs. familiar). Given that 
these factors were manipulated within each stimulus set, the identity of familiar items 
depends on stimulus set. Thus, for the predictive stimulus set, the T1, T2, and 
distractor manipulations compare novel and predictive items. Similarly, for trials 
employing the non-predictive stimulus set, the T1, T2, and distractor manipulations 
compare novel items to those that were non-predictive. This means that within each 
trial the identity of T1, T2, as well as the critical distractors was controlled. The 
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remainder of the stream consisted of the remaining images within that stimulus set in 
random order. Four blocks of 64 trials were completed equating to 256 trials in total, 
and 4 trials per condition. Trials making use of the predictive stimulus set were 
intermixed with trials making use of the non-predictive stimulus set. There was no 
break in between blocks.  
Lag.     The same lags were used here as in Experiment 3. T2 could appear at 
lag 1, 2, 5 or 9. The timing of each item, and therefore the SOA between T1 and T2, 
was also identical to Experiment 3.  
 T1.     In each trial, T1 was either novel or familiar. For predictive stimulus set 
trials, the familiar T1 consisted of a predictive cue, while for non-predictive stimulus 
set trials the familiar T1 was a non-predictive cue. Each image appeared an equal 
number of times as T1, and no more than once in the same condition across trials. T1 
could appear at a serial position of 3, 4, 5, or 6 within the stream. Each of these 
positions was employed an equal number of times throughout the experiment.  
T2. Similarly, T2 consisted of either a novel or familiar item. When trials 
consisted of Set P images, the familiar T2 was predictive, and when a stream 
consisted of Set NP images, the familiar T2 was non-predictive. Each image appeared 
as T2 an equal number of times and was never repeated in the same condition across 
trials. T1 and T2 pairings were never repeated across the experiment.  
 Critical distractors. Critical distractors were defined as the distractors 
immediately flanking both targets, as in Experiment 3. These were either novel or 
familiar. Familiar critical distractors were predictive in predictive set trial types, and 
non-predictive in non-predictive set trial types. The allocation of specific cues as 
critical distractors was approximately equated across trials.  
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Table 2.3.  
RSVP trial types for Experiment 4.  
 
Trial Type Stimulus Set T1 T2 
Critical 
Distractors 
1  P P P 
2  P P Novel 
3  P Novel P 
4 
Set P 
P Novel Novel 
5 Novel P P 
6  Novel P Novel 
7  Novel Novel P 
8  Novel Novel Novel 
9  NP NP NP 
10  NP NP Novel 
11  NP Novel NP 
12 
Set NP 
NP Novel Novel 
13 Novel NP NP 
14  Novel NP Novel 
15  Novel Novel NP 
16  Novel Novel Novel 
 
Note.      Each trial type was presented at lag 1, lag 2, lag 5, and lag 9. P denotes items 
that were predictive in Phase I, and NP denotes items that were non-predictive in 
Phase I. The novel items in Set P and Set NP are separate sets of novel stimuli. 
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2.4.2. Results 
Exclusions.    6 participants failed to reach the learning criterion, and 7 participants 
failed to reach the T1 criterion. These were replaced.  
 
Learning.     Accuracy during the initial acquisition of the discrimination was 
averaged across compounds and is shown in Figure 2.11. Learning increased steadily 
across blocks, as is shown by a significant one-way repeated measures ANOVA with 
Block as a factor, F(4, 188) = 169.14, p < .001, η2p = .78. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11.     Prediction accuracy across training blocks 
for the learning phase of Experiment 4. Error bars show SEM. 
 
RSVP 
T1. Accuracy was analysed with repeated measures ANOVA with Set (Set P vs. 
Set NP), Lag (lag 1, 2, 5, and 9), T1 familiarity (novel vs. familiar), T2 familiarity 
(novel vs. familiar), and Distractor familiarity (novel vs. familiar) as factors. Thus, 
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overall, there are potential effects of lag, familiarity, and stimulus set (i.e., 
predictiveness). For clarity, these will be considered sequentially. Given that the key 
hypotheses relate to the influence of learning, the effects of primary interest are 
interactions involving stimulus set. To anticipate, effects of familiarity were observed 
for target detection, and effects of predictiveness were observed at the level of the 
distractor manipulation. Figure 2.12 depicts these effects across the four lags. For ease 
of interpretation, they are again shown in Figure 2.13, averaged across lag. 
 Effect of lag. Overall, T1 performance was not influenced by lag, F(3, 141) = 
1.1, p = .35, η2p = .02. 
 Effects of familiarity. Familiarity at the target and distractor level influenced 
T1 performance. Accuracy was better when T1 was novel, F(1, 47) = 23.65, p < .001, 
η2p = .34, and better when distractors were familiar, F(1, 47) = 18.87, p < .001, η2p 
= .29. The influence of distractor familiarity differed according to lag, as shown by a 
significant Lag × Distractor familiarity interaction, F(3, 141) = 4.14, p = .008, η2p 
= .08. 
To examine the interaction, accuracy was averaged according to distractor 
familiarity and compared at each lag. This analysis suggests that the interaction is 
driven by performance at lag 2, where distractor familiarity does not appear to 
influence T1 detection. That is, there was no difference in accuracy according to 
whether distractors were predictive or non-predictive at lag 2, F < 1, whereas T1 
detection was better when distractors were familiar at remaining lags, namely lag 1, 
F(1, 47) = 12.7, p =.001, η2p = .21, lag 5, F(1, 47) = 14.13, p < .001, η2p = .23, and lag 
9, F(1, 47) = 7.16, p =.01, η2p = .13. While the T1 familiarity × T2 familiarity × 
distractor familiarity interaction approached significance, the effect did not meet 
conventional standards of significance, F(1, 47) = 3.68, p = .06, η2p = .07. The  
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Figure 2.12.   The effect of familiarity (Panel A) and the effect of 
predictiveness (Panel B) on T1 accuracy for Experiment 4. Panel A 
shows T1 accuracy averaged over T2 conditions across lags. Panel 
B shows T1 accuracy according to distractor familiarity and 
stimulus set. Error bars show within-subject standard error of the 
mean (Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure 2.13.     The effect of familiarity (Panel A) and the effect of 
predictiveness (Panel B) on T1 accuracy for Experiment 4 averaged 
across lags. Accuracy averaged across T2 identity is shown in Panel A. 
Panel B shows accuracy according to distractor familiarity and 
stimulus set. Error bars show within-subject standard error of the 
mean (Cousineau, 2005). 
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remaining main effects of familiarity, as well as their interactions were not significant, 
largest F = 2.3, p = .083, η2p = .04.  
Effects of predictiveness. Overall, T1 detection was better in the stimulus 
set containing familiar items that were predictive, Set P, F(1, 47) = 11.57, p = .001, 
η2p = .2. The effect of distractor familiarity, whereby performance was better when 
distractors were familiar, varied according to stimulus set. That is, there was a 
significant Set (Set P vs. Set NP) × Distractor familiarity (novel vs. familiar) 
interaction, F(1, 47) = 19.27, p < .001, η2p = .29. A simple effects analysis 
investigating the interaction revealed that in Set P (when familiar items were 
predictive), there was no significant difference in T1 detection according to whether 
distractors were novel or familiar (predictive), F <1. However, in stimulus Set NP, T1 
detection was significantly higher when distractors were familiar (non-predictive) 
compared to when they were novel, F(1, 47) = 28.5, p < .001, η2p = .38.  
 
T2. Conditional T2 accuracy (T2|T1) was initially analysed with a 2 (Stimulus set: 
Set P vs. Set NP) × 4 (Lag: 1, 2, 5, and 9) × 2 (T1 familiarity: novel vs. familiar) × 2 
(T2 familiarity: novel vs. familiar) × 2 (Distractor familiarity: novel vs. familiar) 
repeated measures ANOVA. As was observed in T1 accuracy, there were interactions 
demonstrating an effect of familiarity as well as predictiveness. The effect of 
familiarity (Panel A) as well as predictiveness (Panel B) is shown for all lags in 
Figure 2.14. It should be noted that novel conditions did not differ so are collapsed for 
graphical purposes. Figure 2.15 illustrates the effects averaged across lag.  
 Effects of lag. Overall, an attentional blink was observed as suggested by a 
significant effect of Lag on T2 detection, F(3, 141) = 296.68, p < .001, η2p = .86.  
 Effects of familiarity.  Both target and distractor familiarity influenced T2 
detection. Detection was better when T2 was novel, F(1, 47) = 44.34, p < .001, η2p 
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= .49, and better when distractors were familiar, F(1, 47) = 6.27, p = .016, η2p = .12. 
However the influence of distractor familiarity varied according to T1 familiarity, 
producing a T1 familiarity × Distractor familiarity interaction, F(1, 47) = 4.45, p = .04, 
η2p = .09. Data were collapsed across remaining conditions in order to investigate the 
interaction. Simple effects analysis revealed that when T1 was familiar, performance 
was significantly better when distractors were also familiar, F(1, 47) = 4.49, p = .039, 
η2p = .09. When T1 was novel, performance did not vary according to whether 
distractors were familiar or novel, F < 1.  
 
Effects of predictiveness. The benefit in T2 detection for conditions in which 
distractors were familiar relied on whether the stimulus set was Set P or Set NP. That 
is, there was a significant stimulus set (Set P vs. Set NP) × distractor familiarity 
(novel vs. familiar) interaction, F(1, 47) = 4.20, p= .046, η2p = .08. In order to detail 
the interaction, data were collapsed across remaining conditions and subjected to a 
simple effects analysis. This revealed that in stimulus Set P, there was no difference 
in T2 detection according to whether distractors were novel or familiar (predictive), F 
< 1. However, in stimulus Set NP, T2 performance was better when distractors were 
familiar (non-predictive), F(1, 47) = 7.66, p= .008, η2p = .14.  
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Figure 2.14. The top panel shows the effect of T2 familiarity on target 
detection across lags. Overall, target detection was better for novel 
targets. There was no influence of prior predictiveness on the detection of 
familiar targets. Panel B shows the effect of predictiveness. Target 
detection was better when targets were flanked by non-predictive 
distractors. Error bars show within-subject standard error of the mean 
(Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure 2.15. The top panel shows the effect of T2 familiarity for the 
stimulus set containing familiar items that were predictive and the 
stimulus set containing familiar items that were non-predictive averaged 
over lag. Overall, target detection was better for novel targets and there 
was no influence of prior predictiveness on the detection of familiar 
targets. Panel B shows the effect of predictiveness averaged across lag. 
Target detection was better when targets were flanked by non-predictive 
distractors. Error bars show within-subject standard error of the mean 
(Cousineau, 2005). 
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2.4.3. Discussion 
 The aim of this experiment was to replicate the distractor effect observed in 
Experiment 3 by making use of a design that also included a manipulation of novelty 
during RSVP. Overall, there was a robust effect of familiarity that played out 
differently across target and distractor conditions. That is, there was a benefit in 
detection for novel targets, and better target detection when distractors were familiar. 
In line with previous experiments, there was no evidence that the predictiveness of 
targets influenced target identification. While a distractor effect was observed, this 
was in the opposite direction to that seen in Experiment 3. The effect of familiarity 
did differ according to whether distractors were predictive or non-predictive, however 
this amounted to a benefit in target performance for targets flanked by non-predictive 
distractors.  
 Taken in isolation, this effect appears to suggest that non-predictive items are 
easier to inhibit as distractors compared to predictive stimuli. Similar effects have 
been reported previously whereby low value items are easier to discount as distractors 
compared to salient high value stimuli (Anderson et al., 2001; Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2009; Le Pelley et al., 2015). Certainly, this effect could also be interpreted 
in line with the idea that salient predictive distractors are causing more interference. 
In the absence of an appropriate baseline the direction in which stimuli are changing 
in selection priority remains unclear. For example, while an effect of distractor 
predictiveness was observed in both T1 and T2 data benefitting non-predictive 
distractor conditions overall, in T1 this effect was observed on the basis of reduced 
performance when novel distractors appeared in the same stream as non-predictive 
items. That is, predictive and non-predictive distractor conditions were equivalent and 
the change came from reduced detection when distractors were novel, and mixed with 
non-predictive items. In contrast, the effect in T2 arises from increased target 
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detection when distractors were non-predictive; predictive distractors and both novel 
distractor conditions were equivalent. Thus, the inclusion of some indication of 
baseline performance would facilitate interpretation of these results.  
However, the fact remains that the effect observed here goes in the opposite 
direction to that seen in Experiment 3. Thus, so far, when predictive and non-
predictive cues are pitted directly against one another, predictive distractors cause less 
interference. When these appear in separate RSVP streams amongst novel stimuli, it 
seems that non-predictive distractors lose the ability to cause interference. With no a 
priori reason as to why the addition of novelty should change the direction in which 
predictiveness influences visual selection, interpreting these results would benefit 
from being able to compare the trial types used in Experiment 3 and the trial types 
used in Experiment 4 within the same experimental design. This was the aim of 
Experiment 5.   
 
2.5. Experiment 5 
 Following on from the seemingly conflicting results of Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 4, the general aim of Experiment 5 was to further investigate the nature of 
the distractor effect. Given that the overall level of familiarity of the items contained 
in streams was quite different across Experiment 3 and Experiment 4, a design in 
which these can be directly compared would serve to clarify the discrepancy of the 
results. More specifically, it would be beneficial to confirm the direction of this effect 
in a design that also allows for the direct comparison of trials comprising fully 
familiarised items, as in Experiment 3, and trials comprising a combination of 
familiarised and novel items, as in Experiment 4. This would provide a means of 
exploring whether the overall level of familiarity within trials influences the 
 79 
expression of the distractor effect. Additionally, trials were included that consisted of 
novel items only. A novel only condition provides at least some indication of a 
baseline level of target detection when predictiveness and familiarity are not 
influencing performance.  
 
2.5.1. Methods 
Participants and apparatus 
 The participants in this experiment were 32 undergraduate psychology 
students enrolled at the University of Sydney, who took part in the study in exchange 
for partial course credit. The apparatus was identical to previous experiments.   
 
Stimuli 
 The stimuli for Experiment 5 consisted of the 32 images employed in 
Experiment 4. In Experiment 2 – Experiment 4, the same 16 images were 
counterbalanced to serve as cues A – H and S – Z. Novel items were randomised from 
the remaining stimuli. In this experiment, there were 32 counterbalancing conditions, 
as both learning cues and novel stimuli were fully counterbalanced. Allergies were 
randomly allocated to serve as outcomes O1 – O2.  
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Table 2.4 
Design of Experiment 5. 
 
Trial Type Stimulus Set T1 T2 Critical distractors 
1  P P P 
2  Novel 1 P P 
3  P Novel 1 P 
4 P & Novel 1 Novel 1 P 
5 Novel 1 P P Novel 1 
6  Novel 1 P Novel 1 
7  P Novel 1 Novel 1 
8  Novel 1 Novel 1 Novel 1 
9  NP NP NP 
10  Novel 2 NP NP 
11  NP Novel 2 NP 
12 NP & Novel 2 Novel 2 NP 
13 Novel 2 NP NP Novel 2 
14  Novel 2 NP Novel 2 
15  NP Novel 2 Novel 2 
16  Novel 2 Novel 2 Novel 2 
17  P P P 
18  NP P P 
19  P NP P 
20 P  NP NP P 
21 & NP P P NP 
22  NP P NP 
23  P NP NP 
24  NP NP NP 
25  Novel 1 Novel 1 Novel 1 
26  Novel 2 Novel 1 Novel 1 
27  Novel 1 Novel 2 Novel 1 
28 Novel 1  Novel 2 Novel 2 Novel 1 
29 & Novel 1 Novel 1 Novel 2 
30 Novel 2 Novel 2 Novel 1 Novel 2 
31  Novel 1 Novel 2 Novel 2 
32  Novel 2 Novel 2 Novel 2 
 
Note.     Each trial type appeared at lag 3 and lag 9. P denotes items that were 
predictive in learning, and NP denotes items that were non-predictive. Novel 1 and 
Novel 2 items were different sets of novel stimuli. 
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Procedure 
Learning phase.     The learning phase was the same as Experiment 2 – Experiment 4.  
 
RSVP phase.     Instructions, presentation parameters, as well as trial presentation 
remained identical to previous experiments. The design of Experiment 5 is shown in 
Table 2.4. Each of the total 256 trials (4 trials per condition) consisted of one of four 
stimulus sets. Each stimulus set was made up of two separate subsets of cues. These 
subsets were 8 predictive items (Set P), 8 non-predictive items (Set NP), 8 novel 
items (Set Novel 1), and another 8 novel items (Set Novel 2). To create the full stream, 
these were combined in the following manner: (a) Set P and Set Novel 1, (b) Set NP 
and Set Novel 2, (c) Set P and Set NP, (d) Set Novel 1 and Set Novel 2. Within each 
combination of stimuli, the identity of T1, T2, as well as the critical distractors was 
controlled in a crossed fashion.  
 Lag.     Two lags separated the two targets in this design. T2 could appear at 
lag 3 or at lag 9. Each image appeared for 58 ms followed by a blank inter-stimulus 
interval of 35 ms. This means that T2 could appear within 279 or 837 ms of T1. 
 T1.     Depending on stimulus set, T1 consisted of either a predictive, non-
predictive, novel 1, or novel 2 item. T1 could appear at serial position 3, 4, 5, or 6 
within the stream and these were used equally within each stimulus set.  
 T2.     Similarly, T2 could be a predictive, non-predictive, novel 1, or novel 2 
item. Items did not occur in the same condition twice.  
Critical distractors.     These were manipulated in the same way to previous 
experiments, and also consisted of either predictive, non-predictive, novel 1, or novel 
2 items. Non-critical distractors were assigned in the same way as previous 
experiments.  
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2.5.2. Results 
Exclusions.     According to the exclusion criteria set out for previous experiments, 5 
failed to reach an acceptable level of learning, and 7 failed to reach the criterion for 
T1 performance. These participants were replaced. 
 
Learning.     Accuracy was subjected to repeated measures ANOVA with Block (1 – 
5) as a factor. This revealed that performance increased across blocks, F(4, 132) = 
53.52, p < .001, η2p = .63, as is shown in Figure 2.16.  
 
 
Figure 2.16.     Training accuracy for the learning phase of  
Experiment 5. Error bars show SEM. 
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predictiveness of targets influences the selection of items in the AB, the primary 
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set, and balanced across the experiment, the identity of T2 could not be predicted on 
the basis of T1 identity, or the identity of the distractors. Thus, the target analyses 
were restricted to confirming that any effect of familiarity did not vary according to 
predictiveness, as was observed in prior experiments.  
 
Effect of distractors.     The effect of distractor identity on both T1 and T2 
identification is examined below.  
T1 accuracy.     First, in order to replicate the analysis of the distractor effect 
observed in Experiment 4, a 2 (Lag: 3 vs 9) × 2 (Set: Set P & N1 vs. Set NP & N2) × 
2 (Distractor: novel vs. familiar) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. This 
showed an effect of familiarity that did not rely on predictiveness, as shown in the 
upper panel of Figure 2.17. That is, there was a significant benefit in T1 detection 
when the critical distractors were familiar, F(1, 31) = 16.73, p < .001, η2p = .35. The 
remaining main effects as well as their interactions failed to reach significance, largest 
F = 1.65, p = .21, η2p = .05. 
The effect of distractor was also investigated in the stimulus set that 
comprised only familiar items, that is, the P and NP cues. This analysed the trial types 
employed in Experiment 3. Repeated measures ANOVA with Lag (3 vs. 9) and 
Distractor (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors revealed no significant main 
effects or interaction, largest F = 1.50, p = .23, η2p = .05. This effect is shown in Panel 
B of Figure 2.17. 
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Figure 2.17.     The influence of distractor predictiveness on T1 accuracy 
for trials in which predictive and non-predictive items were intermixed 
with novel cues during RSVP for lag 3 and lag 9 (Panel A). Panel B 
shows T1 accuracy for trials in which predictive and non-predictive items 
were intermixed during the same RSVP streams. There was no influence 
of distractor predictiveness on T1 accuracy. Error bars show within-
subject standard error (Cousineau, 2005). 
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T2|T1.     The effects for conditions repeating those of Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 4 are illustrated in Figure 2.18. Following Experiment 4, conditional T2 
accuracy was subjected to a 2 (Lag: 3 vs. 9) × 2 (Set: P & N1 vs. NP & N2) × 2 
(Distractor: novel vs. familiar) repeated measures ANOVA. A significant main effect 
of Lag confirmed the presence of the AB, F(1, 31) = 195.6, p < .001, η2p = .86. Again, 
performance was better when distractors were familiar, F(1, 31) = 10.21, p = .003, η2p 
= .25, though this varied according to whether distractors were predictive or non-
predictive, producing a significant Set × Distractor interaction, F(1, 31) = 4.68, p 
= .038, η2p = .13. Further, this interaction was different at lag 3 compared to lag 9, 
shown by a significant Lag × Set × Distractor interaction F(1, 31) = 4.71, p = .038, 
η2p = .13. 
To detail the three-way interaction, the Set × Distractor interaction was 
examined at each lag. At lag 3, overall performance was better for familiar distractors, 
F(1, 31) = 6.49, p = .016, η2p = .17, though this varied according to Set, F(1, 31) = 8.2, 
p = .007, η2p = .21. Simple effects analysis confirmed that T2 accuracy did not vary 
between novel and predictive critical distractor conditions, F < 1, whereas 
performance was significantly better when distractors were non-predictive compared 
to when they were novel, F(1, 31) = 16.92, p < .001, η2p = .35. The influence of 
predictiveness was no longer evident at lag 9. Only the effect of distractor familiarity 
was significant, favouring familiar distractors, F(1, 31) = 6.12, p = .02, η2p = .17. 
Remaining main effects and interactions did not reach significance, largest F  = 1.63, 
p = .21, η2p = .05. 
To examine the results in the same manner as Experiment 3, repeated 
measures ANOVA with Lag (3 vs. 9) and Distractor (predictive vs. non-predictive) 
confirmed the AB with a significant main effect of Lag, F(1, 31) = 222.44, p < .001, 
η2p = .88. While performance was slightly better for non-predictive distractor  
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Figure 2.18.     Panel A shows conditional T2 accuracy for distractor 
conditions in which familiar items and novel items were intermixed in the same 
RSVP stream. The influence of distractor predictiveness on T2 for trials in 
which predictive and non-predictive items were intermixed is shown in Panel B. 
Error bars represent within-subject standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 
2005).  
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conditions, this did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 31) = 2.98, p = .09, η2p = .08. 
The interaction was not statistically significant, F < 1.  
 
Effect of T1. The T1 analysis was restricted to the T1 identity manipulation. That is, 
T1 accuracy was analysed according to T1 identity within each set at each lag. 
Looking at the analysis for familiarity as per Experiment 4, a 2 (lag: 3 vs. 9) × 2 
(stimulus set: P_N1 vs. NP_N2) × 2 (T1: novel vs. familiar) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of T1 familiarity on T1 detection, benefitting 
novel targets, F(1, 31) = 9.93, p = .004, η2p = .24. Remaining main effects as well as 
their respective interactions failed to reach statistical significance, largest F = 1.74, p 
= .20, η2p = .05. 
 In order to analyse trials where predictive and non-predictive items were 
presented in the same stream, a 2 (Lag: 3 vs. 9) × 2 (T1: predictive vs. non-predictive) 
repeated measures ANOVA was used. This showed a marginal Lag × T1 interaction, 
F(1, 31) = 4.13, p = .051, η2p = .18, providing weak evidence that the effect of T1 
predictiveness varied according to lag. The remaining main effects were not 
statistically significant, largest F = 1.42, p = .24, η2p = .04. 
 
Effects of T2. Conditional T2 accuracy was pooled across T1 and distractor 
conditions so that T2 accuracy could be examined according to T2 identity only. 
These data were analysed by repeated measures ANOVA with Lag (3 vs. 9), Set 
(P_N1 vs. NP_N2), and T2 (novel vs. familiar) as factors. This showed a significant 
effect of lag, F(1, 31) = 202.23, p < .001, η2p = .87, but no remaining main effects or 
interactions, largest F = 2.8, p = .10, η2p = .08. 
 Performance was also examined within streams containing fully familiarised 
items. A 2 (Lag: 3 vs. 9) × 2 (T2: predictive vs. non-predictive) repeated measures 
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ANOVA revealed an effect of Lag, F(1, 31) = 200.03, p < .001, η2p = .87, but no 
further main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1.  
 
Novel baseline condition 
 A secondary aim for including trials in which only novel items appeared was 
to provide an approximation of baseline performance against which the different 
distractor manipulations could be compared. This provides at least one source of 
evidence as to the direction of change in distractor processing. In order to reduce the 
number of comparisons, the critical distractor conditions were compared against novel 
streams for T2 detection only. Novel only conditions did not differ and were therefore 
collapsed. A difference score for the conditions of interest was calculated by 
subtracting this from predictive and non-predictive distractor conditions that 
contained mixed familiarity and fully familiarised trial types. This was done 
separately at each lag. These are shown in Figure 2.19. Paired-samples t-tests 
comparing each condition to baseline revealed that target detection was significantly 
above baseline at lag 3 for the non-predictive distractor condition when these cues 
were pitted against novel items in the same stream, t(31) = 2.81, p = .009, η2p = .2. 
The trend at lag 9 was similar, t(31) = 1.8, p = .08, η2p = .09, though not statistically 
robust. No remaining conditions showed a significant difference from novel only 
performance, largest t(31) = 1.67, p = .10, η2p = .08.  
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Figure 2.19.     Difference scores for conditions in which critical distractors were 
predictive and non-predictive in RSVP streams consisting of either fully 
familiarised items or items that were novel and familiar intermixed within the same 
stream. Scores were calculated as a difference from conditions in which only novel 
stimuli were present. Error bars show within-subject SEM (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
2.5.3. Discussion 
 The main purpose of this experiment was to provide a within-experiment 
comparison of the trial types that produced seemingly conflicting results across 
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4. The effect observed in Experiment 4 was replicated 
here. That is, facilitated target detection was seen when non-predictive distractors 
flanked targets compared to when targets where flanked by novel distractors. In 
contrast, the distractor effect seen in Experiment 3 (i.e., better target performance 
with predictive than non-predictive distractors) was not evident. Indeed, when streams 
consisted of fully familiarised items, there was actually a trend towards better target 
detection when distractors were non-predictive, at least relative to novel only 
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conditions. Thus, it appears that overall the reliable finding is a benefit in non-
predictive distractor conditions when these items are pitted against novel cues in the 
same RSVP stream. These results will be considered further below.  
 
2.6. General Discussion 
 The purpose of exploring learned predictiveness in combination with the 
attentional blink was to test the hypothesis that the bias reflects an automatic change 
in the selection priority of information. There was a fairly convincing failure to 
observe any influence of the predictive history of targets on visual selection. Across 
Experiment 2 – Experiment 5 the predictive history of target items had no bearing on 
the ability of participants to identify and report those stimuli. However, the prior 
predictiveness of stimuli did appear to influence target selection indirectly, at the level 
of distractor processing. While there was some discrepancy in the direction of this 
effect across experiments, the weight of evidence favours the conclusion that 
selection is facilitated when critical distractors are familiar, but non-predictive of a 
prior outcome.  
 In line with the aims of the study, this indeed provides a clear demonstration 
of the automaticity of changes in stimulus processing associated with predictive 
validity. Given that distractors were in no way useful for reporting the identity of the 
target, one would not expect to see the effects of predictiveness emerge exclusively in 
distractor conditions on the basis of controlled attention. This raises the question of 
how changes in distractor processing influence selection in the AB. It appears that 
such changes are associated with the non-predictive stimuli, such that selection 
priority of these distractors is altered in response to learning. When performance was 
compared against streams containing only novel items, the overall trend was that 
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detection in non-predictive distractor conditions was boosted above this 
approximation of baseline target identification.  
 One possibility is that learned predictiveness is facilitating the inhibition of 
task irrelevant information. This suggestion stems from the observation that changes 
in processing associated with predictiveness appear to be confined to the role played 
by distractors. In the design used here, targets are selected on the basis of a feature 
(colour), which is independent of predictiveness. In other words, prior predictiveness 
is task irrelevant during RSVP. According to the biased competition model of 
attention, a fundamental tenet of how attention operates relies on the mutual 
suppression of items competing for processing (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Thus, 
targets and distractors are in a state of mutual inhibition until the system can resolve 
the point at which processing resources should be preferentially allocated. There is 
now much evidence showing that task set establishes a strong top-down bias 
influencing the outcome of this process (Chelazzi, Duncan, Miller, & Desimone, 
1998; Downing, 2000; Han & Kim, 2009; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; 
Woodman & Luck, 2007). Thus, it may be that the top-down attentional set directed 
towards colour targets is sufficient to counteract any advantage that learnt biases 
might contribute towards competitive interactions. One could assume that in the 
absence of that potent source of control, information that is task irrelevant is free to 
influence competitive interactions for remaining items. If this is the case, it suggests 
that non-predictive distractors are more efficiently inhibited, reducing their ability to 
interfere with other stimuli.  
 It is interesting to note that related paradigms have shown dissociated effects 
of prior reward on target and distractor processing. Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009) 
first manipulated the value associated with target and distractor items in a visual 
selection task. Value could be high or low value monetary rewards for both targets 
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and distractors. In a subsequent, unrewarded test phase, all items appeared as targets 
and distractors. In their Experiment 1, for items appearing as targets at test, neither 
prior value or utility, that is, whether an item was previously a target or distractor, had 
an influence on performance. However, a robust effect was observed for distractor 
items. High value targets were subsequently harder to ignore as distractors, producing 
worse performance. In contrast, high value distractors were easier to ignore when 
again appearing as distractors and thus facilitated performance. Interestingly, by 
manipulating the nature of the test (Experiment 2) such that distractor suppression 
was less critical, they observed an influence of reward history on targets and not 
distractors, albeit as a less robust result statistically.  
 First, these findings provide another example in which the utility of ignoring 
an item transfers across tasks to bias attention for non-target items. That is, when top-
down control is not directed towards an item, it is easier to discard that item if 
ignoring it in a past situation has facilitated learning or reward. Second, the finding 
that different test procedures produced diverging results suggests that one way to test 
the hypothesis outlined above, relating to why predictiveness effects are observed in 
distractor conditions only, would be to change the nature of the RSVP task. If the top-
down bias towards colour is overriding any potential influence of predictiveness on 
stimulus competition, then changing the congruence between response selection in 
learning and RSVP may allow a direct effect of predictiveness on target identification 
to emerge.  
 Further, this issue relates to the question of why Raymond and O’Brien (2009) 
were able to find a clear effect of valence on target detection. Indeed, while our 
learning task investigated the influence of predictiveness on the AB as opposed to 
value associations per se, there is evidence to suggest that these two kinds of learning 
influence attention in similar ways (Le Pelley, Mitchell, & Johnson, 2013). What does 
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differ between the present experiments and Raymond and O’Brien’s study is the 
similarity of response selection across the learning and AB stages. In Raymond and 
O’Brien (2009), both the learning task and the AB response required face 
identification. In the procedure here, learning required object selection followed by 
selection based on colour. This suggests that an influence of learning on target 
detection may rely on a degree of congruence between the top-down requirements of 
the attentional task and the specific selection mechanisms engaged during prior 
learning.  
 A point worth noting is that the distractor effect observed here is most easily 
detected, if not isolated to, situations in which familiar items are pitted against novel 
cues. It appears that when predictive and non-predictive items compete within the 
same stream, the influence of predictiveness on distractor processing is less clear. One 
could argue that separating predictive and non-predictive items into separate streams 
allows for a cleaner comparison, given uncertainty as to the effect of predictiveness 
on activation and inhibition. If these processes are pitted against one another, an effect 
can be difficult to observe in the AB given a high degree of variability. One problem 
with this idea is that there was no evidence that predictive distractors differed from 
novel distractor conditions. In the absence of any such indication, it remains unclear 
whether predictive distractors are maintaining salience that is comparable to novel 
items, or whether there are changes in activation or inhibition to which the measures 
used here are not sensitive.  
It is true that predictive and non-predictive items are in direct competition 
during learned predictiveness procedures in which the bias is consistently observed 
(e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Le Pelley et al., 2010; Le Pelley et al., 2011; 
Livesey et al, 2011). Unfortunately the role of novelty is yet to be systematically 
investigated in relation to learned predictiveness in more traditional two-phase 
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designs. While there is evidence that learning is still biased towards predictive items 
when these appear against novel items following the second stage of learning (Le 
Pelley, Suret, & Beesley, 2009), the question of how cue competition emerges during 
stage two when predictive and non-predictive items compete against novel cues at the 
outset remains open. This would provide a useful comparison to the results observed 
across conditions of mixed and consistent familiarity using the direct measure of 
attention used here. This provides the focus for experiments presented in Chapter 4. 
One final methodological point relates to the number of comparisons required 
with the lengthy designs employed here. These far outnumber many AB experiments 
(e.g., Dux & Harris, 2007; Harris, Benito, & Dux, 2010; Livesey & Harris, 2011; 
Harris & Little, 2010; Maki, Frigen, & Paulson, 1997), and raise the possibility of a 
Type I error. Given that the benefit in target detection for non-predictive distractor 
conditions was replicated, overall this effect appears to be robust, if subtle. 
Nonetheless, it would be ideal to provide a replication making use of a design in 
which the number of conditions, and therefore the number of required statistical 
comparisons, is reduced.  
In summary, this chapter provides evidence that at least one component of the 
learned predictiveness bias corresponds to an automatic change in stimulus selection. 
While effects of predictiveness on target selection could be interpreted as 
motivational, there is no incentive for participants to process distractors in the current 
task, suggesting that the influence of predictive history is influencing visual selection 
in a way that is independent of the intentions of the observer. Certainly, this does not 
suggest that automatic processes provide the sole basis for observing the bias. Indeed, 
many sources of evidence interact to ultimately direct attentional resources. Chapter 3 
investigates how automaticity and controlled attention might interact during learned 
predictiveness. 
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Chapter 3: Learned predictiveness and instructional manipulations 
 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, the ability to detect cues as a function of their 
predictive history was measured under conditions in which the availability of 
controlled attention was disrupted. This provides a way of assessing automatic 
changes in the processing of stimuli. In this chapter, top-down attention is 
manipulated by issuing instructions about the causal structure of the task at the start of 
the second stage of learning. As highlighted in the introduction, this approach was 
introduced in the context of learned predictiveness by Mitchell et al. (2012), who 
instructed one group of participants (the continuity condition) that previously 
predictive cues would remain predictive, and the remaining group (the change 
condition) that previously predictive cues were no longer likely to be useful. The 
critical result was a complete reversal of the learned predictiveness effect in the 
change condition, that is, more was learnt about the relationship between previously 
non-predictive cues and their associated outcomes. Thus, learned predictiveness can 
come under complete top-down control, suggesting that inferred beliefs play a role in 
producing the bias.  
Although the design of Mitchell et al.’s reversal experiment (2012) confirms 
that the effect of instructed attention is strong under certain conditions, it is not well-
equipped to test whether automatic processes also contribute to the learned 
predictiveness bias. At test, Mitchell et al. (2012) used a learning score measure that 
combines cue-outcome recall and the extent to which that same cue is judged to be 
causal. The use of this measure in learned predictiveness experiments is certainly not 
uncommon, nor is the use of causal ratings in associative learning research more 
generally. One can make a defensible argument that the strength with which a cue is 
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associated with an outcome serves as an important source of evidence when making 
judgments about the causal relationship between them, especially when no further 
information is provided that might bear on this relationship. However, when a more 
compelling source of evidence, such as an explicit instruction, is present, there are 
strong reasons to question the link between the strength of learning and the strength of 
a causal judgment. Given that a set of cues was explicitly emphasized as important in 
each condition, it is not surprising that participants responded accordingly, providing 
higher causal ratings for cues instructed as likely to be causal. This might be viewed 
as nothing more than demand characteristics, or as a genuine form of rational causal 
attribution that does not necessarily reflect the strength of learning. For example, in 
the change condition, learning might still be weaker for W, a previously non-
predictive cue. Thus, at test, the association between W and the outcome with which it 
was paired, O3 for example, would be weak. However, given the nature of the 
instruction, that is, that W is likely to be causal, participants might provide a higher 
rating in order to reflect the requirements of the task. By the same logic, a previously 
predictive cue such as A might be given a very low causal rating even if the 
participant remembers its associated outcome very well, because they have been 
instructed that the cue probably does not cause the effect.  
Certainly, it is unsurprising that explicit instruction about causation affects 
causal reasoning. However, given the introduction of this instruction, one would 
assume the relationship between associative strength and causal inference to change. 
Le Pelley et al. (2013) reported a finding in which training and instruction showed 
opposing influences, such that attentional bias towards cues with a predictive history 
of signalling a high value outcome was observed. In contrast, under some situations 
instructions issued following training produced a bias towards cues signalling low 
value outcomes. This suggests that instruction can affect causal learning, though 
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importantly in a way that is dissociable from prior training. Thus, associative history 
and instructed inference may operate as distinct bases of causal judgment. Given that 
the major theories that offer an explanation of the learned predictiveness effect (e.g. 
Mackintosh, 1975) are theories of associative learning and not causal reasoning, a 
different measurement approach is needed when instructional manipulations are used, 
one that assesses the strength of associative retrieval and the strength of causal 
judgment separately. 
The aim of the present set of experiments was to test whether these sources of 
bias could be distinguished within learned predictiveness in order to further gauge the 
relative contribution of automatic and controlled processes in producing the effect. To 
this end, instructional manipulations of learned predictiveness were explored in which 
cue-outcome recall and causal attribution were assessed separately at test. Thus, the 
test phase consisted of two components across all experiments. Cues were presented 
individually and rated on both a memory and causal inference question. The memory 
question probed the extent to which participants could accurately pair a given cue 
with its associated outcome, while the causal rating tested the extent to which a cue 
was believed to cause an allergic reaction, independent of the knowledge of the 
identity of that reaction. Given that instructional manipulations were administered 
throughout the study, one might expect a measure of causal inference to reflect that 
manipulation. That is, if you tell a participant that a specific food is likely to cause an 
allergic reaction, then their rating on a causal scale should reflect that instruction.  
However, according to interpretations of learned predictiveness that rely on 
changes in processing according to associative strength, such as that offered by the 
Mackintosh (1975) model, the benefit for previously predictive cues in Phase II relies 
on the ability of those cues to become associated with specific outcomes. The recall 
measure, therefore, should provide an indication of that association. If a dissociation 
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between these measures can be demonstrated, such that a residual bias from Phase I 
training can be observed in recall despite a direct correspondence between instruction 
and causal ratings, this would implicate automatic attentional processes in producing 
the learned predictiveness bias. Such measures have been used successfully in related 
causal learning paradigms examining the blocking effect (e.g., Mitchell, Lovibond, & 
Gan, 2005; Mitchell, Lovibond, Minard, & Lavis, 2006), but have not previously been 
applied to learned predictiveness.  
Experiment 6 attempted to replicate the finding by Mitchell et al. (2012) 
making use of the same instructional manipulation, albeit with a different cover 
scenario. To anticipate, a complete reversal was not observed, instead the results 
showed no difference across both test ratings according to predictiveness in the 
change condition. Thus learned predictiveness was abolished instead of reversed. 
Subsequent experiments introduced an orthogonal manipulation between Phase I 
predictiveness and instruction. If automatic biases are evident then one might expect 
to see differences in recall between previously predictive and non-predictive cues 
within the same instructional condition, despite causal ratings reflecting the 
instructional manipulation more directly.  
 
3.1. Experiment 6 
The aim of Experiment 6 was to replicate the instructed reversal of learned 
predictiveness reported by Mitchell et al. (2012). Participants completed the allergist 
causal learning task (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003) according to the learned 
predictiveness training structure outlined in Table 3.1. In this task, participants were 
asked to observe the allergies of a fictitious patient in order to predict which foods 
were causing various allergic reactions. At the start of Phase II, participants were told 
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that they would be observing a new patient, suffering from different allergies. Further, 
one group of participants, those in the continuity condition, were told that it was 
likely that both patients were allergic to the same foods. Those in the change 
condition were instructed that the two patients likely suffered from allergies to 
different foods. In line with the findings of Mitchell et al. (2012), we anticipated that 
learning would be sensitive to the instructions issued at the start of Phase II. However, 
given the modifications to the test phase whereby associative memory and causal 
judgment were assessed independently at test, a different pattern of responding across 
these measures was expected. If the instructional manipulation indeed serves to 
control the extent to which participants reason about the causal nature of specific cues, 
then one would expect to see this inference reflected in the causal ratings. This 
measure, therefore, should show a complete reversal of learned predictiveness 
according to instruction. On the other hand, accuracy in the recall measure relies more 
specifically on the ability to identify the outcome with which a cue was paired. While 
this should still be sensitive to the instructions given at the start of Phase II, 
demonstrating an overall benefit in recall for cues instructed as causal, an automatic 
bias may be evident in better memory for cue-outcome relationships for previously 
predictive cues (A – D) compared to previously non-predictive cues (W – Z).  
 
3.1.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
Forty-eight first year psychology students from the University of Sydney (27 
female, mean age = 19) were tested individually for Experiment 6 in exchange for 
partial course credit. The experiment was conducted on Apple Mac Mini computers 
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attached to a 17-in. CRT monitor, running software programmed in PsychToolbox for 
Matlab (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
 
Stimuli 
Eight photographic pictures of food items, consisting of: coffee, fish, lemon, 
cheese, eggs, garlic, bread, and peanuts, were selected as stimuli in the experiment. 
These were randomly allocated for each participant to serve as predictive (A – D) and 
non-predictive (W – Z) cues. All cues measured 6.9° × 6.9° of visual angle at a 
viewing distance of approximately 57 cm and were presented in pairs in the upper 
half of the screen separated by 9.5°. Four allergic reactions were randomly allocated 
to serve as the outcomes (O1 – O4). These were: headache, nausea, rash, and fever. 
Outcomes appeared in text format in the lower half of the screen. 
 
Procedure 
After being randomly allocated to either the continuity or change conditions, 
participants were informed that the task required them to take the role of an allergist 
in order to discover the allergens of a fictitious patient. They were told that on every 
trial they would observe two foods that the patient, Mr. X, had eaten. On being shown 
the foods, participants were required to predict which of two allergic reactions would 
occur. Each self-paced selection was immediately followed by feedback for the 
duration of 1 second stating whether the prediction was correct or incorrect, as well as 
providing the actual allergic reaction experienced.  
Phase 1 consisted of the eight trial types shown in Table 1. Each of these was 
presented twice in each of the eight blocks of trials. Within each block, the order of 
trials was randomized, and the left and right position of the cues was counterbalanced.  
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At the start of Phase II, participants were told that they now had a new patient, 
Miss Y, and as before would be required to learn about which foods were causing 
which allergic reactions. They were then issued with one of the following sets of 
instructions: 
 
Mr. X and Miss. Y [are/are not] allergic to the same foods. Therefore, it is highly 
[likely/unlikely] that the foods that controlled which reaction Mr. X suffered in the last phase 
will also influence which reactions Miss. Y suffers in this phase. 
 
 The instructions in italics differentiate between the two conditions, such that 
those in the continuity group were told that the two patients shared the same allergens, 
while those in the change group were told that the patients were allergic to different 
foods. Participants completed eight blocks of trials, with each block consisting of two 
of the four component discriminations shown in Table 3.1. Again, the order of trials 
was randomized and the location of cues counterbalanced.  
 
Table 3.1  
A basic learned predictiveness design (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). 
 
Phase I Phase II Test 
AW – O1 AY – O3 AC 
AX – O1 BZ – O4 WY 
BW – O2 CW – O3 BD 
BX – O2 DX – O4 XZ 
CY – O2   
CZ – O2   
DY – O1   
DZ – O1   
 
Note.  Letters (A – D and W – Z) refer to 
individual food cues. O1 – O4 refer to 
four outcomes. 
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 A test phase was administered immediately following Phase II. All cues were 
presented individually and in randomized order throughout this phase. Participants 
were first issued with the following set of instructions emphasizing the difference 
between the recall and causal ratings: 
 
Every food that Miss Y ate (during the second phase of the experiment) was only ever 
followed by one type of allergic reaction. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
food caused the allergic reaction…. Indicate which allergic reaction followed after the food 
was eaten by Miss Y. This is a bit like a memory test to see how well you recall which foods 
and which reactions went together…. [Then] indicate to what degree you think this food 
caused the allergic reaction in Miss Y. 
 
On each trial, participants were first required to indicate whether the cue had 
been paired with outcome 3 or outcome 4. This was done by making a rating on a 
linear analogue scale, labeled “Definitely goes with [outcome 3]” on the left anchor, 
and “Definitely goes with [outcome 4]” on the right anchor. The midpoint of the scale 
was made explicit with the label “No idea”. Once this rating had been made, another 
scale appeared asking participants to rate whether that cue was causal. This scale was 
labeled “Definitely does not cause the reaction” on the left, and “Definitely does 
cause the reaction” on the right. Each rating scale yielded a value out of 100. 
 Finally, a manipulation check was included to ensure participants had encoded 
the instructions at the start of Phase II. Participants were presented with both sets of 
instructions and required to report which of those applied to their patient. There were 
no exclusions on the basis of this check, all participants having correctly indicated the 
set of instructions corresponding to the condition they had completed.  
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3.1.2. Results 
Given that the critical predictions throughout this paper rely on sufficient 
acquisition of the initial component discriminations, an additional exclusion criterion 
was adopted whereby participants who failed to achieve 60% accuracy across the 
final quarter of the first phase were excluded from further analysis. This is similar 
with previous learned predictiveness protocols (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003) and 
was applied to all three experiments. No participants were excluded on the basis of 
this criterion in Experiment 6. 
   
Phase I.     In order to assess initial acquisition, the accuracy of predictions was 
averaged across the eight compound trial types for each block. Participant accuracy 
increased steadily across training. A mixed-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with block (1 – 8) and condition (continuity vs. change) as factors revealed a 
significant main effect of block, F(7, 322) = 65.37, p < .001, η2p = .59, but no 
significant effect of condition, and no block × group interaction, Fs < 1, providing no 
evidence of initial group differences. Phase I and Phase II learning curves are shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
 
Phase II.     Again, prediction accuracy was collapsed across trial types and increased 
steadily for both groups across Phase II. A mixed-measures ANOVA with training 
block (1 – 8) and group (continuity vs. change) as factors showed a significant effect 
of block, F(7, 322) = 81.48, p < .001, η2p = .64. Accuracy for the change group was 
slightly better than for the continuity group, though this difference failed to reach 
conventional levels of significance, F(1, 46) = 3.94, p = .053, η2p = .08, and there was 
no significant block × group interaction, F(7, 322) = 1.88, p = .07, η2p = .04. 
 104 
 
Figure 3.1.     Mean accuracy during training for Phase I (Panel A) and Phase II 
(Panel B) for the continuity and change conditions in Experiment 6. Error bars 
indicate SEM.   
 
Memory ratings.     For each cue, the memory rating was recoded as a score out of 
100, where 100 reflects the most confident possible choice of the correct outcome, 
and 0 reflects the most confident possible choice of the wrong outcome. Thus 50 on 
this scale is representative of chance. Scores were averaged according to whether they 
were predictive (A – D) or non-predictive (W – Z) in Phase I. These are shown for the 
continuity and change conditions in the upper panel of Figure 3.2.  
  Scores were subjected to a mixed-measures ANOVA with group (continuity 
vs. change) and predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors. There was no 
main effect of group, F < 1, and the main effect of predictiveness failed to reach  
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Figure 3.2.  Memory scores (Panel A) and Causal ratings (Panel B) for 
the continuity and change conditions for previously predictive and 
previously non-predictive cues in Experiment 6. Those in the continuity 
condition were instructed that previously predictive cues were likely to 
be relevant, while those in the change condition were instructed that 
previously non-predictive cues were likely to be relevant. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean difference between predictive and 
non-predictive cues. The dotted line in Panel A represents chance. 
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conventional significance, F(1, 46) = 3.49, p = .07, η2p = .07, despite a slight benefit 
in memory for predictive cues. However, as suggested by the figure, this resulted 
from a significant group × predictiveness interaction, F(1, 46) = 8.79, p = .004, η2p 
= .16. This was explored using simple effects analysis, which revealed that memory 
scores for predictive cues were higher than non-predictive cues in the continuity 
condition, F(1, 23) = 11.51, p = .002, η2p = .33. The scores for the predictive and non-
predictive cues did not differ significantly in the change condition, F < 1. 
 
Causal ratings.     Causal ratings were averaged according to Phase I predictiveness 
and are shown in the lower panel of Figure 3.2 for the continuity and change 
conditions. A mixed-measures ANOVA with group (continuity vs. change) and 
predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) as factors showed a significant effect of 
predictiveness, F(1, 46) = 6.22, p = .016, η2p = .12, whereby predictive cues were 
given significantly higher causal ratings overall, as well as a significant group × 
predictiveness interaction, F(1, 46) = 14.96, p < .001, η2p = .25. The main effect of 
group did not reach significance, F < 1. The simple effects analysis investigating the 
interaction revealed that the pattern of causal ratings mirrored that of the memory 
ratings. That is, the difference in causal ratings between predictive and non-predictive 
cues was significant in the continuity condition, F(1, 23) = 16.56, p < .001, η2p = .42. 
This difference was not statistically significant in the change condition, F(1, 23) = 
1.21, p = .28, η2p = .05. 
 
3.1.3. Discussion 
Experiment 6 provides a partial replication of Mitchell et al. (2012). Overall, a 
clear effect of instruction on learned predictiveness was observed on both associative 
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memory and causal ratings. In the continuity condition, recall was better for cues 
instructed as important, that is, previously predictive cues, compared to non-
predictive cues. This was also observed in the causal ratings, whereby predictive cues 
were rated as more likely to be causal compared to non-predictive cues. However, 
learned predictiveness was abolished rather than reversed in the critical change 
condition. That is, there was no difference in recall between previously predictive and 
previously non-predictive cues, and no difference in the extent to which these cues 
were considered as causal of an allergic reaction when participants were told that non-
predictive cues were informative for the second phase.  
 These results further validate the influence of voluntary processes on learned 
predictiveness. However, they provide an important extension to those of Mitchell et 
al. (2012) by demonstrating that the instructed reversal changes the strength of 
associative memory as well as the extent to which cues are judged as causal. A fairly 
significant caveat, however, is that our reversal was incomplete in the change 
condition. On the basis of the current design, this lack of complete reversal may be 
attributable to several factors. One possibility is that the instructional manipulation 
increases difficulty in the change condition. If more is learnt about the predictive cues 
in Phase I, these may still be needed for confirming the identity of cues that are 
important in Phase II. In order to know which cue is the allergen on any given trial, 
participants in this condition may use a strategy in which the known allergen from 
Phase I is identified and excluded. This is an additional process that is not necessary 
in the continuity condition. However, the trend towards higher accuracy in the change 
condition compared to the continuity condition in Phase II would argue against this 
interpretation. Alternatively, the results in the change condition might reflect 
competition between opposing inferential and automatic processes. If both of these 
processes are in operation, then an automatic attentional bias towards cues A – D 
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conflicts with the instructed explicit inference favouring cues W – Z. Although these 
two explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the question remains as to 
why they might be evident here and not in the results of Mitchell et al. (2012).  
 It is worth noting that this discrepancy arises from a different pattern of results 
in the change condition across the two experiments. In the change condition of 
Mitchell et al. (2012), learning was better for previously non-predictive cues 
compared to previously predictive cues. In our results, there was no evidence for 
differences in learning across these two cue types. Given our null result in the critical 
change condition, one potentially informative analysis is a Bayes Factor (BF) 
calculation indicating whether the null hypothesis (no difference between predictive 
and non-predictive cues) is more likely than the alternative hypotheses given the data. 
Employing a method suggested by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey and Iverson 
(2009), a BF was calculated for the t-test comparing cue types in our change condition. 
As Rouder et al. suggest, the JZS prior was used that assumes a Cauchy distribution 
of effect sizes for the alternative hypothesis (see Rouder et al., 2009 for further detail). 
Odds of 3 to 1 in favour of the alternative (BF = 0.33) or 3 to 1 in favour of the null 
(BF = 3) are widely considered to constitute moderate evidence in favour of one 
hypothesis over the other. Our analysis yielded a BF of 4.7, suggesting the null 
hypothesis is 4.7 times more likely than the alternative, providing moderate evidence 
favouring the conclusion that no instructed reversal of the learned predictiveness 
effect occured.  
 Further, there was no differentiation between recall and causal ratings. This is 
somewhat surprising in light of related causal learning research showing that causal 
judgments and prediction judgments are sensitive to different kinds of information 
about the relationship between a cue and an outcome (Vadillo & Matute, 2007; 
Vadillo, Miller, & Matute, 2005). However, while this suggests that different 
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judgments at test are sensitive to different kinds of information about the relationship 
between a cue and an outcome, there are some important differences between these 
previous protocols and the one used here. For example, the prediction judgment 
employed by Vadillo et al. (2005) requires participants to predict the likelihood that 
an outcome will occur given a cue. While this may rely on recall to some degree, it 
requires a judgment regarding probability of a future event. This is distinct from our 
recall measure which requires a judgment about the prior co-occurrence of a cue and 
an outcome, independent of what might happen if the cue were presented again in the 
future.  
 Given the introduction of an explicit instruction about causality, whether a 
dissociation between our measure of recall and causal attribution is anticipated by an 
inferential account of learned predictiveness, such as that favored by Mitchell et al. 
(2012), is unclear. While a more detailed discussion of the limitations of such an 
explanation will be examined in more detail in the General Discussion of this chapter, 
given the absence of a complete reversal in either measure, it seems unlikely that 
learning is completely under the control of inferential reasoning. In order to assess 
stimulus associability independently of causal reasoning, a clear instruction is needed 
that separates knowledge of causality from Phase I bias. Since Experiment 6 
established that a reversal instruction had a significant effect on the memory for cue-
outcome pairings, Experiment 7 sought more definitive evidence of an automatic 
effect of Phase 1 predictive validity, that is, an effect that cannot be reasonably 
attributed to the instruction itself. The reversal design is not well-equipped to test this 
possibility because, as is evident in Experiment 6, even when resistance to reversal is 
observed it might be attributed to several mitigating factors, such as the reversal 
instruction just being inherently more complex. 
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3.2. Experiment 7 
 Experiment 7 was designed to further tease apart the involvement of 
inferential and automatic processes. This was achieved by introducing an orthogonal 
manipulation between Phase I predictiveness and instruction, the design of which is 
shown in Table 3.2. The first phase of training, in which participants learnt about the 
allergies of an initial patient, was identical to that of Experiment 6. Again, 
instructions about the causal status of foods as allergens for a new patient were issued 
before the start of the second phase. In Experiment 6 participants were either told that 
the same cues were likely to be relevant for the new patient, or that different cues 
were likely to be important, thus making use of a general instruction that relied on 
Phase I learning. In contrast, in Experiment 7 all participants were told that the new 
patient was allergic to a list of four foods, the names of which were made explicit.  
Thus, for example, they were told that Miss Y is only allergic to fish, coffee, lemon, 
and cheese. The critical manipulation here is that two of those foods were predictive 
in the first phase, corresponding to cues A and C, while the remaining two were non-
predictive cues from Phase I, corresponding to cues X and Z. This means that in 
Experiment 7 there were four cues known to be causal, and four cues known to be 
non-causes. Of the known causes, two were predictive in Phase I (A and C), while 
two were non-predictive (X and Z). Of the cues now known to be safe, two were 
predictive in Phase I (B and D), and two were non-predictive in Phase I (W and Y). 
This orthogonal design therefore creates the condition in which an unambiguous 
instructional manipulation is present without removing the opportunity to observe an 
automatic influence of Phase I training, if indeed it is present.   
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Table 3.2   
Design of Experiment 7.  
 
Phase I Phase II Test 
AW – O1 AY – O3 A 
AX – O1 BZ – O4 B 
BW – O2 CW – O5 C 
BX – O2 DX – O6 D 
CY – O2  W 
CZ – O2  X 
DY – O1  Y 
DZ – O1  Z 
 
Note.  Letters indicate individual cues. Underlined 
letters indicate cues instructed as informative for 
Phase II. O1 – O6 refer to the six outcomes. 
 
 If, as suggested by the findings of Experiment 6, controlled inferential 
processes are in operation, then a clear influence of instruction should be observed 
whereby causal ratings should reflect the instructions issued at the start of Phase II. 
Thus, by providing the exact identity of the allergens, participants should be able to 
accurately identify causal and non-causal cues on test. Again, it was anticipated that 
the memory ratings would show distinct results from those of the causal ratings. 
Given the explicit nature of the manipulation, recall should be better, overall, for cues 
instructed as causal. However, if an automatic attentional bias favouring predictive 
cues is also present, then a difference should be observed between instructed cues 
according to whether they were predictive (A and C) or non-predictive (X and Z) in 
the first phase. Given the advantage conferred by predictive utility, this predicts better 
recall of cue-outcome relationships for A and C relative to X and Z. Similarly, a bias 
would be expected in favour of previously predictive cues for cues known to be non-
causal. Thus one might expect to observe better recall for B and D relative to W and 
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Y. This result, despite the introduction of knowledge equating the causality of 
predictive and non-predictive cues, would provide good evidence for an automatic 
residual bias favouring previously predictive information.  
 
3.2.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
Twenty-six University of Sydney first year students (20 female, mean age = 
19) participated in Experiment 7 for partial course credit. Apparatus remained as per 
Experiment 6. 
 
Stimuli 
Stimuli remained identical to those employed in Experiment 6 with the 
exception of the introduction of two additional allergic reactions in order to account 
for additional outcomes included within the design. These were coughing and 
sweating. 
 
Procedure 
Phase I training and instructions remained the same as in Experiment 6. 
Following Phase I, participants were told that they were now observing the allergies 
of a new patient. Further, they were issued with an instruction explicitly stating which 
foods were allergens for the new patient. That is, they were shown the names of four 
foods, corresponding to cues A, C, X, and Z and were informed that they would need 
to learn which of these corresponded to the various reactions that the patient was 
experiencing. Participants completed two blocks, each block consisting of two of the 
four trial types shown in Table 2. This change in procedure from Experiment 6, which 
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employed longer Phase II training, was motivated by an attempt to avoid ceiling 
performance in memory, given the small number of cues and the explicit nature of the 
instructional manipulation. On each trial, participants were now required to predict 
which of four allergic reactions would occur. By employing four outcomes this 
ensures that previously predictive known causes A and C were paired with different 
outcomes, as were previously non-predictive known causes, Z and X. 
 For each trial of the memory test, the four outcomes were displayed on screen 
as distinct alternatives beneath an individual cue. Participants were required to 
indicate which of these the cue had been paired with. Once that judgment had been 
completed, a rating scale appeared asking them to rate how confident they were in 
their response. The left anchor was labeled “Not at all confident”, and the right 
anchor labeled “Very confident”. This was followed by the appearance of the causal 
rating scale, which was identical to that used in Experiment 6. 
 Finally, the manipulation check required participants to report the instructed 
allergens of the second patient. Participants were excluded if they failed to correctly 
report all four allergens. Five participants were excluded on the basis of this check, as 
well as two participants who failed to reach the Phase I learning criterion, leaving 19 
participants in the analysis. Remaining details of the method were as per Experiment 
6. 
 
3.2.2. Results 
Phase I.     In line with Experiment 6, prediction accuracy was averaged across the 
eight component discriminations and again increased steadily across training, as 
shown by Figure 3.3. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
of block on accuracy, F(7, 126) = 26.35, p < .001, η2p = .59.  
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Figure 3.3.  Panel A shows mean accuracy for Phase I training for 
Experiment 7. Panel B shows accuracy for Phase II for compounds 
with an instructed component that was previously predictive 
(congruent), and an instructed component that was previously non-
predictive (incongruent). Each block represents two presentations 
of the compound trials shown in Table 3.2. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Phase II.     Accuracy for Phase II was averaged across compounds according to 
whether it contained an instructed component that was previously predictive (i.e. 
congruent: AY/CW) or an instructed component that was previously non-predictive 
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(i.e. incongruent: BZ/DX). This is shown in Figure 3.3. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with block (1 – 2) and compound (congruent vs. incongruent) showed a 
significant effect of block on accuracy, F(1, 18) = 39.29, p < .001, η2p = .69, and a 
main effect of compound, F(1, 18) = 7.25, p = .015, η2p = .29, such that accuracy was 
significantly higher for congruent compounds. The block × compound interaction 
failed to reach significance, F < 1. 
 
Memory ratings.     Accuracy for cue-outcome pairings was averaged according to 
whether cues were predictive or non-predictive in the first phase. This is shown for 
cues instructed as causal and those known to be non-causal in Figure 3.4. One 
advantage of having four outcomes at test is that differences in accuracy are 
potentially easier to detect, allowing use of outcome accuracy as a measure (without 
conflating accuracy and confidence, as is the case with most learning scores in this 
literature). These were analysed by means of a predictiveness (predictive vs. non-
predictive) × instruction (causal vs. non-causal) repeated-measures ANOVA. There 
was a significant main effect of instruction, F(1, 18) = 18.28, p < .001, η2p = .5. While 
there was no main effect of predictiveness, F < 1, predictiveness and instruction 
showed a significant interaction F(1, 18) = 10.6, p = .004, η2p = .37, such that 
accuracy was higher for predictive than for non-predictive cues instructed as causal, 
F(1, 18) = 5.7, p = .028, η2p = .24, while for known non causes accuracy for non-
predictive cues was higher relative to predictive cues, F(1, 18) = 6.4, p = .02, η2p 
= .26, as revealed by simple effects analysis.3  
 
                                                
3 For consistency with the other experiments, it is worth noting that when the same analysis was 
conducted on a measure that combined recall accuracy with confidence scores, it showed a similar 
pattern of results, that is, a robust interaction between Phase I predictiveness and instruction. 
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Figure 3.4.       Accuracy for cue-outcome pairings (Panel A) and causal 
ratings (Panel B) averaged according to predictiveness, for known causes 
and known non-causes for Experiment 7. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean difference between predictive and non-predictive cues. 
The dotted line in Panel A represents chance.  
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Causal ratings.     Again, causal ratings were averaged according to Phase I 
predictiveness and instruction, as shown in Figure 3.4. A repeated-measures ANOVA 
with predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) and instruction (causal vs. non-
causal) as factors showed a significant effect of instruction, F(1, 18) = 22.03, p < .001, 
η2p  = .55. Cues instructed as causal were given higher causal ratings at test. There 
was no main effect of predictiveness, and no instruction × predictiveness interaction, 
Fs < 1. 
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
The causal inference and cued recall tests in Experiment 7 clearly diverge. 
Causal ratings closely followed the instructions issued at the start of Phase II: 
Regardless of the predictive status of cues in the first phase, cues instructed as 
allergens were attributed as causal at test, while those known to be safe were given 
low causal ratings. Recall of cue-outcome pairings, however, showed differences 
according to predictiveness within each of the instructional conditions.  Consistent 
with predictions, the learned predictiveness effect was still evident amongst cues 
known to be allergenic. That is, more was learned about the previously predictive 
cues compared to previously non-predictive cues, despite the explicit knowledge that 
both sets of cues were allergens.  
Surprisingly, the opposite pattern emerged for cues that were known non-
causes, whereby recall was better for cues that were non-predictive in Phase I. This 
reversal raises the question of how Phase I training influences further learning under 
conditions of instructional manipulation. While the result for known causes suggests a 
role for automatic bias, this does not appear to combine with inferential reasoning in 
an additive manner to direct learning.  
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 One limitation for providing a coherent account of the observed reversal is an 
asymmetry in outcome equivalence for predictive and non-predictive components 
across the two phases. For example, given that predictive cues A and C were paired 
with distinct outcomes during Phase I, O1 and O2 respectively, one way in which 
learning about the cue-outcome relationships may have been facilitated for these cues 
in Phase II is if participants equate O1 with O3, and O2 with O5, that is, the outcomes 
with which A and C are subsequently paired. A more detailed analysis of the 
acquisition results will be considered in the General Discussion, but it is worth noting 
that acquisition was indeed better for compounds in which outcome equivalence 
might facilitate learning (i.e., AY & CW). However, given that these are also the 
compounds in which the instructed component was previously predictive, there is no 
way to distinguish the effects of outcome equivalence from Phase I predictiveness on 
learning. If the results observed in Experiment 7 can be replicated under conditions in 
which no outcome equivalence is present for predictive cues across the two phases of 
learning, this would provide clearer evidence for an interaction between automatic 
and inferential processes in learned predictiveness under conditions of instructional 
manipulation.  
 
3.3. Experiment 8 
 In Experiment 8 an extended design was employed, closely following that of 
Experiment 7. This is shown in Table 3.3. As per previous experiments, the initial 
phase of training followed the learned predictiveness procedure, though it employed 
additional cues that served to double the number of Phase I trial types. Again, at the 
start of Phase II, participants were informed which cues would be allergenic for the 
new patient. This instruction was issued at the category level whereby it was made 
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explicit that the new patient was allergic to (and only allergic to) a specific category 
of foods. Therefore, all food cues in this experiment came from one of two categories. 
Half of the cues, those corresponding to A – D as well as W – Z, belonged to one 
category that was instructed as allergenic. The remaining cues, those corresponding to 
E – H and S – V, belonged to the “safe” category, thus each compound consisted of 
one component from either category. Given that half of the cues in each category 
were predictive in Phase I, and the remaining half non-predictive, this manipulation 
creates the same conditions as those in Experiment 7. If the results observed in 
Experiment 7 are robust, then recall for previously predictive cues should be better 
than non-predictive cues in the instructed category. For the category known to be safe, 
the reverse is expected whereby recall should be better for non-predictive compared 
to predictive cues. This measure should no longer be sensitive to differences in 
outcome equivalence across the two phases of learning, which are negated in the 
extended design. For example, cues A and D are predictive of O1 during the first 
phase. These same cues are equally likely to predict O3 and O4 respectively in Phase 
II. Thus any strategy employed by participants to equate outcomes across training 
phases would yield incorrect predictions on half of the trials.  Causal ratings are again 
expected to reflect Phase II instructions, showing high causal attribution to the 
category of foods instructed as allergenic, and low ratings for foods in the category 
known to be safe.  
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3.3.1 Method 
 
Participants and apparatus 
Twenty-seven first year students enrolled at the University of Sydney 
participated in the experiment (17 female, mean age = 20). Apparatus was the same as 
previous experiments.   
 
Stimuli 
Food stimuli for this experiment were drawn from the two categories of “fruit 
and vegetables”, and “animal products such as meat, poultry, and dairy”. The eight 
fruit and vegetable category items consisted of: lemon, apple, avocado, peas, banana, 
mushroom, strawberries, and broccoli. Items from the meat and animal products 
category included: fish, milk, eggs, steak, cheese, bacon, chicken, and yoghurt. The 
four outcomes, as well as remaining details of the presentation parameters, were as 
per Experiment 6.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure for the initial phase of training was identical to that of the 
previous two experiments, though with an additional number of trial types in each 
block given the extended design. Following this, participants were again informed 
that they would be observing a new patient. They were told that this patient was only 
allergic to a specific category of food, corresponding to either fruit and vegetables, or 
animal products such as meat, poultry, and dairy. The eight compounds in this phase 
appeared twice per block, with participants completing two blocks each. The 
allocation of categories as allergens was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Aside from the additional cues presented at test, corresponding to each of the 16 cues 
included in the design, the structure of the test phase was identical to that of 
Experiment 6. This was followed by a manipulation check asking participants to 
report the category of food that the second patient was allergic to. There were no 
exclusions on the basis of this check, as all participants correctly reported the 
allergenic category. Three participants were excluded on the basis of the Phase I 
learning criterion, leaving twenty-four participants in the final analysis.  
 
Table 3.3   
Design of Experiment 8.  
 
Phase I Phase II Test 
AS – O1 AU – O3 A 
AT – O1 BV – O4 B 
BS – O2 CS – O3 C 
BT – O2 DT – O4 E 
CU – O2 EY – O3 F 
CV – O2 FZ – O4 G 
DU – O1 GW – O3 H 
DV – O1 HX – O4 S 
EW – O1  T 
EX – O1  U 
FW – O2  V 
FX – O2  W 
GY – O2  X 
GZ – O2  Y 
HY – O1  Z 
HZ – O1   
 
Note.    Letters refer to individual food cues. Underlined 
letters indicate cues instructed as causal for Phase II. O1 – O4 
refer to the four outcomes in this experiment. 
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3.3.2 Results 
Phase I.     Initial acquisition proceeded as expected, with a repeated-measures 
ANOVA showing a significant effect of block, F(7, 161) = 50.57, p < .01, η2p = .69.  
 
Phase II.     Figure 3.5 shows accuracy for Phase I and Phase II, averaged across 
compounds according to whether they contained an instructed component that was 
previously predictive (congruent) or previously non-predictive (incongruent). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with block (1 – 2) and compound (congruent vs. 
incongruent) showed a significant effect of block, F(1, 23) = 29.3, p < .001, η2p = .56. 
Acquisition for congruent compounds was slightly better than incongruent 
compounds, though this difference did not reach a conventional level of significance, 
F(1, 23) = 3.42, p = .07, η2p = .13, and there was no significant block × compound 
interaction, F < 1. 
 
 123 
 
 
Figure 3.5.     Panel A shows mean accuracy for Phase I training 
for Experiment 8. Panel B shows accuracy for Phase II for 
compounds with an instructed component that was previously 
predictive (congruent), and an instructed component that was 
previously non-predictive (incongruent). Each block represents two 
presentations of the compound trials shown in Table 3. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
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in the first phase. These are shown in Figure 3.6. for cues instructed as causal, and 
those known to be non-causal. Scores were analyzed by way of a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive) and instruction (causal vs. 
non-causal) as factors. This revealed a main effect of predictiveness, F(1, 23) = 4.81, 
p = .039, η2p = .17, a main effect of instruction, F(1, 23) = 32.62, p < .001, η2p = .59, 
as well as a significant predictiveness × instruction interaction, F(1, 23) = 9.16, p 
= .006, η2p = .29. A simple effects analysis investigating the interaction revealed that 
for instructed causes, memory scores were significantly higher for previously 
predictive compared to previously non-predictive cues, F(1, 23) = 8.36, p = .008, η2p 
= .27. For known non-causes, the benefit for non-predictive cues was marginally 
higher compared to predictive cues, showing a similar, though less robust, trend to 
that observed in Experiment 7, F(1, 23) = 3.55, p = .07, η2p = .13. 
 
Causal ratings.     Causal ratings, shown in Figure 3.6, were similarly analysed by 
repeated-measures ANOVA, showing a significant main effect of predictiveness, F(1, 
23) = 5.27, p = .03, η2p = .19, as well as a main effect of instruction, F(1, 23) = 64.52, 
p < .001, η2p = .74. The predictiveness × instruction interaction did not reach 
significance, F(1, 23) = 1.11, p = .30, η2p = .05. 
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Figure 3.6.    Memory scores (Panel A) and causal ratings (Panel B) 
averaged according to predictiveness, for known causes and known 
non-causes for Experiment 8. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean difference between predictive and non-predictive cues. The 
dotted line in Panel A represents chance.  
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3.3.3 Discussion 
 Overall, the results of Experiment 8 provide a replication of those seen in 
Experiment 7, under conditions in which facilitation through outcome equivalence is 
impossible. For cues instructed as causal, better retention of the specific cue-outcome 
relationships was observed for predictive compared to non-predictive cues. The 
difference between predictive and non-predictive cues in the safe category did not 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance by a two-tailed test (p = .07). 
Nevertheless, the ordinal pattern of means was the same as Experiment 7 and, given 
the robust interaction between predictiveness and instruction, it is very clear that prior 
predictiveness does not have the same effect on learning about known non-causes as it 
does on learning about known causes. Again, causal ratings showed little evidence of 
an interaction between Phase I training and instruction, closely reflecting the 
instructional manipulation. Further, acquisition followed a similar, though less 
statistically robust (p = .07), pattern to that observed in Experiment 7, such that 
learning was better for compounds that contained an instructed component that was 
previously predictive.  
This pattern of results suggests a reliable persistence of the influence of Phase 
I training in learned predictiveness over and above the influence of instructional 
manipulations. Although making use of a categorical instruction appears to have 
improved memorability of the instruction following Phase II, this may have allowed 
for differences in generalization between cues across Phase I and Phase II. As cues 
from the same category are likely to be more similar to one another compared to cues 
from the alternative category, the associability of an item from Phase I might 
generalize more readily to items of the same category in Phase II. However, this is 
highly unlikely to have a confounding influence on the results. Across both stages of 
learning, each compound consisted of one component from either category. However, 
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each category consisted of cues that were predictive in Phase I, and cues that were 
non-predictive in Phase I. Take for example the instructed components A and Y, from 
compounds AU and EY respectively. Both A and Y are taken from the same category, 
yet one was predictive in Phase I, that is A, and one was non-predictive in Phase I, 
that is Y. If there was greater generalization between members of the same category, 
this would affect both A and Y. This means that any potential generalization of 
associability within a category is equated for predictive and non-predictive 
components. 
 
3.4 General Discussion 
 Three experiments investigated the effect of instructional manipulations on 
associative memory and causal reasoning in learned predictiveness. In all experiments, 
the instructional manipulation clearly influenced recall of cue-outcome associations. 
Overall, this was also the case for causal ratings. While these closely followed the 
pattern of results observed for cue-outcome recall in Experiment 6, causal judgments 
in Experiments 7 and 8 diverged from our measure of associative memory. In line 
with the findings of Mitchell et al. (2012), Experiment 6 confirmed that reversal 
instructions influence the learned predictiveness bias, and provided an important 
extension by demonstrating that this influence is not isolated to causal reasoning, but 
also includes associative memory. In the continuity condition, both recall and causal 
attribution were higher for predictive cues compared to non-predictive cues. However, 
the reversal of the learned predictiveness effect in the change condition was 
incomplete as no difference between predictive and non-predictive cues was observed 
across both measures. It is unclear why the instructed reversal of learned 
predictiveness was not found here while Mitchell et al. (2012) showed strong 
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evidence for a reversal. One difference between the two protocols is the conceptual 
scenario employed. In the study of Mitchell et al. (2012), fictitious seeds, acting as the 
predictive and non-predictive cues are cross-pollinated in order to grow various 
shapes of tree, the outcomes. This scenario potentially favours a more categorical 
inferential process. Given the nature of the causal relationship between seeds and 
trees, that is, that only one seed will grow a specific tree, this aspect of the design 
raises the possibility that a complete reversal was facilitated based on conceptual 
aspects of the scenario in addition to the manipulation of interest. Specifically, if each 
outcome is most likely attributable to only one of the compound components during 
Phase II and not the other, this means that at test, ratings are more likely to reflect a 
mutually exclusive causal structure across those same components. However, whether 
this conceptual component would be sufficient to strengthen the magnitude of the 
reversal remains an empirical question.  
 Subsequent experiments provided clear evidence of an automatic bias in Phase 
II recall according to Phase I training. Making use of an orthogonal manipulation 
between Phase I predictiveness and instructions issued at the item (Experiment 7), and 
categorical (Experiment 8) level, a robust benefit in recall for previously predictive 
compared to previously non-predictive cues was observed for cues known to be 
allergenic. Surprisingly, this reversed for known non-causes as recall was higher for 
non-predictive cues. This reversal raises the question of how Phase I training 
influences further learning under conditions of instructional manipulation. While the 
result for known causes suggests a role for automatic bias, this does not appear to 
combine with inferential reasoning in an additive manner to direct learning.  
One explanation for this result is that instead of directing attention in a rigid 
fashion, predictive utility enhances cognitive control. That is, previously predictive 
cues are both easier to attend and ignore, depending on task requirements. According 
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to this explanation, learning is facilitated for predictive known causes and suppressed 
for predictive cues known to be non-causal. 
 An alternative explanation can be made on the assumption that differences in 
congruence between instruction and predictive history is crucial for the rate of 
learning about the Phase II compounds. In both Experiments 7 and 8, some Phase II 
compounds can be seen to possess congruence between instruction and Phase I 
predictive utility. For example, in Experiment 7, for compounds AY and CW, 
predictive cues in Phase I are instructed as causal for Phase II and non-predictive cues 
in Phase I are instructed as non-causes in Phase II and thus remain irrelevant. In 
contrast, a switch in the utility of the cues occurs for the Phase II compounds BZ and 
DX in which cues that are non-predictive in Phase I are instructed as causal in Phase 
II, and cues that were predictive in Phase I are known to subsequently be non-causal. 
The incongruence between Phases of the utility of the cues in the latter set of 
compounds may produce a cost to learning about all stimuli present on those trials. 
Likewise, according to this explanation, when the predictiveness of the cues from 
Phase I and the instructions about causation in Phase II are congruent, learning about 
all presented cues is achieved relatively easily. This raises the possibility that less is 
learned in general about Phase II compounds in which participants have to attend to 
the previously non-predictive cue and ignore the previously predictive cue.  
The rate of learning in Phase II for congruent trial types appeared to be 
somewhat higher than for the incongruent trials in both Experiments 7 and 8. 
Prediction accuracy was higher for congruent trials in Experiment 7 and trended in the 
same direction in Experiment 8. This result is consistent with there being interference 
to the general rate of learning on incongruent trials. However, it is worth noting that 
this result is also amenable to an explanation based on a change in cognitive control. 
If previously predictive cues afford greater cognitive control then each would serve as 
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a highly attended and therefore associable cue on congruent trials or an efficiently 
ignored cue on incongruent trials. If cognitive control of the previously non-predictive 
cues was poorer, and thus did not compensate fully for the attention or suppression of 
the predictive cue, then net performance would remain higher on congruent trials than 
on incongruent trials. 
Finally, a third alternative, based on the formation of within-compound 
associations during Phase II, might explain the observed interaction between Phase I 
training and instruction. During Phase II, there were compounds in which the 
instructed component was predictive in Phase I, such as AY, and compounds in which 
the instructed component was non-predictive in Phase I, such as BZ. If Phase I 
predictiveness increases the strength of the association for instructed components, 
then the predictive, instructed cue A would be expected to form a strong association 
with O3 on trials in which AY is present. In contrast, the non-predictive instructed 
component Z would be expected to form a weaker association with O4 on trials in 
which BZ is present. The formation of within-compound associations between A and 
Y therefore predicts that learning about Y is benefitted indirectly by virtue of a Y-A-
O3 chain. Alternatively, the association between B and Z predicts that learning about 
B receives less benefit by virtue of the B-Z-O4 chain. This leads to the prediction that 
learning for A should be greater than learning for Z, but also that learning for B 
should be less than learning for Y, which is the pattern of results observed. Indeed, 
evidence consistent with the formation of within-compound associations during 
causal learning has previously been reported (Dickinson & Burke, 1996). While 
retrieval-based associative models can largely explain these effects without appealing 
to the presence of within-compound associations (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001), 
whether these are necessary in explaining the present data will depend on further 
defining the nature of the interaction. 
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 Regardless of why this interaction between predictive history and instruction 
occurs, an interesting feature of the results is that the outcome recall measures clearly 
produced a different set of results to the causal ratings across both experiments. The 
causal ratings closely followed the instructions issued at the start of Phase II. 
Theorists who claim a link between associative learning and causal inference (e.g., 
McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994) usually assume that the strength with which a 
cue retrieves an associated outcome serves as one potential source of evidence on 
which a causal judgment might be made. This does not preclude the possibility that 
causal judgments might be made on the basis of alternative sources of evidence, such 
as the product of explicit inferences, if the individual is given sufficient motivation to 
do so. Direct instructions do exactly this. Importantly, our results demonstrate that 
despite the instructions having a profound effect on causal ratings, and a strong effect 
on memory-based judgments, there was still clear evidence that Phase I learning 
impacted on associative memory in a way that is not explained by the instruction. It 
should be noted that there was also some evidence for an influence of predictiveness 
on causal attribution in Experiment 8. This suggests that causal judgments, though 
reflecting explicit inference, may nonetheless be influenced by the strength of 
associations in some situations. 
 One important point to consider here, however, relates to the predictions 
generated by an inferential account of associative learning. In their investigation of 
memory and causal reasoning in the context of blocking, Mitchell et al. (2006) have 
argued that an inferential account predicts a dissociation between measures of 
associative memory and causal reasoning. In the case of blocking, a novel (blocked) 
cue appears alongside a cue previously established as causal. An inferential account 
makes the assumption that the relationship between the blocked cue and the outcome 
with which it is paired is indeed encoded. The memory of that relationship then serves 
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as a means to judge that same cue as non-causal. Thus, memory ratings for blocked 
cues should be comparable to cues previously established as causal. On the other hand, 
causal ratings for blocked cues would be low, while causal ratings for previously 
causal cues should be high. If this line of reasoning is extended to a more traditional 
demonstration of learned predictiveness, a strong inferential position might predict no 
evidence of learned predictiveness in associative memory, rather observing the bias in 
causal attribution. That is, one might expect to observe no difference in associative 
memory between predictive and non-predictive cues, while causal attribution would 
be high for predictive cues and low for non-predictive cues.  
However, this line of reasoning becomes less clear when an instruction is 
introduced into the procedure. Given that the instructions are issued at the start of 
Phase II, participants have access to the explicit inference regarding causality while 
they are engaged in learning, and therefore have little reason to encode information 
about cues known to be non-causal. For example, if participants know that A is causal 
and that Y is non-causal, when encountering these cues during training there is little 
motivation to remember the relationship between Y and the outcome with which it is 
paired. Thus, whether an inferential account would predict the same dissociation 
when attention is purposefully biased via explicit instruction is unclear. This raises the 
question of whether an inferential account of associative learning is specified in 
enough detail in order to generate clear predictions in situations where automatic 
biases may be interacting with higher order inferences.  
Certainly, it remains unclear as to whether these are best thought of as distinct 
ways in which information is processed, or whether automatic associations form the 
underlying structure from which inferences emerge. In either case, once an inference 
is present it is unlikely to exhibit the same properties as a simple association. The fact 
that the effects of instruction and predictive history are dissociable but seemingly 
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interactive seems to support this. Given that measures of causal learning were 
seemingly more sensitive to instruction than measures of associative memory, this 
raises the question of whether different kinds of learning are equivalent in their 
sensitivity to inferential processes. It may be that learning about causal value is under 
greater control of inferential processing. Whether instructions would manipulate 
predictive learning for example, independently of causal value, remains to be seen. 
Overall, the present findings are consistent with an increasing collection of 
results from related paradigms demonstrating that predictiveness influences stimulus 
selection in tasks that are thought to reflect non-strategic processes. For example, it 
has been shown that previously predictive cues facilitate learning of subsequent 
spatial motor response sequences (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010), capture spatial 
attention (Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013), and attenuate the attentional blink 
(Livesey, Harris, & Harris, 2009). While this provides evidence for an automatic 
attentional bias, it should be noted that our observed reversal in recall does not 
conform to the proposed relationship between associability and predictive history. 
Accordingly, there are a number of studies suggesting that the learned predictiveness 
effect does not operate via the competitive associative algorithms of attentional 
change described by Mackintosh (1975; Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). 
For instance, Le Pelley et al. (2010b) found that competition between cues in 
compound was not necessary for learned predictiveness to occur, and Livesey et al. 
(2011) found no evidence that direct (i.e. within-trial) comparison between predictive 
and non-predictive cues affected the magnitude of learned predictiveness. The current 
study demonstrates another way in which the automatic allocation of attention appears 
to behave differently from model predictions. Although there appears to be a 
relatively automatic influence of the predictive history of the cues, that influence only 
matches the predictions of associative learning theories for cues that are deliberately 
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attended. 
So far, the interpretation has assumed that associability influences the strength 
of learning, such that cues with high α following Phase I have a direct benefit in the 
formation of subsequent associations. However, Mackintosh (1975) did raise the 
possibility that associability may influence performance as well as learning. Indeed, 
some models describe cue competition effects largely in terms of performance effects 
on test rather than acquisition deficits (Stout & Miller, 2007). Accordingly, Le Pelley, 
Suret, and Beesley (2009) have noted that a performance-based explanation of learned 
predictiveness would allow for equivalent gains in associative strength for predictive 
and non-predictive cues across Phase II. The observed bias is therefore a function of 
increased responding to cues with high α at test, that is, those that were predictive in 
Phase I. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that predictiveness impacts 
performance as well as learning (Le Pelley et al., 2009). Given that evidence of 
differences in acquisition was found in Experiments 2 and 3, it seems unlikely that 
our results would be amenable to explanations of learned predictiveness that rely 
exclusively on performance at test to explain differences in learning scores. However, 
it is possible that the effects reported here reflect a combination of changes in 
performance as well as learning.  
In conclusion, it would appear that automatic biases in learning persist under 
conditions of explicit instructional manipulation of the learned predictiveness effect. 
Further, these results suggest a distinct effect of associative memory and causal 
reasoning in producing the bias. However, these processes do not appear to influence 
learning in an additive manner. Rather, it seems that reasoning and associative 
memory combine in ways that are not directly anticipated on the basis of attentional 
models of associative learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975). As stated at the end of 
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Chapter 2, a useful comparison for the effects observed when selection was measured 
during the AB in combination with manipulations of novelty would be an 
understanding of how learned predictiveness proceeds in combination with novelty 
under more traditional procedures demonstrating the effect. This was the aim of 
Chapter 4, which also allows a test of various explanations offered for the effects 
observed above.  
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Chapter 4: Learned predictiveness and novelty 
 
 In Chapter 2, the influence of predictiveness on stimulus selection during the 
attentional blink was assessed, both when predictive and non-predictive items were in 
direct competition with one another (Experiment 2 – Experiment 3, and Experiment 
5), as well as when predictive and non-predictive cues were independently contrasted 
with novel items (Experiment 4 – Experiment 5). Chapter 3 investigated the nature of 
the direct competition between predictive and non-predictive cues under conditions 
where controlled attention was manipulated via instructions. This chapter extends the 
findings reported in Chapter 3, to include manipulations of familiarity in which 
predictive and non-predictive stimuli compete against novel items when volitional 
attention is manipulated. Thus, the question of interest in this study is how novelty 
influences the expression of learned predictiveness when instructions are issued about 
the causal nature of the cues. This provides a useful comparison of the effects of 
novelty under the various manipulations of cognitive control employed thus far.  
 While the effect of novelty on learned predictiveness has yet to be 
systematically investigated, there is some indication as to how predictiveness may 
operate in situations where predictive and non-predictive components appear 
separately during training. For example, Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers, and Knipe 
(2010) demonstrated that the benefit for previously predictive cues holds when that 
prior predictiveness is established for individual cues via single cue – outcome 
associations. Thus the benefit in learning for predictive cues emerges even when 
predictive and non-predictive components are not directly competing on a single 
learning trial. Similarly, Livesey et al. (2011) showed that even when participants are 
learning about the relationship between compound trials and an outcome, the direct 
comparison of predictive and non-predictive components within a trial is not 
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necessary to produce the effect. Rather, there is little evidence that the relative 
predictiveness of cues provides any additional contribution towards the bias beyond 
the effects of the absolute predictiveness of a single component. This evidence 
suggests that changes in stimulus selection during learned predictiveness operate at 
the level of individual cues, such that subsequent cue competition in favour of 
predictive components does not rely on the direct within-trial comparison of 
predictive and non-predictive components. 
 In line with this, in their Experiment 4, Le Pelley, Suret, and Beesley (2009) 
investigated a learned predictiveness task in which the second stage of learning 
incorporated two different sets of associations, experienced sequentially. First, 
participants completed traditional trial types comprising a combination of previously 
predictive and previously non-predictive cues. Following the acquisition of these cue 
– outcome pairings, new compounds were introduced, without any obvious break in 
training, that continued to predict the same outcomes, within the same context. Both 
predictive and non-predictive cues were paired with novel stimuli. Thus, predictive 
cue A was paired with novel cue a to form the compound Aa, and non-predictive cue 
W was paired with the novel cue w to create the compound Ww. When examining the 
learning for novel cues, they observed poorer learning for novel cues appearing in 
compound with predictive cues, such as cue a, compared to novel cues appearing 
alongside non-predictive cues, such as cue w. That is, predictive cues were more 
likely than non-predictive cues to block learning about the relationship between the 
novel cue and an already predicted outcome.  
Thus, the increased selection priority of predictive cues appears to hold 
against novel items, at least under conditions in which novelty does little to signal the 
appearance of new outcomes. This provides an interesting contrast to demonstrations 
in which attention is automatically directed towards novel stimuli during tasks in 
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which the influence of learning is less explicit. For example, in visual search, when 
overall familiarity is manipulated across trials, novel stimuli automatically capture 
attention amongst familiar cues (Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliot, & DeWitt, 1990; 
Johnston & Schwarting, 1997; Neo & Chua, 2006). If items are pre-exposed in a 
separate task, faster reaction times are observed for novel targets amongst familiar 
distractors (Kaplan & Lubow, 2001; Lubow & Kaplan, 1997). Similarly, the 
introduction of novel distractors appears to interfere with performance (Lubow & 
Kaplan, 1997).  
Such studies manipulate novelty in a manner that is separate from, or 
incidental to, the intentions of the observer. That is, the task is always to search for 
and respond as quickly as possible to a specific target. Any influence of novelty, 
whether at the level of target or distractor, therefore appears unlikely to emerge from 
any intention to direct attention towards or away from novel items. However, 
optimising the allocation of attentional resources may rely on some degree of 
flexibility in responding to novelty, such that the extent to which novel items compete 
for processing resources depends on the context in which they are encountered. When 
controlled attention is manipulated, task instructions can influence the selection of 
novelty. Chong et al. (2008) differentially emphasised the importance of target 
detection versus exploratory visual search in a task that required a response to a target 
appearing amongst a small number of novel items. They observed decreased 
attentional responses to novel items under conditions in which target detection was 
highlighted, suggesting that task instructions can influence the extent to which 
novelty directs selection.  
As a whole, these data suggest that while attention appears to be biased 
towards novelty in a fairly automatic fashion, the influence of top-down, volitional 
attention can modulate the expression of that bias. What is unclear is how learning in 
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particular influences this process, when familiar items have received equivalent pre-
exposure but differ in prior predictiveness. The present chapter starts by investigating 
how learned predictiveness proceeds under conditions in which novel items are paired 
with predictive and non-predictive components at the start of Phase II. Subsequent 
experiments observe how learning proceeds for those same compounds when 
instructional manipulations are introduced.  
 
4.1. Experiment 9 
 Experiment 9 was designed to examine the expression of learned 
predictiveness when predictive and non-predictive cues compete against novel items 
under conditions that mimic traditional demonstrations of the bias, that is, in the 
absence of instructions that explicitly state the identity of the causal components in 
Phase II. This provides a useful comparison of how learned predictiveness emerges in 
combination with novelty under traditional procedures, and how it emerges in 
combination with novelty when measured via the AB (Chapter 2). A secondary aim 
for introducing novelty is to test the predictions set out in Chapter 3 as they relate to 
the various explanations offered for the interaction between predictiveness and 
instruction. This will be addressed in Experiment 10. However, as a necessary pre-
curser, in this study, the design of which is shown in Table 4.1, one group of 
participants, Group Standard, completed the standard two-stage learned 
predictiveness task. For the remaining group, Group Novel, predictive and non-
predictive cues from Phase I were each paired with a novel component such that each 
compound consisted of one familiar cue and one novel cue. Given the findings of Le 
Pelley et al. (2009), it was anticipated that the benefit in learning for predictive cues 
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would be preserved when these appeared alongside novel cues during Phase II. Thus, 
a bias towards predictive over non-predictive cues is expected in both conditions.  
 
4.1.1. Methods 
Participants and apparatus 
 Fifty-six undergraduate psychology students (37 female, mean age 19.5) 
enrolled at the University of Sydney participated in the experiment in exchange for 
partial course credit. The apparatus was the same as for previous experiments.  
 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli consisted of 16 photographic images of food items, including coffee, 
fish, lemon, olive oil, banana, apple, cheese, milk, eggs, garlic, bread, pasta, peanuts, 
avocado, steak, and mushrooms. These were randomly allocated to serve as the cues 
shown in Table 4.1. All images measured 6.9° × 6.9° of visual angle at a viewing 
distance of approximately 57 cm and were shown in pairs in the upper half of the 
screen separated by 9.5°. Four allergic reactions were chosen to serve as outcomes O1 
– O4. These were randomly allocated and consisted of headache, nausea, rash, and 
fever.  
 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly allocated to Group Standard or Group Novel. The 
instructions at the start of Phase I and presentation parameters were identical to those 
in Chapter 3. Phase I consisted of the trial types shown in Table 4.1. These were 
identical for both groups and were presented twice in each of the eight blocks 
comprising this stage of learning. The order of trials was randomised and the left and 
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right position of the cues was counterbalanced within blocks. Following Phase I 
participants were told that they would now be observing a new patient with different 
allergic reactions and that they would be required to discover which foods were 
causing which allergic reaction based on their observations. For those in Group Novel, 
predictive cues A – D now appeared alongside novel cues a – d, whereas non-
predictive cues W – Z appeared alongside novel cues w – z, as is shown in Table 4.1. 
For Group Standard, trial types consisted of traditional Phase II learned predictiveness 
compounds, that is, compounds comprising predictive and non-predictive cues in 
novel combinations. In addition, they responded to compounds consisting of the novel 
cues a – d as well as w – z (see Table 4.1). Participants completed four blocks of trials. 
Each compound appeared twice per block, with the left and right position of the cues 
counterbalanced.  
Immediately following the second training phase, each cue was tested 
individually, in random order. Participants were instructed that they would be 
observing the foods that the second patient had eaten and would be required to judge 
how likely it would be that a specific food caused each of the allergic reactions. On 
each trial, the cue was presented in the upper half of the screen, with two analogue 
rating scales appearing below it. Each rating scale was titled, How likely is it that [O3 
/ O4] will follow given that Miss Y ate this food? The left anchor was labelled 
Definitely WILL NOT occur, and the right anchor was labelled, Definitely WILL occur. 
Participants were required to make a selection on each scale before moving on to the 
next trial, which was self paced. Each rating scale yielded a score out of 100.  
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Table 4.1 
Design of Experiment 9 
 
 
 
Note.     Letters represent food cues. Lowercase letters denote food cues that 
are novel at the beginning of Phase II. O1 – O4 refer to the four outcomes 
employed during the experiment.  
 
Phase I Phase II Test 
Group Standard  
All cues individually 
AW – O1 AY – O3 
AX – O1 BZ – O4 
BW – O2 CX – O3 
BX – O2 DW – O4 
CY – O2 ay – O3 
CZ – O2 bz – O4 
DY – O1 cx – O3 
DZ – O2 dw – O4 
Group Novel  
All cues individually 
AW – O1 Aa – O3 
AX – O1 Bb – O4 
BW – O2 Cc – O3 
BX – O2 Dd – O4 
CY – O2 Ww – O3 
CZ – O2 Xx – O4 
DY – O1 Yy – O3 
DZ – O2 Zz – O4 
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4.1.2. Results 
Exclusions.     Participants were excluded if they failed to reach 60% accuracy during 
the last quarter of the first phase. Four participants failed to reach this criterion and 
were excluded.  
 
Phase I.     Prediction accuracy was averaged across compounds for each block. This 
increased steadily for both groups during Phase I, as shown in Figure 4.1. Scores were 
analysed by way of a mixed measures ANOVA with Block (1 – 8) and Condition 
(novel vs. standard) as factors. This revealed a significant effect of Block, F(7, 350) = 
81.97, p < .001, η2p = .62, but no main effect of Condition and no Block × Condition 
interaction, all Fs < 1, showing no evidence of initial group differences.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.     Accuracy for Phase I averaged across 
compounds for Group Standard and Group Novel. Error 
bars show SEM. 
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Phase II.     Accuracy for Phase II learning was analysed separately for each group 
and is shown in Figure 4.2. Panel A of the figure shows training accuracy for Group 
Standard. For this group, accuracy was averaged according to whether compounds 
consisted of familiar items, that is, one predictive and one non-predictive item, or 
whether compounds consisted of novel items, which appeared in separate trials. 
A 4 (Block: 1 – 4) × 2 (Familiarity: novel vs. familiar) repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that accuracy increased steadily across blocks, producing a main effect of 
Block, F(3, 78) = 30.20, p < .001, η2p = .54. Overall learning was better for novel 
compounds, F(3, 78) = 37.65, p < .001, η2p = .6, and there was no significant Block × 
Familiarity interaction, F(3, 78) = 1.12, p = .35, η2p = .04. 
For Group Novel, each compound consisted of one novel component, and one 
familiar component that was either predictive or non-predictive in Phase I. Thus, 
accuracy was averaged according to whether the familiar component in a compound 
was predictive or non-predictive. This is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 4.2. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with Block (1 – 4) and Compound (predictive vs. non-
predictive) as factors showed a significant effect of Block, F(3, 72) = 60.19, p < .001, 
η2p = .71, but no main effect of Compound and no Block × Compound interaction, all 
Fs < 1.  
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Figure 4.2.    Phase II accuracy for Experiment 9. Panel 
A shows accuracy for Group Standard across training 
blocks during Phase II for compounds consisting of 
familiar items and compounds consisting of novel items. 
Panel B shows accuracy for Group Novel averaged 
according to whether a compound contained a familiar 
item that was predictive or non-predictive in Phase I. 
Error bars show SEM.  
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Test.   In order to assess the extent to which individual cues were associated with 
outcomes at test, a learning score was calculated for each cue by subtracting the rating 
for the outcome that was not predicted on the basis of that cue from the rating for the 
outcome that was predicted on the basis of the cue. This variable was transformed to 
reflect a score out of 100, ranging from 0 to 100, with 50 representing chance. These 
scores were averaged for predictive and non-predictive cues, as well as novel cues a – 
d and w – z. These are shown separately for Group Standard and Group Novel in 
Figure 4.3.   
First, in order to examine the presence of learned predictiveness across groups, 
predictive cues were compared to non-predictive cues for each group separately using 
paired-samples t-tests. This confirmed the traditionally observed benefit in learning 
about previously predictive cues in Group Standard (i.e., where predictive and non-
predictive items appeared in the same compound in Phase II), t(26) = 2.83, p = .009, 
η2p = .24. This was absent in Group Novel (i.e., where predictive and non-predictive 
items appeared on separate trials alongside a novel cue), t(24) = .26, p = .79, η2p 
= .003.  
A 2 (Familiarity: novel vs. familiar) × 2 (Group: standard vs. novel) mixed 
measures ANOVA showed that novel cues were learnt about more effectively than 
familiar cues in both groups, as shown by a significant main effect of Familiarity, F(1, 
50) = 27.72, p < .001, η2p = .36, that did not vary by group, F(1, 50) = 1.40, p = .24, 
η2p = .03. The main effect of group also failed to reach significance, F(1, 50) = 2.40, p 
= .12, η2p = .05. Finally, there was no significant difference between novel cues a – d 
and w – z in both groups, as shown by mixed-measures ANOVA with Cue (ad vs. wz) 
and Group (standard vs. novel) as factors. This produced no significant effects, largest 
F(1, 50) = 1.44, p = .24, η2p = .03.  
 147 
 
Figure 4.3.     Learning scores for Group Standard and Group Novel 
for Experiment 9. Scores were averaged across predictive and non-
predictive cues from Phase I, as well as novel cues a – d and w – z 
respectively. Error bars show SEM.  
 
 
4.1.3. Discussion 
 Despite observing a robust learned predictiveness effect under conditions 
employing traditional trial types, Experiment 9 found no evidence of the learned 
predictiveness bias that held for individual cues when these appeared with novel 
stimuli at the start of Phase II. Rather, under these conditions, learning was 
preferentially directed towards novel items. 
This is somewhat surprising in light of the results reported by Le Pelley et al. 
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difference between this design and theirs is that in Le Pelley et al. (2009) novel cues 
did little to signal the presence of any new outcome or context because they were 
introduced once Phase II training was already underway. In the design used here, 
novel cues appeared alongside previously predictive and non-predictive items at the 
outset of Phase II. This suggests that once a bias towards learning about predictive 
cues in Phase II has been established, such as in Le Pelley et al. (2009), this is robust 
against the subsequent introduction of novelty. In contrast, when predictive and non-
predictive items appear alongside novel cues at the outset of the new learning context, 
as they did here, their predictive history no longer influences learning.  
Several theorists claim that multiple sources of evidence are integrated in 
order to judge the causal relationship between co-occurring events, (e.g., McLaren, 
Green, & Mackintosh, 1994; McLaren et al., 2014). This suggests that there are 
several possibilities regarding the content of information that is transferred between 
the two stages of learning in a learned predictiveness procedure. For example, one 
thing that participants learn in the first phase is that the patient is only ever allergic to 
one food presented on any given trial. This is necessary for successfully learning the 
causal structure of this stage given the design. If this factor transfers to subsequent 
phases, this means that at the start of Phase II, participants in Group Novel are faced 
with a novel cue appearing alongside a familiar cue that has been associated with a 
prior alternative outcome, or a familiar cue that is non-predictive of any specific 
outcome. If only one of these components is assumed to be potentially causal of a 
new outcome, one could reasonably argue that this creates a situation in which novel 
cues more readily become the focus of new learning. 
This could reflect automatic associative processes whereby in the absence of 
interference from prior cue – outcome associations, novel stimuli are learnt about 
more easily. Alternatively, it could arise from an explicit assumption on the part of 
 149 
the subjects that novel cues are more informative about new outcomes, in line with 
the arguments of Mitchell, de Houwer, & Lovibond (2009) and Mitchell et al. (2012). 
It should be noted that this strategy does not necessarily reflect a rational inference, 
given that there is no reason to think that any relationship experienced in the first 
phase is useful for learning the allergies of a distinct person. By this same logic, one 
could argue that the presence of learned predictiveness is not logical either. Thus, the 
challenge is in disentangling any number of assumptions that might exist in a situation 
of causal ambiguity.  
The important point is that in the absence of explicit knowledge about 
causality, causal ambiguity can be resolved in a number of ways. It appears that 
novelty provides a strong source of evidence during this process in a way that 
overrides any prior influence of predictiveness. It is interesting to note that the lack of 
learned predictiveness in Group Novel appears to be driven by a rise in learning for 
non-predictive cues as opposed to a drop in learning for the predictive cues. This 
suggests that the introduction of novelty is influencing the way in which 
predictiveness affects subsequent learning as opposed to generating a deficit in 
learning for familiar cues overall. One could argue that this could be explained by 
appealing to within-compound associations. If the association between the novel cue 
w and the outcome is strong, at test this may boost responding to the familiar, non-
predictive, cue W given its within-compound association with w. However, to 
anticipate, the validity of this explanation appears to break down in the context of 
subsequent findings. This issue is discussed in further detail in the General Discussion 
of this chapter. 
Based on the issues raised above, Experiment 10 attempts to reduce the extent 
to which novel cues completely override a bias towards predictive stimuli via causal 
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certainty in the form of instructions. This may allow a clearer test of the relationship 
between novelty and predictive history. 
 
4.2. Experiment 10 
 This experiment, the design of which is shown in Table 4.2, employs a variant 
of the orthogonal manipulation between instruction and Phase I predictiveness used in 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8.  Following Phase I, participants were allocated to 
one of two groups, each learning about a different set of cues. One group, the Positive 
Transfer Group, saw only predictive cues A – D each paired with a novel item, 
consisting of cues a – d. They were explicitly informed that the new patient was 
allergic to four foods, and were provided with the names of those foods. The 
instructed causes corresponded to two previously predictive cues, A and C, as well as 
two novel cues, b and d. The second group, the Negative Transfer Group, saw only 
compounds consisting of the non-predictive cues W – Z each paired with a novel 
stimulus, w – z. Participants in this group were told that the allergens were cues W 
and Z, as well as cues x and y. Thus, for both groups, each compound for Phase II 
contains one instructed cause, and one item known to be safe. 
 Thus, the current design assesses the competition between familiar and novel 
cues when familiar items are predictive or non-predictive in Phase I under two 
instructional conditions. That is, there are known causes that are predictive and novel 
(i.e., in the Positive Transfer Group), and known causes that are non-predictive and 
novel (i.e., in the Negative Transfer Group). There are cues known to be safe that are 
predictive and novel (i.e., in the Positive Transfer Group), and cues known to be safe 
that are non-predictive and novel (i.e., in the Negative Transfer Group). It was 
suggested above that the introduction of instructions might diminish the ability of 
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salient novel cues to override a bias associated with predictive history for familiar 
cues, allowing a more sensitive measure of residual predictiveness effects. If this were 
confirmed, then one would anticipate that for known causes, associative memory 
would be better for predictive compared to non-predictive items. In line with the 
results observed in Chapter 3, this is predicted to reverse for cues known to be non-
causal whereby better recall is shown for non-predictive cues compared to predictive 
cues. 
 
Table 4.2. 
Design of Experiment 10 
  
Phase I Phase II Test 
All Groups Positive Transfer Group  
AW – O1 Aa – O3 
A – D and a – d 
individually 
AX – O1 Bb – O4 
BW – O2 Cc – O5 
BX – O2 Dd – O6 
CY – O2 Negative Transfer Group  
CZ – O2 Ww – O3 
W – Z and w – z 
individually 
DY – O1 Xx – O4 
DZ – O2 Yy – O5 
 Zz – O6 
 
Note. Letters refer to individual food cues. Bold underlined letters indicate cues 
instructed as causal for Phase II for the two separate groups. O1 – O6 indicate the six 
different outcomes.  
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 The predictions for the recall of novel cues across the two instructional 
conditions are less clear, as this may rely on the mechanisms that produce the 
interaction between instruction and predictiveness seen in Chapter 3. One factor 
relates to the congruence between instructions and Phase I predictiveness. Predictive 
cues instructed as causal, as well as non-predictive cues instructed as safe retain 
congruent roles across Phase I and Phase II. Alternatively, non-predictive cues 
instructed as causal, as well as predictive cues instructed as non-causes have 
incongruent roles across phases. Thus, interference on trials with incongruent stimuli 
may retard learning for these compounds more generally. Another possibility is that 
predictiveness enhances cognitive control. According to this explanation, predictive 
cues are easier to learn about when relevant, and easier to supress when irrelevant.  
 These mechanisms give rise to two different scenarios for how learning will 
proceed for novel stimuli. For clarity, a schematic representation of these is presented 
in Figure 4.4. As is shown in Panel A of the figure, if the interaction reflects the 
influence of cognitive control, then recall should be better for novel causes appearing 
with predictive cues known to be safe, as these non-causes are easier to supress as 
safe cues. This is relative to novel causes appearing with non-predictive safe cues. 
These safe cues would receive less of this “facilitated suppression”, such that learning 
for the novel cues with which they are paired is worse. By the same reasoning, for 
novel cues known to be safe, recall should be worse for items that are paired with 
predictive causes, as learning is more easily directed towards these instructed 
components. Recall for novel safe cues appearing with non-predictive causes would 
be worse, as learning is less easily facilitated by non-predictive causes.  
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Figure 4.4.     Predictions relating to the pattern of results expected for novel 
causes and novel non-causes appearing in compound with predictive and non-
predictive components. Panel A outlines the predictions relating to the 
mechanism of cognitive control, and Panel B shows the expected results if 
congruence is affecting performance. 
 
 The congruence scenario is shown in Panel B of the figure. If the reversal seen 
in Chapter 3 is the result of interference stemming from differences in congruence, 
then novel causes appearing alongside predictive safe cues, as in compound Bb, 
should be worse than novel causes appearing alongside non-predictive safe cues, as in 
compound Xx. For novel cues drawn from the safe category, those appearing in 
compound with predictive causes, as in compound Aa, should show better recall than 
those appearing alongside non-predictive known causes, as in compound Ww. This is 
because learning should be better overall for compounds Aa and Xx, as there is no 
conflict from Phase I present for these trials. On the other hand, learning would be 
generally retarded for compounds such as Bb and Ww, as the roles of familiar cues 
are incongruent across the two stages of learning. Thus, this design allows a test of the 
interaction observed in Chapter 3 as well as investigating the role of novelty in the 
volitional control of attention. 
Known causes Known non-causes
Cognitive control
A
cc
ur
ac
y
A
Known causes Known non-causes
Congruence
B
Predictive compound
Non-predictive compound
 154 
 
4.2.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
 Sixty first-year psychology students (25 female, mean age = 19.5) enrolled at 
the University of Sydney participated in Experiment 10 in exchange for course credit. 
The apparatus and testing conditions were identical to Experiment 9.  
 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli in this experiment comprised 16 photographic images of food. These 
consisted of: coffee, fish, lemon, cheese, eggs, garlic, bread, peanuts, olive oil, 
bananas, apples, milk, pasta, avocado, beef, and mushrooms. Two additional 
outcomes were added to those used in Experiment 9, these were coughing and 
sweating. The presentation parameters of all stimuli were also identical to those used 
in Experiment 9. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly allocated to the Positive Transfer or the Negative 
Transfer conditions. For both groups, initial training was identical to previous 
experiments, consisting of the trial types shown in Table 4.2. Upon completion of the 
first training phase, all participants were told that they would now be required to 
observe the allergies of a new patient. They were issued with explicit instructions 
providing the name of four foods that the new patient was allergic to, and were 
informed that they would be required to learn which of the allergens was causing 
various allergic reactions in the patient. For those in the Positive Transfer group, those 
four foods corresponded to cues A, D, b, and c. Alternatively, those in the Negative 
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Transfer condition were instructed that foods corresponding to cue W, Y, x, and z 
were allergens. Two blocks were completed comprising the trial types shown in Table 
4.2. On each trial, participants were now required to make a prediction as to which of 
four allergic reactions would occur. Remaining parameters were the same as those 
used in Experiment 9.  
 Immediately following training, the test phase commenced in which all cues 
were tested individually on both a memory and causal question. Beneath the food cue 
for that trial, the four outcomes were presented in text form and participants were 
required to indicate which of these had been paired with the cue. Following this 
judgment, a scale appeared asking them to indicate how confident they were in that 
response by means of a rating scale labelled not at all confident on the left anchor and 
very confident on the right anchor. This was followed by the appearance of the causal 
rating scale.  This was an identical rating scale with a title asking whether the food 
was causal of the allergic reaction. The left anchor was labelled, definitely DOES 
NOT cause a reaction, and the right anchor was labelled, definitely DOES cause a 
reaction. This yielded a score out of 100.   
 Finally, a manipulation check required participants to name the food items 
instructed as allergens for the second patient. Participants were excluded if they failed 
to correctly report the identity of all four allergens. Three participants were excluded 
on the basis of this criterion, as well as eight participants who failed to reach the 
Phase I learning criterion. These participants were replaced in order to maintain an 
equal number of participants in each condition. 
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4.2.2. Results 
Phase I.     Prediction accuracy was averaged across compounds for each block, and is 
shown in Panel A of Figure 4.5. This increased steadily for both groups during Phase 
I. Scores were analysed by way of a mixed measures ANOVA with Block (1 – 8) as 
repeated measures and Condition (Positive Transfer vs. Negative Transfer) as the 
between subjects factor. This revealed a significant effect of Block, F(7, 406) = 
105.77, p < .001, η2p = .65, but no main effect of Condition, and no Block × 
Condition interaction, all Fs < 1, showing no evidence of initial group differences.  
 
Phase II.     Accuracy during Phase II was averaged according to the nature of the 
component instructed as causal. This is shown in Panel B of Figure 4.5. There was 
little evidence that learning differed between groups during training. A 2 (Condition: 
Positive Transfer vs. Negative Transfer) × 2 (Block: 1 – 2) × 2 (Instruction: familiar 
cause vs. novel cause) mixed measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Block, 
F(1, 58) = 170.71, p < .001, η2p = .75, but no other significant main effects or 
interactions, largest F(1, 58) = 1.24, p = .27, η2p = .004. 
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Figure 4.5.     Prediction accuracy across training blocks. Panel A 
shows acquisition for the Positive Transfer and Negative Transfer 
groups during Phase I. Panel B shows Phase II learning for both 
groups according to whether the instructed cause was familiar or 
novel. Error bars show SEM. 
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Test phase 
Memory ratings.     For each cue, accuracy for cue – outcome recall was averaged 
according to whether items were novel or familiar, and according to whether they 
were instructed as causal or non-causal. This is shown for the Positive Transfer Group 
(i.e., when familiar cues were predictive) and the Negative Transfer Group (i.e., when 
familiar cues were non-predictive) in Figure 4.6 (Panel A). Accuracy was analysed 
with a mixed measures ANOVA with Group (Positive Transfer vs. Negative Transfer), 
Instruction (causal vs. non-causal), and Familiarity (novel vs. familiar) as factors. 
This revealed that the instruction was indeed effective in influencing learning, as 
shown by a significant main effect of Instruction, F(1, 58) = 73.88, p < .001, η2p = .56, 
as well as a benefit in memory for novel cues F(1, 58) = 22.46, p < .001, η2p = .28. 
There was also a significant Instruction × Familiarity interaction, F(1, 58) = 6.02, p 
= .02, η2p = .09, suggesting the benefit for novelty varied according to whether cues 
were instructed as causal or non-causal. The main effect of Group as well as 
remaining interaction effects did not reach significance, all Fs < 1.  
 Breaking down the interaction provided little evidence that the Instruction × 
Familiarity interaction was meaningful. The Group (Positive Transfer vs. Negative 
Transfer) × Familiarity (novel vs. familiar) mixed measures ANOVA was conducted 
separately according to instruction, that is, for known causes and then for known non-
causes. For known causes, this showed significantly better accuracy for novel cues, 
F(1, 58) = 6.10, p = .016, η2p = .10. This did not vary according to group, Group × 
Familiarity interaction F(1, 58) = 3.11, p = .08, η2p = .05, and there were no 
significant group differences, F < 1. For non-causes, accuracy was also better for 
novel cues, F(1, 58) = 15.90, p < .001, η2p = .22, and there was no main effect of 
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Group, or Group × Familiarity interaction, all Fs <1. Thus, for both causes and non-
causes, the main influence on recall was familiarity.  
 
Causal ratings.   Causal ratings for each cue were averaged according to the 
familiarity of the cues (novel vs. familiar) as well as the instructed status of the cue 
(cause vs. non-cause). These are shown for the Positive Transfer Group and the 
Negative Transfer Group in Panel B of Figure 4.6. Ratings were subjected to a 2 
(Group: Positive Transfer vs. Negative Transfer) × 2 (Instruction: causal vs. non-
causal) × 2 (Familiarity: novel vs. familiar) mixed measures ANOVA. This revealed 
that cues instructed as causal were indeed rated as significantly more likely to cause 
an outcome, F(1, 58) = 155.16, p < .001, η2p = .73. Novel cues also received higher 
casual attribution compared to familiar cues overall, F(1, 58) = 7.25, p = .009, η2p 
= .11. No other main effects or their corresponding interactions were significant, all 
Fs < 1.  
 A fairly important caveat in interpreting these data should be mentioned. In 
both the memory ratings and causal attribution data there was at least one condition in 
which the groups had unequal variance, Levene’s test p < .05. This suggests that in 
fact non-parametric tests are more appropriate for the present data. However, such 
tests are not well suited to test the nature of the interaction across conditions that are 
of interest in this design. Thus, despite some evidence that familiarity is the main 
driver of differences in this experiment, this conclusion requires additional testing.  
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Figure 4.6.     Accuracy of cue – outcome recall (A) and causal ratings (B) 
averaged according to familiarity and instructional condition, for the Positive 
Transfer Group and the Negative Transfer Group for Experiment 10. Familiar 
cues in the Positive Transfer Group are predictive cues from Phase I, and 
familiar cues in the Negative Transfer Group are non-predictive cues from 
Phase I. Error bars show SEM. The dotted line in Panel A shows chance 
performance in the recall test.  
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4.2.3. Discussion 
 It appears that novelty overrides any bias towards learning about cues with a 
history of prior predictiveness, even when the intentional nature of learning is more 
explicitly controlled. Learning was preferentially directed towards novel items, 
regardless of whether familiar cues were predictive or non-predictive. This was the 
case for cues known to be causal as well as cues known to be non-causal.  
Interestingly, this pattern of results also emerged in the causal rating data, 
suggesting that even though participants explicitly knew that a cue was causal, they 
viewed novel stimuli as more likely to cause an allergy. Thus, causal attribution and 
associative memory are not well differentiated in this experiment. One could argue 
that it is unsurprising that cue – outcome associations proceed more rapidly for novel 
cues, given that they have no prior associations with a different prior outcome. 
However, if memory and causal assessments are conflated this raises the possibility 
that a common source of evidence is influencing both judgments.  
 There is reason to suggest that the data in this experiment might be 
problematic. First, performance is at ceiling for known causes. While the use of four 
outcomes should increase working memory load as well as provide a more sensitive 
measure of accuracy, the instructional manipulation may simply be too strong to 
allow hypothesised differences to emerge. Second, in both the memory data as well as 
the causal rating data, there appear to be differences in variance across groups for 
some conditions. Thus, any interpretation of the current data is limited given the 
violation of critical statistical assumptions. As such, Experiment 11 aims to replicate 
the conditions in Experiment 10 making use of an extended within-subjects procedure 
designed to increase task difficulty.  
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4.3. Experiment 11 
 Experiment 11 employed an extended within subjects design, shown in Table 
4.3, creating the same conditions as Experiment 10. The initial training employed 
additional cues in order to double the number of Phase I compounds but was 
otherwise the same as previous experiments. Again, at the start of Phase II, 
participants were issued with instructions about the causal nature of the food cues for 
the second patient. Unlike in the previous experiment where individual cues were 
instructed as causal, here the instruction was issued at the level of food category. That 
is, participants were told that the new patient was allergic to (and only allergic to) a 
particular category of food consisting of either meat and animal products or fruit and 
vegetables. As such, half of the cues used in this experiment were taken from the meat 
and animal products category, and the remaining cues drawn exclusively from the 
fruit and vegetables category, and each compound consisted of one item from either 
category. The food cues corresponding to A – D, W – Z, e – h, and s – v all belonged 
to the same category, and this category was instructed as allergenic. The food cues 
corresponding to E – H, S – V, a – d, and w – z were drawn from the other category 
and were known to be non-causal.  
This means that the cues known to be causal consisted of previously predictive 
cues, i.e., A – D, previously non-predictive cues, i.e., W – Z, novel cues appearing 
alongside previously predictive cues, i.e., e – h, and novel cues appearing alongside 
previously non-predictive cues, i.e., s – v. Similarly, cues known to be safe for the 
patient consisted of previously predictive cues, i.e., E – H, non-predictive cues from 
Phase I, i.e., S – V, novel cues appearing alongside predictive causes, i.e., a – d, and 
novel cues appearing alongside non-predictive causes, i.e., w – z. Given the extended 
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number of associations in Phase II this manipulation should serve to increase task 
difficulty and bring performance below ceiling, allowing a test of the predictions 
outlined in Experiment 10.  
 
4.3.1. Method 
Participants and apparatus 
 The sample for this experiment comprised thirty undergraduate students (20 
female, mean age = 19.6) enrolled at the University of Sydney who participated in 
exchange for course credit. The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 10.  
 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli consisted of 32 photographic images of food items, half of which were 
drawn from the food category “animal products such as meat, poultry, and dairy”, and 
the other half from “fruit and vegetables”. The sixteen meat and animal products 
category consisted of: butter, chicken, bacon, prawns, lamb, egg, duck, octopus, 
kangaroo, beef, fish, milk, yoghurt, cheese, lobster, and pork. Items from the fruit and 
vegetable category included: pineapple, pumpkin, cherries, peach, broccoli, tomato, 
corn, carrots, mango, strawberries, apple, banana, lemon, mushrooms, peas, and 
avocado. Items were randomly allocated to serve as cues within each category. The 
four outcomes consisted of fever, nausea, headache, and rash. The presentation 
parameters of the stimuli remained the same as Experiment 10.  
 
Procedure 
 Aside from the increased number of trial types, the initial training phase was 
identical to that of Experiment 10. Following Phase I, participants were informed that 
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they would be observing the allergies of a new patient. They were told that the new 
patient was only allergic to a specific category of food, either to fruit and vegetables, 
or to meat and animal products. The allergenic category was counterbalanced across 
participants. The 16 trial types shown in Table 4.3 were presented twice per block, for 
the duration of two blocks in total. Note that compounds in Phase II always contained 
one allergenic and one safe item. 
 The test phase commenced immediately following the completion of Phase II. 
Each cue was presented individually on separate test trials in random order. On each 
trial, a rating scale assessing memory for specific cue – outcome pairings appeared 
beneath the food cue. This was rated on a linear analogue scale labelled, definitely 
goes with [Outcome 3] on the left, and definitely goes with [Outcome 4], on the right. 
The mid point of the scale was made explicit with the label no idea. This was 
different to the scale used in Experiment 10 as the number of outcomes in Phase II in 
this design differs. Once this rating had been completed, another scale appeared 
asking whether the current food cue caused the reaction. Similarly, this was a rating 
scale with definitely DOES cause the reaction on the left, and definitely DOES NOT 
cause the reaction on the right. Both rating scales yielded a score out of 100. A 
manipulation check was included whereby participants were presented with a 
question asking them to provide the category of food that their second patient was 
allergic to. There were no exclusions on the basis of this check, all participants having 
correctly provided the allergenic category.   
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Table 4.3.  
Design of Experiment 11.  
 
Phase I Phase II Test 
AS – O1 Aa – O3 
All cues individually 
AT – O1 Bb – O4 
BS – O2 Cc – O3 
BT – O2 Dd – O4 
CU – O2 Ee – O3 
CV – O2 Ff – O4 
DU – O1 Gg – O3 
DV – O1 Hh – O4 
EW – O1 Ss – O3 
EX – O1 Tt – O4 
FW – O2 Uu – O3 
FX – O2 Vv – O4 
GY – O2 Ww – O3 
GZ – O2 Xx – O4 
HY – O1 Yy – O3 
HZ – O1 Zz – O4 
 
Note. Letters represent individual food cues during training. Bold underlined letters 
show cues instructed as causal for Phase II. All cues instructed as causal come from 
one food category, and the remaining food cues are drawn from an alternative 
category. O1 – O4 indicate the four different outcomes.  
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4.3.2. Results  
Phase I.     Prediction accuracy was averaged across the eight compound 
discriminations for Phase I and is shown across training blocks in Panel A of Figure 
4.7. As is shown in the figure, accuracy increased steadily across training. This was 
confirmed in a repeated measures ANOVA with Block (1 – 8) as a factor, which 
showed a significant effect of block on accuracy, F(7, 203) = 55.14, p < .001, η2p 
= .66. 
 
Phase II.     In order to assess acquisition during Phase II, accuracy was averaged 
according to the nature of the component instructed as causal. Panel B of Figure 4.7 
shows this for compounds with a predictive causal component (Aa – Dd), a non-
predictive causal component (Ww - Zz), a novel cause appearing alongside a 
predictive non-cause (Ee – Hh), and a novel cause appearing alongside a non-
predictive non-cause (Ss – Vv). Accuracy was analysed with a 2 (Block: 1 – 2) × 2 
(Familiarity: novel vs. familiar) × 2 (Compound: predictive compounds vs. non-
predictive compounds) repeated measures ANOVA. This revealed a significant effect 
of Block, F(1, 29) = 20.41, p < .001, η2p = .41. Overall, acquisition was slightly better 
for compounds containing of non-predictive components, but this was not significant, 
F(1, 29) = 3.14, p = .08, η2p = .10. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, largest F(1, 29) = 2.78, p = .11, η2p = .09.  
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Figure 4.7.     Panel A shows prediction accuracy averaged across all  
training compounds for Phase I during Experiment 11. Phase II accuracy is 
shown in Panel B, for compounds with novel and familiar cues instructed as 
causal. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Test 
Memory ratings.  A memory score was calculated for each cue to reflect a 
score out of 100, where 100 represents the most confident choice of the correct 
outcome, and 0 the most confident choice of the incorrect outcome. A score of 50 
therefore represents chance. Scores were averaged according to whether cues were 
familiar or novel, as well as whether novel items appeared in compound with 
previously predictive components (predictive compounds), or previously non-
predictive components (non-predictive compounds) in Phase II. These are shown for 
the known causes and non-causes in Panel A of Figure 4.8.  
Scores were analysed by repeated measures ANOVA with Instruction (causal 
vs. non-causal), Familiarity (novel vs. familiar), and Compound (predictive vs. non-
predictive) as factors. This revealed an overall benefit in memory for cues instructed 
as causal, F(1, 29) = 17.04, p < .001, η2p = .37, as well as cues that were novel, F(1, 
29) = 13.91, p = .001, η2p = .32. However, this varied according to whether 
compounds contained previously predictive or non-predictive items, as suggested by 
the significant Instruction × Familiarity × Compound interaction, F(1, 29) = 7.1, p 
= .012, η2p = .2. The Familiarity × Compound interaction approached significance, 
F(1, 29) = 3.93, p = .057, η2p = .12, but the remaining main effects as well as their 
interactions were not significant, largest F(1, 29) = 2.65, p = .12, η2p = .08. 
In order to investigate the three-way interaction, the Familiarity × Compound 
interaction was assessed for causal and non-causal instructional conditions separately. 
For cues instructed as causal, there was superior memory for novel items, F(1, 29) = 
10.99, p = .002, η2p = .28, but no main effect of Compound, and no Familiarity × 
Compound interaction, all Fs < 1. For cues known to be non-causal, memory for cue 
outcome pairings was also better for novel cues, F(1, 29) = 5.06, p = .03, η2p = .15. 
However this varied according to which compound cues were presented in, resulting 
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Figure 4.8.     Memory ratings (A) and causal ratings (B) averaged according 
to familiarity for known causes and known non-causes for Experiment 11. 
Error bars show within-subjects standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005). 
The dotted line in Panel A shows chance performance in the recall test.  
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in a significant Familiarity × Compound interaction, F(1, 29) = 9.61, p = .004, η2p 
= .25. Simple effects analysis revealed that for familiar cues, memory was 
significantly better for predictive cues compared to non-predictive cues, F(1, 29) = 
4.33, p = .04, η2p = .13. For novel cues, this pattern reversed with better memory for 
novel items appearing alongside non-predictive causes compared to novel items 
appearing alongside predictive causes, F(1, 29) = 5.69, p = .02, η2p = .16. 
Causal ratings.  As shown in Figure 4.8 (Panel B), causal ratings were 
averaged in the same way as memory scores. A 2 (Instruction: causal vs. non-causal) 
Familiarity: novel vs. familiar) × 2 (Compound: predictive vs. non-predictive) 
repeated  measures ANOVA showed a significant effect of Instruction, F(1, 29) = 
55.59, p < .001, η2p = .66. No further main effects or interactions reached statistical 
significance, largest F(1, 29) = 1.51, p = .23, η2p = .05. 
 
4.3.3. Discussion  
 The extended design was clearly effective in bringing recall performance 
below ceiling for cues instructed as causal. There was a clear influence of controlled 
attention on associative memory such that learning was superior for cues instructed as 
causal. Once again, novelty eradicated the learned predictiveness bias, at least for 
items explicitly known to be causal. However, differences did emerge for cues known 
to be non-causal, whereby a residual learned predictiveness effect was present for 
familiar cues. In contrast, better associative memory was seen for novel cues that 
appeared alongside non-predictive causes compared to novel cues that appeared in 
compound with predictive causes.  
 This pattern of results runs counter to what was reported in Chapter 3, where 
cues instructed as causal were resistant to complete voluntary control. The differences 
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for non-causes was the opposite of that seen in Experiment 7 and Experiment 8. 
Given that causal inference once again diverged from cue – outcome recall, this 
suggests that participants were indeed making their causal judgments on the basis of 
instruction alone in a way that did not appear to be influenced by associative memory. 
Thus, it appears that the introduction of novelty alters the way in which selection is 
biased by predictive history in a way that is different for known causes compared to 
known non-causes. This result is considered in more detail below.   
 
4.4. General Discussion 
 In this chapter, three experiments examined the expression of learned 
predictiveness when predictive and non-predictive cues appeared in compound with 
novel items at the start of Phase II. In the absence of explicit knowledge about the 
causal nature of the cues, this eliminated the learned predictiveness bias (Experiment 
9). Subsequent experiments controlled the allocation of voluntary attention by issuing 
instructions about the causal nature of the cues. Although the data in Experiment 10 
proved problematic for statistical purposes, there was some consistency between this 
and Experiment 11. In both experiments, learned predictiveness was absent in the 
recall measure for known causes, suggesting that the introduction of novelty 
eliminates the bias, at least for cues that are the target of intentional learning. 
However, it also seems that voluntary attention alleviates the strong bias towards 
novelty, that is, overall participants are able to turn their attention away from novel 
cues known to be safe. In both Experiment 10 and Experiment 11, instruction 
influenced associative memory such that learning was better for familiar causes 
compared to the novel ‘safe’ cues with which they were paired.  
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 In Experiment 11 there was some evidence that the predictive history of cues 
influences associative memory when learning is unintentional, that is, for cues known 
to be non-causal. This varied for familiar and novel cues such that learned 
predictiveness emerged when non-causes were familiar; better associative memory for 
predictive compared to non-predictive cues was observed. On the other hand, there 
was better learning for novel cues paired with non-predictive known causes compared 
to novel cues appearing in compound with predictive causes. This pattern of results is 
consistent with traditional assumptions about the relationship between attention and 
predictive history. While attentional models of associative learning (e.g., Kruschke, 
2001; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010) do not generally allow for 
differential predictions relating to intentional versus unintentional learning conditions, 
the effect for familiar non-causes is consistent with the proposed benefit in selection 
for stimuli with prior predictive utility. Given an attentional advantage for predictive 
cues from the first phase of learning, selection favours these cues in subsequent 
contexts. This same principle suggests that novel non-causes appearing with 
predictive items lose out in the competitive process, more so than novel safe items 
paired with non-predictive causes.  
 It should be noted that while the reasoning outlined above conforms to the 
general idea that attention varies according to associative competition, additional 
assumptions would need to allow for the fact that such effects can emerge in 
incidental learning conditions when the remaining components in a given compound, 
that is, the known causes, are under complete control of volitional attention and 
therefore not sensitive to the same mechanisms. Of course, the interaction between 
inference and automaticity is a complicated one. This pattern of results was quite 
different to those observed in Chapter 3 when familiar cues appeared in direct 
competition with one another. One could argue that observing the effect of predictive 
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history in distractor, or incidental conditions exclusively provides a strong case for the 
presence of automaticity, given that there is clear motivation to discard these items 
during learning. However, by that same reasoning it is somewhat surprising that 
residual predictiveness effects were preserved for intentional learning conditions in 
Chapter 3. As the results presented here are clearly less consistent across the similar 
manipulations applied in Experiment 10 and Experiment 11, compared to the 
observations put forward in Chapter 3, further attempts at disentangling these 
processes need to clarify the influence of novelty in changing the way in which 
selection is biased by predictiveness.  
A further motivation for using a design in which novelty was pitted against 
predictive and non-predictive cues was to differentiate explanations of cognitive 
control and congruence in producing the interaction between predictive history and 
instruction in Chapter 3. Unfortunately the results from Experiment 10 and 
Experiment 11 are not easily amenable to the predictions set out by either explanation. 
First, both explanations anticipate that the reversal seen previously would replicate. 
Sadly that reversal was absent here. Rather, in both experiments there was no 
indication that predictive history influenced recall for instructed causes when 
comparing predictive and non-predictive stimuli indirectly through their pairing with 
novel cues.  
Similarly, the two predictions rely on observing a difference for novel causes 
as well as novel non-causes according to whether they appeared in compound with 
predictive or non-predictive cues. Overall, there was no difference between novel 
causes regardless of the nature of the remaining components. A difference for novel 
non-causes did emerge in Experiment 11 that was consistent with the mechanism of 
cognitive control. The prediction states that recall should be worse for novel non-
causes appearing with predictive causes compared to novel non-causes appearing with 
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non-predictive causes. This is because it should be easier to attend exclusively to 
predictive causes compared to non-predictive causes. While it is true that this was 
observed, if cognitive control was engaged by predictive history, then you would 
expect the influence of predictiveness to be robust against novelty and a difference to 
emerge for novel causes as a result of that. This was not the case, and it seems 
unlikely that cognitive control would operate exclusively at the level of incidental 
learning conditions.  
It should be mentioned that a third possibility, the presence of within-
compound associations, was raised as a potential source of the interaction found in 
Experiment 7 and Experiment 8. According to this explanation, if predictive history 
facilitates associative memory for cues instructed as causal, then previously non-
predictive non-causes appearing with predictive causes would receive a boost in 
associative strength with the outcome via its within-compound association with the 
known cause. Given that cues from Phase I are paired with novel items at the outset of 
the second stage, this manipulation prevents any within-compound associations 
forming between the cues in which the interaction was observed, given that they no 
longer appear together, as they did in Chapter 3. An indirect argument might be made 
that since the interaction was absent when the involvement of the hypothesised 
within-compound associations was negated that it provides a plausible mechanism for 
producing the interaction.  
However, in order for within-compound associations to provide a viable 
explanation of the interaction in Chapter 3, one would have to assume that in the 
second stage, the direct associations between instructed causes and outcomes are 
strong, and, on test, are not influenced by these second-order associations, whereas 
direct learning about non-causes is relatively weak. Thus, second-order associations 
support most of the variation in performance for non-causal cues on test. The results 
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from Experiment 10 and Experiment 11 speak against this hypothesis in two ways. 
First, if this was the case, one would expect higher recall for familiar non-causes 
compared to novel non-causes as these would be supported by stronger second-order 
associations: They are paired with novel causes. This was not seen. Second, in 
Experiment 11 one would expect novel non-causes paired with predictive causes to 
show better recall than novel non-causes paired with non-predictive causes. This is 
the opposite of what was observed. Thus the presence of within-compound 
associations does not provide a consistent explanation of the results across Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. Whether recourse to such explanations is necessary or sufficient 
remains unclear.  
In summary, the introduction of novelty appears to alter the way in which new 
learning is biased by predictive history. This is the case under more traditional 
learning procedures as well as when voluntary attention is manipulated by way of 
instruction. Overall, novelty appears to override a bias towards learning about 
previously predictive cues. Voluntary attention seems to overcome the influence of 
novelty, directing learning towards familiar over novel items if they are known to be 
causal. Nevertheless, novel known causes elicited better recall than familiar known 
causes, and novel safe cues showed better recall than familiar safe cues, suggesting 
that the advantages for novel cues in stage two are not purely inferential in nature. 
While there is some evidence that predictiveness effects are present in incidental 
learning conditions, a finding consistent with the presence of automatic processes, the 
influence of novelty remains to be fully characterised.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
 This thesis posed the problem that biases in learning that arise due to the 
predictive history of information can be characterised by a number of the processing 
changes associated with selective attention. The aim of this work was to investigate 
what these changes may be, and as such examined the expression of learned 
predictiveness under manipulations of automatic and controlled attention. By using 
cognitive measures of stimulus processing in combination with learning, the studies 
reported here complement an increasing body of evidence relating to the nature of the 
processing changes that emerge with learning, as well as highlighting how they 
function. In this chapter, findings are first summarised according to the two 
manipulations of interest, that is, measuring the processing of predictiveness during 
the AB as an index of automatic mechanisms, and issuing instructions about the 
causal nature of cues as a manipulation of controlled, inferential processes. This is 
followed by a discussion of how they relate to theories of learning and attention.  
 
The attentional blink as an index of automaticity 
 Previous work (e.g., O’Brien & Raymond, 2012; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009) 
has introduced the use of stimuli with prior value associations in visual detection tasks 
such as the attentional blink. This was extended here to examine the effect of 
predictive history on target detection under conditions in which the availability of 
controlled attention is severely limited. This method provided evidence for the 
presence of an automatic change in selection due to learning. Predictive history 
influenced visual detection exclusively at the level of distractor processing, an effect 
that appears to stem from decreased interference from non-predictive distractors 
(Experiment 4 and Experiment 5). That is, when learned predictiveness was combined 
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with the AB, the only influence of predictiveness on detection was at the level of 
distractor predictiveness. There was no effect of target predictiveness on target 
detection. Here, a key feature of the attentional blink is that distractors interfere with 
target detection, suggesting that performance is unlikely to reflect any strategy in the 
way in which these items are attended. This means that distractor effects, such as the 
one observed here, appear to emerge outside of volitional control. In combination 
with previous findings showing an effect of prior learning on the ability of distractors 
to cause interference (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 2011b; Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2009; Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013), this finding suggests that 
learning can influence the properties of the bottom-up processing of a stimulus to the 
extent that its ability to compete for attention is affected. This is an idea further 
clarified in later stages of this chapter. 
 It is well established that novelty is a potent source of processing bias (e.g., 
Horstmann & Ansorge, 2006; Johnston & Schwarting, 1997; Lubow, Kaplan, 
Abramovich, Rudnick, & Laor, 2000; Lubow, Kaplan, & De la Casa, 2001; Neo & 
Chua, 2006). This was also observed here. Novel targets were easier to detect than 
familiar targets, regardless of the predictive history of those familiar items 
(Experiment 4 and Experiment 5). It is unlikely that the strong bias towards novel 
targets was overriding any direct influence of predictiveness on target detection, given 
that target effects were absent when only familiar items were present (Experiment 3 
and Experiment 5). However, there was a more subtle indication that the overall 
novelty of the RSVP stream influenced the sensitivity of performance to 
predictiveness. Changes at the level of distractor processing associated with 
predictiveness were most easily detected, or potentially isolated to, conditions in 
which familiar items were competing with novel cues in the same stream, as observed 
across and within Experiment 4 and Experiment 5. This means that the indirect effect 
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of predictiveness on visual detection preferentially emerges when attention is engaged 
by novelty.  
 
Instructions as an index of controlled attention 
 According to the explanation of learned predictiveness put forward by 
Mitchell et al. (2012), the inferential attentional bias responsible for the effect 
emerges as a result of beliefs developed across both phases of learning. The 
attentional blink procedure tested predictiveness effects immediately following the 
first phase of learning, providing evidence for a change in automatic selection that can 
be detected without the occurrence of the second stage of the learning scenario in 
which the critical inference is proposed to develop. Subsequent experiments examined 
selection following the initial stage of learning. Instructions about the causal structure 
of the task were employed in order to control the content of the inference, an 
approach first introduced by Mitchell et al. (2012). However, using orthogonal 
manipulations of instruction and predictive history produced conditions in which top-
down and automatic biases were consistent (i.e., when predictive items were 
instructed as causal, and non-predictive items instructed as safe), as well as 
conflicting (i.e., when predictive items were instructed as safe, and non-predictive 
items instructed as causal). By including distinct measures of reasoning and 
associative memory processes, the procedure here potentially provides a more 
sensitive way of assessing the relative contribution of automatic and controlled 
selection. 
This method provided two additional sources of evidence to suggest the 
presence of automatic selection. First, in Chapter 3, despite a robust influence of 
controlled attention on learning, there was still an effect of predictive history that was 
resistant to complete volitional control (Experiment 7 – Experiment 8). In particular, 
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associative memory was better for instructed targets that were predictive in prior 
learning. Thus, a selection bias towards predictive items was still evident in the 
presence of a strong top-down signal, that is, explicit knowledge. One could argue 
that while participants may have understood and remembered the instructions, this 
would not necessarily confirm that they were in fact using these instructions to direct 
their learning during the second stage. If they found adhering to the instructions too 
effortful, it is possible that they simply relied on what they had learnt earlier in a 
controlled manner. However, one aspect of the data presented here argues against this 
possibility. In Experiment 7 – Experiment 8 the effect of predictiveness reversed 
across known causes and known non-causes. If participants were relying on what they 
had learnt previously in an explicit controlled manner, you would see the same pattern 
of results across known causes and non-causes.  
Second, predictive history still influenced associative memory when there was 
no reason to learn about or attend to cues. That is, there were residual effects of 
predictiveness for items known to be non-causal of an aversive outcome. The pattern 
of these ‘instructed distractor’ effects presented a complex picture across Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. When instructed causes failed to come under complete control 
(Chapter 3), associative memory for distractor items was biased towards non-
predictive stimuli compared to predictive cues (Experiment 7 – Experiment 8). In 
Chapter 4, when instructed targets came under top-down control, more was learnt 
about predictive safe items over non-predictive safe stimuli. Novel distractor items 
also varied according to the predictive history of the causes with which they were 
paired. More was learnt about novel safe cues appearing with non-predictive causes 
compared to novel safe cues appearing in compound with predictive causes 
(Experiment 11).  
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 An important factor differentiating the designs across these two sets of 
experiments is the presence of novelty. In the absence of instruction, learning was 
directed towards novelty in a way that eliminated any indication of an attentional bias 
towards stimuli with prior predictiveness (Experiment 9). This was also the case for 
items instructed as causal when top-down attention was controlled. For instructed 
targets, learning was better for novel over familiar target items, and familiar targets 
showed no evidence of attentional priority that varied with predictive history 
(Experiment 10 – Experiment 11). Thus, in a similar finding to that observed when 
top-down attention was restricted during the attentional blink, target selection favours 
novelty irrespective of the predictive history of familiar targets. 
 
Summary 
 To summarise, an effect of predictiveness on target selection only emerged in 
Chapter 3 when top-down biases were engaged and familiar items were in direct 
competition with one another. In contrast, remaining studies showed a strong 
preference towards novel targets regardless of the predictive history of familiar target 
stimuli. Predictiveness effects emerged consistently in distractor conditions, both 
when top-down attention was limited during the AB (Chapter 2), and when it was 
controlled during instructional manipulations (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). However, 
the direction of interference associated with predictiveness was not always in the 
same direction, and to some degree relied on the presence of novelty. 
  
Theoretical questions 
 Based on the results reported here it seems logical to conclude that learned 
predictiveness reflects the operation of both automatic and controlled selection. How 
does this conclusion align with attentional theories of learning? In the context of the 
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inferential account of learning put forward by Mitchell et al. (2009), it should be 
noted that the existence of automatic processes is not denied, but instead isolated to 
recall mechanisms. Although the nature of how these interact with attention and 
performance is not well defined, one can pose the question of whether recall might 
account for the evidence of automaticity presented here. For example, if the explicit 
knowledge that non-predictive stimuli are not useful leads to inferior encoding, and if 
one assumes that items in working memory are tied to more long term encoding 
processes, then this might explain why non-predictive distractors compete less during 
the attentional blink. As discussed previously, the reasoning associated with this view 
becomes less clear when inferential processes are manipulated during learning, 
providing direct motivation for preferentially encoding some items over others. The 
fact that differences in associative memory were still observed at test under these 
conditions suggests that aspects of the data are less easily amenable to this role for 
automaticity. Given the tight coupling between learning, memory, and attention (e.g., 
Ballesteros, Reales, Garcia, Carrasco, 2006; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Gazzaley & 
Nobre, 2012; Markant, Worden, & Amso, 2015), providing a theoretically clarified 
role for automaticity presents a challenge for this class of explanation.  
Similarly, specific predictions about the interaction between higher-order and 
automatic attentional mechanisms are generally absent from the class of attentional 
models of associative learning that connect attention with an automatic gain in 
associative strength (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975). One might start by asking how such 
models might capture the evidence for automaticity observed in the absence of 
volitional control during the attentional blink, when changes in processing were 
observed immediately following stage 1. It appears that the exact nature of the change 
observed here is not fully anticipated by models such as the one put forward by 
Mackintosh (1975), which although generally predicting an increase in attention to 
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predictive items, remains largely silent as to the nature of the variation in processing 
that is expected on the basis of this change beyond an increased rate of learning. If 
one assumes that the starting value of α is low, then the Mackintosh model predicts 
that the attention paid to novel cues increases for progressively familiarised, 
predictive cues. Instead, the results here suggest that the processing of predictive 
items, at least at the level of distractors, was no different to novel salient items and it 
was instead the non-predictive components that were processed differently. In line 
with this, if one instead assumes that the starting value of α is high, then the model in 
fact predicts that the attention paid to novel cues is high and decreases for non-
predictive cues. Importantly however, this was only the case for distractor conditions, 
raising the issue that the application of such models to the specific components of 
attentional tasks in which target and distractor conditions are more clearly delineated 
by task requirements can be challenging. In the attentional blink for example, 
although volitional control is limited via high temporal processing demands, top-
down biases are still present for target items on the basis of task instructions. In the 
absence of an explicit assumption about how this top-down signal might override the 
automatic preference for predictive items at the target level, such a model would 
struggle to describe this pattern of results. 
 When more traditional measures of learning were employed, the automatic 
allocation of attention did not always conform to model predictions. In Chapter 3, the 
automatic resistance of predictive history to volitional control was consistent with 
model predictions only for items that formed the focus of deliberate attention. In that 
situation, the effects of automaticity and top-down bias were additive. However, 
across conditions the effect of automaticity and top-down signals was clearly 
interactive. Adding to the complexity of the problem, in Chapter 4 when novelty was 
introduced and the bias towards previously predictive target items was eliminated, 
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there was some indication of learned predictiveness for non-causal distractor items, 
that is, better associative memory for previously predictive compared to non-
predictive items.   
 It should be noted that there are alternative theories about the direction of the 
relationship between automatic selection and learning. For example, the Pearce-Hall 
model (Pearce & Hall, 1980) takes as its foundation the idea that attention is most 
adaptively directed towards information for which the usefulness is unknown. This 
means that the attention devoted to novel stimuli is high in order to support rapid 
learning, and this attentional priority gradually decreases as cues become better 
predictors of specific events and responding to them becomes automatic. At a general 
level this model makes few sensible predictions regarding learned predictiveness, 
given that it assumes that the attention to all information present will change equally, 
so does not allow for differences between predictive and non-predictive items to 
emerge in the first phase. However, the spirit of the model does capture superior 
selection for novel stimuli, a result observed throughout this thesis. Further, there are 
findings in human learning that are consistent with a mechanism favouring the 
processing of information for which the outcome is unknown (e.g., Griffiths, Johnson, 
& Mitchell, 2011; Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008; Trick, Hogarth, 
& Duka, 2011). This suggests that the role of learning in producing automatic changes 
in selection may be multiply determined. 
 There are certainly models that allow for selection to be preferentially directed 
towards useful predictors as well as towards stimuli for which the outcome is 
unknown (Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). Given the evidence 
discussed above, it seems reasonable to argue that both biases operate in concert in 
order to determine ultimate selection during learning. One could argue that traditional 
demonstrations of learned predictiveness are biased towards observing changes in 
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selection consistent with what would be expected on the basis of the Mackintosh 
(1975) model. In the first phase of learning the structure of the task necessitates that 
selection come under the control of predictive items. In the second phase, two 
familiarised items are presented in isolation on every trial, providing little choice or 
motivation to change a pattern of response. Different learning tasks that provide the 
opportunity to engage a wider variety of selection mechanisms may be sensitive to 
detecting differences in the direction of attentional change. 
The nature of this issue mirrors a fundamental problem for cognition, that is, 
that we appear to be simultaneously biased towards processing novelty and familiarity. 
For example, Triesman (1992) highlighted this distinction in the observation that: 
 
by creating accumulated traces of past perceptual objects or 
events, the world molds our minds to recreate earlier 
experiences. At the same time, we retain an impressive 
capacity also to represent any new object that fails to find its 
match in our prior assembly of stored tokens. (p. 874) 
 
One could argue that this paradox reflects some of the fundamental mechanisms 
inherent in a system of limited capacity optimising the processing of information. 
Desimone and Duncan (1995) suggest that familiarity can be thought of in terms of an 
object feature that influences attentional competition. While novel objects have an 
initial competitive advantage in acquiring attentional control, increased experience 
with a stimulus increases the amount of information incorporated into stable 
knowledge that serves the function of streamlining behavioural responses to that item. 
This reduces the strength of that signal, freeing up resources for the processing of 
subsequent novelty. 
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The description above highlights bottom-up, or automatic, biases in attentional 
control. According to the biased competition framework (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), 
bottom-up biases are not restricted to physical salience, such as high contrast or 
sudden onset, but are also derived from information available in long-term memory 
that may influence the initial processing of a stimulus. Importantly, this latter form of 
bottom-up bias is tied to the learned importance of an event. Desimone and Duncan 
relate this to examples of learned relevance breaking through perceptual noise, such 
as the classic cocktail party effect.  
The theory does fall short of fully integrating an idea of how differences in 
learning correspond to variations in the mechanisms of bottom-up competition. As a 
result, some predictions regarding how these might interact with top-down bias are 
unclear. However, some general questions can be raised on the basis of the principles 
outlined above. In the interest of clarity, I first examine the situation in which only 
familiar items that vary in past predictiveness are present. If predictive items have 
undergone superior processing this means that they would have a bottom-up 
competitive advantage, given the automatic retrieval of information conferring a 
processing preference for these stimuli. At a general level this is consistent with what 
is observed in learned predictiveness under normal conditions. If a strong top-down 
bias is induced by way of an inferential manipulation, it stands to reason that this 
bottom-up preference would work in an additive manner with the top-down 
processing. This is consistent with our target effects observed in Chapter 3, though 
would require the added assumption that the strength of the top-down influence is not 
sufficient to completely override bottom-up processing.  
It is less clear whether the results observed for instructed distractors are as 
easily amenable to the model. Consider classic findings showing that when a well-
practiced, or ‘automatised’ target is subsequently a distractor, it interferes with 
 186 
performance (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). This suggests that under some conditions 
top-down selection bias can come into conflict with automatic bottom-up biases, 
causing a detriment to performance. Thus a potential prediction is that due to conflict 
between top-down and bottom-up signals for predictive distractors, they lose out in 
terms of selection bias relative to items for which bottom-up and top-down signals are 
congruent, that is, for non-predictive distractors.  
How does novelty fit within these predictions? The finding that novelty 
changed the way in which predictiveness effects emerged implies that this factor 
modulates the competitive interactions between top-down and bottom-up signals. The 
benefit in selection for novel targets is consistent with an additive relationship 
between top-down signals and novelty in a manner that overrides any competition that 
may arise from the bottom-up retrieval of information associated with that stimulus. 
This suggests that the change in bottom-up processing with learning measured in this 
thesis is relatively weak. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the training 
employed here is far shorter than other demonstrations of automatised stimulus 
processing with experience (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Le Pelley et al., 
2015; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
 
Caveats 
 The discussion above draws comparisons from the results observed across two 
distinct manipulations of attention in which learning is not equated. While this 
allowed a test of automaticity at two critical points in learning, it does prompt some 
qualifications in relation to the general theoretical issues raised thus far. It may be that 
the kind of automatic process that is sensitive to measurement in the attentional blink 
is quite distinct from that observed in measures of associative memory employed in 
subsequent chapters. Indeed, I have highlighted above the argument that automatic 
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effects differ according to the nature of the information stored about specific stimuli. 
This raises the possibility that the automatic effects measured here should be 
considered as distinct from one another, such that the way in which they compete with 
top-down signals would be expected to show different properties. It would be 
informative to examine the attentional blink manipulation following the completion of 
the learned predictiveness procedure in order to examine whether the effects change. 
Similarly, a procedure in which automatic and volitional control can be engaged 
independently while equating learning would be informative as to the degree of 
specificity for which the current results should be interpreted.  
 Related to this issue is the observation that the attentional blink engages 
distinct performance from that generally involved in learned predictiveness tasks. 
Conversely, the kind of responses required in learned predictiveness diverge from 
demonstrations in which learning or frequency effects have been reported in the 
attentional blink (e.g., Crebolder, Jolicoeur, & McIlwaine, 2002; Livesey et al., 2009; 
Mayberry, Livesey, & Dux, 2010). If the congruence between the performance 
engaged by the learning task and an attentional measure influences how that measure 
is sensitive to changes in selection due to learning, it may be that more ‘implicit 
response’ learning paradigms might produce quite different results in a measure such 
as the attentional blink.  
 The discussion above questions the extent to which attentional models of 
associative learning (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; 
Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010) can be applied to findings in which changes in selection 
are indexed by direct measures of attention taken from the cognitive literature. One 
could argue that this comparison is not a directly relevant one, given that such models 
are explicitly formulated in order to explain changes in the rate of learning, a measure 
that is subsequently tied to attentive processing. Indeed, it seems that such models are 
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not equipped to handle results at the level of specificity discussed here. However, the 
fact still remains that such models make claims about the automatic nature of the 
change in attention with learning. Isolating the predictions of these models to this 
measure would appear to limit their applicability to theorising about attentive 
processes. A clearer outline of the relationship between changes in associability, or 
learning rate, and other attentive processes may provide some clarity in how these 
models would be applied to increasing work combining direct measures of attention 
with learning. Work in this arena is still in its infancy, such that key questions remain 
as to the kind of results that should inform extensions of such models.  
 
Conclusions 
 This thesis explored variations in stimulus selection during learned 
predictiveness in order to gain a better understanding of how learning and attention 
co-ordinate behaviour. The results provide clear evidence for the presence of 
automatic processes, suggesting that both top-down and bottom-up signals contribute 
to the observation of learnt biases. However, these interact in complex ways. Under 
some circumstances, they appear to be additive, for example, when automatic signals 
for familiar targets are congruent with top-down biases at the object level and there is 
no competition from novel stimuli. Novelty appears to provide a salient source of 
stimulus selection, modulating the competitive interaction between learnt bottom-up 
signals and deliberate attention. For items that form the focus of top-down attention, 
novelty overrides any competitive advantage for the bottom-up signals associated 
with learning. However, these are present in situations when top-down attention is 
directed elsewhere, that is, for distractors. Clearly the ways in which these sources of 
processing bias interact are complex. Further work clarifying the boundaries of these 
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competitive interactions presents an exciting challenge both empirically and 
theoretically.  
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